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- ART. I.—1. *The Soul, her Sorrows and her Aspirations. An Essay towards the Natural History of the Soul, as the True Basis of Theology.* By FRANCIS WILLIAM NEWMAN. Second Edition. London: Chapman. 1849. 12mo. pp. 264.
2. *Phases of Faith; or Passages from the History of my Creed.* By FRANCIS WILLIAM NEWMAN. London: Chapman. 1850. 12mo. pp. 234.

MR. FRANCIS NEWMAN is a younger brother of the Very Reverend John Henry Newman, D. D., the Superior of the English Oratorians. He was formerly Fellow of Baliol College, Oxford, and, as far as he reveals himself in the works before us, is a man of a grave and earnest turn of mind, good natural parts, and respectable scholarship. He evidently has a kind and warm heart, and full persuasion of his own honesty and sincerity. As a man, he interests us much, and we regret to see him wasting his fine powers and attainments in the unpraiseworthy effort to obliterate faith from the human heart, and reduce mankind in their own estimation to a level with the beasts that perish.

It were easy to say severe things against Mr. Francis Newman, and to prove even from his own writings that his persuasion of his own sincerity and guilelessness is simply a delusion. We cannot respect his complaints of the coldness or harshness with which he says his religious friends have treated him, and we regard him as quite wrong in alleging that he could not honestly have escaped

the infidel conclusions at which he has arrived. No man, brought up and liberally educated in a country where Christianity is preached as extensively as it is in England by the Catholic clergy, can be an unbeliever, except through culpable ignorance, or wilful persistence in error. In fact, no modern infidel's plea of sincerity can be entertained, for no really sincere mind, honestly and loyally seeking the truth, can ever fall under the gross delusion that truth warrants the rejection of Catholicity. Nevertheless, Mr. Newman must stand or fall to his own master. We remember our own past delinquencies, and the great mercy of God in bringing us to the truth, as it were in spite of ourselves, and we can speak of no one personally in severe or censorious terms. We can interpret his unbelief, and even his blasphemies, by our own past experience, and although unable now to sympathize with him, we remember all too vividly the time when we should have done so, and have hailed him as one of the lights of the age.

But however we may be disposed to treat the man, we can have no toleration for the author. His principles and doctrines are utterly abhorrent to Christian faith and piety, and we have the right to subject them, if we choose, to the most rigid criticism. In setting them forth, he has challenged the Christian world to mortal combat, and he is not permitted to complain if his challenge is taken up, and some stripling from the camp of Israel shall do his best to discomfit the modern son of Anak, who rashly defies the armies of the living God. Between his system and the Gospel there can be only war, and war to the death; for if the Gospel is true, if our Blessed Lord was not an impostor, but what he declared himself, his system is false and destructive; and if his system be true, the Gospel is a cheat, and all who adhere to it are wretched idolaters, enemies of God and man, laboring only to keep the human race bound in the chains of ignorance, vice, and superstition.

For Mr. Francis Newman as a man, and before his Protestant brethren, there may, indeed, be some excuse; for he has only followed out to its last consequences the Evangelicalism in which he appears to have been brought up. He was reared in the bosom of the so-called *Church* of England. The members of that crazy Establishment are divided, among other divisions too numerous to mention, in-

to High-Churchmen and Low-Churchmen. High-Churchmen speak always with a double tongue,—a thing which God abhors. They both assert and deny sacramental grace. They assert it against Low-Churchmen or Evangelicals, who deny it, and they deny it against Catholics, who always assert it. If they are right against Evangelicals, they are wrong in protesting against Catholics, and can never clear themselves of the charge at least of schism, since they are severed from the Holy See, and are out of Catholic unity. If they are right against Catholics, they are, since distinguished from Evangelicals, mere formalists, holding that the observance of a few outward forms and ceremonies, or, at farthest, the practice of mere natural morality, is sufficient for salvation, than which nothing is more unchristian or unreasonable. No earnest-minded man, with tolerable intellectual capacity, can long continue a High-Churchman. He must either press forward to Rome, or fall back on Evangelicalism, as Mr. Francis Newman says he told his illustrious brother, as far back as 1823. Protestantism is essentially in the doctrine of justification by faith alone, as its whole history proves, and for a Protestant, holding as he invariably does to imputed justice, to embrace what the Puseyites call “the sacramental system,” is suicidal, since justification by faith alone, in his sense, is simply the denial of sacramental grace.

Evangelicalism on one side stands opposed to mere formalism, and is so far commendable; but on another side it stands opposed to sacramental grace. Its blunder is in recognizing no distinction between mere formalism and the infusion of sanctifying grace into the heart by the Holy Ghost through the sacraments as its instrumental cause. Denying habitual grace, infused through the sacrament of Baptism, and renewable, if lost, by the sacrament of Penance, the second plank after shipwreck, as the Fathers are accustomed to call it, the Evangelical has no resource but the assertion of justification by faith alone. But this justifying faith, since it is not an infused habit, cannot be intellectual faith, for the devils believe and tremble. Nor can it be an affection of the will; for, since the will is unelevated by habitual grace, such an affection could not rise above the order of natural morality. Justifying faith, then, must be an affection of the sensitive nature, and be essentially a feeling or a sentiment. Hence

Evangelicalism, as every body knows, is mere sentimentalism, and teaches that sanctity consists in a right state of the sensitive affections. Consequently, it teaches that concupiscence is in itself sin, and that its motions are sinful, even when not assented to by the will, but actually resisted.

Starting as an Evangelical from this point, with the doctrine of imputed justice, that is, that Christ justifies forensically, without sanctifying, you fall practically into Antinomianism, and conclude with Luther that the regenerate are in effect relieved from the obligations of the moral law. Or if, to escape this difficulty, you hold, with the more recent Evangelicals, that there is a twofold imputation of the merits of Christ, one which justifies us in the eye of the law, and another which effects in some way internal sanctity, you fall, if of a tender conscience, into despair; for you always find concupiscence, a law in your members, warring against the law of your mind, and bringing you into captivity to the law of sin and death. Brought to this point, what are you to do? Feel right and you will be right. Perhaps so, perhaps not so. But the precise difficulty is that you do not feel right, and your feelings are not under the control of your will. Here was our great difficulty, when, awaking from our rationalistic dream, we felt it necessary to escape from sin, and to strive after real sanctity; and God in his mercy sent us to the Church for a solution. The Church solved it for us by teaching us that concupiscence, when not assented to, is not sin, that our merely sensitive feelings count for nothing, and that all we need strive after is to have the will or the voluntary affections right, in which, through the aid of Divine grace, never withheld, we may be always successful. But this solution is no solution at all to those who reject the Church, deny sacramental grace, and place sanctity in a right state of the sensitive affections. For them there are only three alternatives;—1. The practical Antinomianism just mentioned, that is, that sins committed after justification are not imputed or reckoned as sins; 2. Perfect despair of God's mercy and salvation; or 3. The denial of sin itself, by resolving all that passes under the name of sin into simple imperfection, natural defect, or natural infirmity. The first alternative is the one generally adopted by Evangelicals. They make a superb act of hypocrisy,

and persuade themselves that they are regenerated by the Spirit, and therefore that they are saints. Assuming that whatever saints do must be saintly, they conveniently conclude that they may do whatever they list, without detriment to their sanctity or danger to their salvation. How can this thing be a sin, since he who does it is a saint? A smaller number, yet at times comparatively large, adopt the second alternative, and fall into complete despair, conclude that they are reprobates, predestined to hell, and become religious maniacs, and not unfrequently murderers and suicides; or, assuming that their doom is sealed, and that nothing they can do will affect it one way or the other, give loose reins to their appetites and passions, and plunge into every excess of vice and iniquity. Mr. Francis Newman adopts the third alternative, and denies sin to be properly sin, and considers it the necessary result of natural imperfection, and as naturally tending to develop and perfect the sinner, or the one we should call a sinner; which is only another phase of the first alternative, or Antinomianism.

Again, by placing the faith by which the sinner is assumed to be justified in the sensitive nature, as distinguished from reason, that is, intellect and will, Evangelicalism necessarily declares all dogmatic theology and all belief in dogmas proposed to the intellect, unessential, and really worthless, if not absolutely hurtful. It leaves the believer, therefore, free to reject, without any impeachment of his religious character or danger to his salvation, any intellectual proposition he pleases. If he has the approved feelings or affections, he has all that is required, although he denies every article of the creed, and even the existence of God; and perhaps the farther he carries his denial the better, because the affirming of dogmas requires an intellectual exercise, and leads to a reliance on intellect, which tends to impair the purity and intensity of the feelings, and therefore the true religious life. The nearer one approximates the pure animal, or, it may be, the mere sensitive plant, the better Evangelical he is. Moreover, placing religion in the sensitive affections as its subject, Evangelicalism makes one's feelings the test or criterion of truth, and therefore binds him to reject as false and hurtful whatever is disagreeable to them. Mr. Francis Newman finds the inspiration of the Scriptures, the Church, ecclesiastical authority and discipline, the sacred mysteries

of the Trinity and Incarnation, and especially the doctrine of future retribution and the endless punishment of the wicked, very disagreeable to his feelings, and therefore boldly and decidedly rejects them as blasphemous errors, as lets and hinderances to Christian freedom and genuine piety. All this is deplorable, but it is only the legitimate development of Evangelicalism, and no Protestant has the least right to complain of it.

We have foreshadowed in these preliminary remarks the general character of Mr. Francis Newman's doctrines, or rather negation of doctrines. His system, if system it can be called, is no novelty to us or to our readers, and we have on several occasions discussed its chief principles and main features, especially in our admonitions to Protestants and our articles on Parker, Channing, Morell, Bushnell, and the Mercersburg Reviewer. The author is a Developmentist, and belongs to the great Protestant neological party of our times. In this city, he would be classed with the Transcendentalists, though transcendentalizing in very tolerable Anglo-Saxon. The second title of the first-named of the works on our list reveals at once his principle and method;—*An Essay towards the Natural History of the Soul, as the True Basis of Theology*. His system, be it what it may, is derived, then, from the *natural* history of the soul, and therefore excludes the supernatural order, and can be only naturalism. If derived from the natural history of the *soul*, it must be pure humanism, egotism, or psychological idealism; for from the soul alone, only the soul can be obtained. This in the very outset asserts both the unchristian and the unphilosophical character of his system, and ranks it among the later forms of infidelity.

"By the soul," the author says, "we understand that side of human nature upon which we are in contact with the Infinite, and with God, the Infinite Personality; in the soul, therefore, alone is it possible to know God; and the correctness of our knowledge must depend eminently on the healthy, active, and fully developed condition of our organ." (Preface, p. vii.) The author, therefore, it would seem, distinguishes between the Infinite and God. Can he tell us what the Infinite is as distinguished from God? or what God is as distinguished from the Infinite? Nothing is or exists but God and his creatures; no creature is or can be infinite, and consequently, if God is not the Infinite,

there is no Infinite, and if no Infinite, then no God. What, we may ask, does the author mean by "our organ"? Does he, as his words seem to imply, mean the soul? Does he then regard my soul as distinct from me? What, then, am I whose organ is the soul, and who am distinguishable from it? The human personality, then, is not in the soul, and does not pertain to it, but uses the soul as its organ! What is this personality? Of what is the soul an organ? And what sort of an organ is it? Material, or spiritual? If spiritual, what is a spiritual organ? Moreover, what is the test or criterion of the soul's healthy, active, and fully developed condition? How is the author, or how are we, to know whether the soul is in that condition, or whether it is in an unhealthy state, abnormally developed, and morbidly active? Unless he can determine this, he cannot determine the correctness of his knowledge, and his utterances are worthless for him and for us, for they may turn out to be those of a diseased soul or a madman. Here is a grave difficulty at the very threshold, and one which excites numerous misgivings. But let this pass.

The author says that it is in the soul alone that it is possible to know God. But he distinguishes, as is evident from his book, the soul from the intellect or understanding, and therefore must make it, in itself considered, a mere blind faculty, like the will, and without light except as enlightened by some other faculty. How, then, can the soul be a medium of knowledge, correct or incorrect, of God, or of any thing whatever? The soul distinguished from the intellect cannot know any thing at all, and consequently we can know in it or through it only what is intelligible, or an object of intellect. The soul, in Mr. Francis Newman's sense, is the sensitive nature, or the capacity of feeling,—as he supposes, of *feeling the infinite*; but feeling is always, as feeling, purely subjective, and never of itself introduces us to any object distinguishable from the sensitive subject or feeling itself. The apprehension of an external, material, or sensible object as the exterior occasion or cause of the feeling or sensitive affection, is never the work of the feeling, or of the soul as simple, sensitive subject, but always of the intellect, that is, of the soul as understanding, or intellectual subject. If, then, the author distinguishes the soul from understanding, as he certainly

does, and maintains that it is only in the soul that we do or can know God, he virtually denies that we can know God at all, and excludes from his religion all objective reality, that is, resolves religion into mere egotism or psychological idealism.

That religion has a subjective side is unquestionably true; but to assume that it is purely subjective is to deny it outright. Religion, or worship, the author says, "is a state of the affections"; and that he means sensitive affections is evident from his adding, that they "are not under the control of the will," and defining them to be "gentle emotions," or a lower degree of the same thing. But worship can be a state of the affections, sensitive or otherwise, only in relation to an object really existing. The author elsewhere calls worship "a spiritual exercise"; but it cannot be a purely subjective exercise, for by the very force of the term it is an exercise in reference to and for an object, that is, God, and therefore an exercise not possible without intuition or intellectual apprehension of God, or the object who commands it, and to whom it is due. In point of fact, every exercise of the soul demands as its essential condition intuition or intellectual apprehension of its object. None of our faculties can operate without their specific objects. The specific object of the eye is light, and where there is no light there is and can be no seeing; the specific object of the intellect is truth, and where there is no truth, that is, no objective reality, there can be no intellection, or act of knowing; the specific object of the will or of love is good, and where there is no good apprehended, there can be no act of will or of love. No faculty creates its object, because no one can operate without its object. Abstract the subject from all object, and you annihilate its actual existence; abstract any particular faculty from its specific object, and you annihilate it as an active faculty, render it inoperative, and practically as if it were not. Consequently, the author by losing the object loses the subject, and by excluding religion as objective necessarily excludes it as subjective, that is, even as a spiritual exercise, or state of the affections.

The author asserts in his very title-page that the natural history of the soul is the true basis of theology, and therefore, in philosophical language, supposing him really to intend to admit objective reality, that psychology is the true

basis of ontology. Nobody can suppose that the author in this really means to affirm that the soul is the true basis of all being, and that God is merely a creature or emanation of the human soul; yet this is the real import of his assertion, for psychology can be the true basis of ontology, or the natural history of the soul the true basis of theology, only on condition that the soul is the true basis of all being, and therefore of God himself. From the natural history of the soul, strictly defined, we obtain only the soul and its subjective affections, and therefore no predicates of which the soul is not the subject. This fact is evident enough of itself, and has been proved again and again by modern philosophers. To call any thing we thus obtain theology, which is the science of God and whatever pertains to him as cause, — either first cause or final cause, — whether evident *per se* to natural reason or evident only by faith, is to assume, either that God and the soul are identical, or that God is an affection or mere product of the soul.

What deceives many excellent people on this point is their not taking note, in stating their thesis, that the facts they include under the name of psychological facts are always complex facts, having always a twofold character, the one psychological and the other ontological. As the soul never actually exists or operates abstracted from its object, so we never do or can apprehend our soul without at the same time, and in the same act, apprehending that which is not the soul, but its object, really distinguishable from it, and existing objectively *a parte rei*. Contemplating this object, which we intuitively apprehend in apprehending ourselves, or rather, in apprehending which we recognize ourselves as apprehending subject, and reflecting on it as it is presented to us anew in language, we without much difficulty find it to be real and necessary being, that is, God; but having neglected to distinguish the intuition of it from the recognition of ourselves as the subject of the intuition, they conclude it to be a product of our intuition of ourselves, and therefore that psychology is the basis of ontology, the natural history of the soul the basis of theology, — a grave mistake which vitiates all modern philosophy.

Chronologically considered, it is no doubt true that the psychological fact and the ontological, the *primum psycho-*

logicum and the *primum ontologicum*, are given to the mind simultaneously; but they are not given as identical, nor is the ontological given as contained in the psychological, but the psychological is given as proceeding from the ontological. It is this fact that the psychologist overlooks, when he makes war on the ontologist, and contends that psychology is the basis of ontology. He assumes that all the facts he studies in studying psychology are simple psychological facts, and neglects to observe that in all these facts there is an element purely ontological in its origin and character. In every cognition, or distinct act of knowledge, there is unquestionably a recognition of the soul as knowing subject, or subject of the act, in scholastic language, as *ens percipiens*, and it would be a grave mistake to regard the intellectual act as a pure intuition of the object. But it were equally a mistake to regard any intellectual act as a pure apprehension or recognition of the subject perceiving, including no intuition of object. There is no apprehension where no object is apprehended; and there is no apprehension of the soul by itself, where there is no intuition of object distinguishable from it, and existing objectively *a parte rei*, that is, there is no *ens percipiens* where there is, distinguishable from it and independent of it, no *ens perceptum*. This *ens perceptum*, regarded simply under the relation of object perceived, is consentaneous with the *ens percipiens*, but in itself, in the order of reality, it must be prior to the perception, or *ens percipiens*; because no *ens* can be perceived before it is, since what is not is not perceptible, and because the *ens percipiens* is *percipiens* only in perceiving. As the soul is percipient, or *ens percipiens*, only in perceiving the object, as perception or intuition does not create its object, and as the object must be in order to be perceived, it follows that also in the order of science the object is logically prior to the subject. Hence the order of science, contrary to the pretension of the psychologists, follows the order of reality, or the ontological order, and therefore the *primum logicum*, or *primum philosophicum*, must be the *primum ontologicum*. The *primum psychologium* is the recognition of ourselves as percipient, or *ens percipiens*, and it can never be the *primum philosophicum*, as Mr. Francis Newman and modern psychologism assert, because, though chronologically simultaneous with the *primum ontologicum*, it is logically

subsequent to it, and dependent on it, since the soul perceives itself only in perceiving the object which is not itself. The *principium*, or *primum philosophicum*, must then be the *primum ontologicum*, and the first verse of the book of Genesis gives us the *principium* of all philosophy as well as of all theology, namely, *In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram*.

The mistake of psychologists on this point lies in supposing that what they call the genesis of ideas, that is, the genesis of knowledge, is in the reverse order of the genesis of things, and that the *primum philosophicum*, or principle from which in philosophizing we are to start, is not the *primum ontologicum*, that is, the principle of things, but the *primum psychologicum*, or the soul apprehending itself. They suppose that we do not see things as they are in the order of reality, in the order in which they exist to the Divine mind, but in a contrary order; and therefore they imagine a *mundus logicus*, or logical world, distinct from the *mundus physicus*, or real world. The former they give as the immediate, and the latter as only the mediate, object of intuition, or of knowledge. They appear to have been led into this error by the doctrine of Aristotle, that the mind can know only in itself, and by their laudable effort to escape Platonic pantheism. But they should recollect that this *mundus logicus*, as distinguished from the *mundus physicus*, is a mere abstraction, and, in itself considered, a sheer nullity, for there are no abstractions in nature; and they should also bear in mind, that, if the soul has immediate intuition only of this logical world, it is impossible to assert any real existence, for nothing can be concluded from abstractions not contained in them, and if in intuition of them there is no intuition of the physical or real world, no such world is contained in them. Moreover, if the mind can have intuition only of what is in it, since whatever is in it is it, the mind can know only itself, and then can assert nothing but itself. How the soul can perceive what is not in it, or what is objective to it, we for ourselves do not know, any more than we know how it can know itself or any thing in itself. How it can know at all is to us an inexplicable mystery, and we take good care to refrain from all attempts to explain it. We know that we know, and we know that if the soul cannot know what is objective to itself, or if it can know only in identi-

ifying the object with itself, or if knowledge be the identification of the subject with the object, as some of the Alexandrian philosophers seem to teach, we cannot really know at all. We explain nothing by means of the *phantasms* and *species* of the Peripatetics. There is no *tertium quid* between subject and object conceivable. What is not subject is object, and what is not object is subject. The subject either apprehends the object, or it does not; if it does not, there is the end of the matter, and science or knowledge is out of the question; if it does, it apprehends it where and as it is, in so far as it apprehends it at all.

The Peripatetics sought very properly to escape the pantheism evidently involved in the Platonic doctrine of ideas. Plato made all science consist in the intuition or knowledge of ideas, and ideas were in fact the only reality he recognized. All else he regarded as merely phenomenal. The *idea* in his system is the Divine paradigm, or archetype in the Divine mind or reason, and therefore God himself; for whatever is in God, or the Divine reason, is God. Hence St. Thomas says, "*Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei.*" Plato, then, must have regarded God as all and the only reality, and the universe merely as phenomenal, of which God is the substance or subject, which is sheer pantheism. To avoid this fatal conclusion, the Peripatetics, in accordance with their doctrine that the mind apprehends only in itself, conceived ideas to be in the mind, and a *tertium quid* between the mind and the object existing *a parte rei*. Hence they regarded ideas, which are also the forms or possibilities of things, as something distinguishable from the mind on the one hand, and from God on the other. Hence they asserted an ideal or logical world, in itself neither ontological nor psychological, neither God nor creature, like the *ens in genere* of Rosmini. Hence the interminable question of the scholastics as to *possibilities*, which a slight reference to the pages of St. Augustine would have speedily disposed of. Plato was right in asserting the objectivity of ideas, and the old realists, like St. Anselm, St. Bernard, and St. Bonaventura, were perfectly right in asserting their reality, their existence *a parte rei*; Plato was also right in considering them as the paradigms, archetypes, or models of things in the Divine reason or mind, for as St. Thomas says, "*Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo*

omnium rerum";* but he erred in regard to the fact of creation, and in considering actual things not as creatures, but as the mere impress of these ideas or forms on an eternally existing matter, as the impress of a seal on wax. Man according to him is this Divine idea or eternal form impressed on matter, instead of a real creation by God from nothing, according to, or after, this idea, form, or archetype in the Divine mind. But this idea, regarded as paradigm or archetype, is simply the Divine Intelligence, and is the same whether there be or be not a creature *ad extra* created after it. The Divine Intelligence, being infinite, includes all ideas, paradigms, archetypes, or *creatable* existences, which God may or may not create as it seems to him good. As paradigms, archetypes, models, or ideas, they are *creabilia*, or possible creatures, the possibilities of things, or, as some say, *essentiæ rerum metaphysicæ*, and therefore the Divine Omnipotence, and consequently really and identically God, for no distinction *in re* is admissible in God between one attribute and another, or between his attributes and his essence. Ideas, the eternal forms, essences, or possibilities of things, are then neither mental conceptions existing only in our own minds, nor a *mundus logicus* distinguishable from the real world, but are God himself, apprehended by us in him, and real with all the reality of his being. God is himself the ideal or the possible, the paradigm and possibility of all things. The distinction we are to make is not a distinction between God and the possible, nor between ideal or possible and real, but between God and creature, between the idea and the actual existence created after it. The possible creature is God; the actual creature is the product of God's creative act, creating according to his own Divine idea, or the form eternal in his own mind, that is, according to his own Divine essence, the *similitudo omnium rerum*.

The error of the Platonists lies precisely in confounding the creature, the *creatum* or *creatura*, with the creatable, or *creabile*, that is, in overlooking or denying the intervention of God's creative act, and thus asserting only God and in him the possible world, but no actual world created *ad extra*. The error of the Peripatetics lies in distinguish-

* *Summa* 1, Q. xv., a. 1 ad 3.

ing the ideal or possible from God, making it neither something nor yet nothing, and at best only subjectively real. Such modern philosophers as follow the Platonists tend to pantheism; and such as follow the Peripatetics tend to conceptualism, nominalism, and nihilism. The former lose the creature as actual existence. The latter lose God, for the creature is inconceivable without the creator. To escape atheism, we must understand that ideas are the Divine Intelligence, and possibles the Divine Omnipotence, therefore truly and identically God; and to escape pantheism, we must understand that ideal or possible existences are actual and distinguishable from God only *mediante* the creative act of God, or that the idea or the possible is actual existence distinguishable from God only as an existence, responding to it as its type or paradigm, is actually created by God from nothing.

It follows from this that there is and can be no *mundus logicus* distinguishable from the *mundus physicus*, or possible world, interposed midway, as it were, between reality and nullity. God and actual creation include all that is or exists, and what is not actual creation is God, and what exists and is not God is creation. As what is not is neither intelligible nor conceivable, it follows that in every intuition there must be intuition of some object existing *a parte rei*, and this object must in all cases be either God or actual creature. The *ens possibile* of the philosophers is *ens reale* in God, is God himself, and therefore in conceiving it we really conceive God. In conceiving it as possible, or in denominating it possible, we only say it is an idea in the Divine mind, which he can endow with existence if he chooses. We conceive it in conceiving the Divine Intelligence and Omnipotence, and it is intelligible to us only in the intelligibility of the Divine attributes, and known only in so far as we know them, in which it is real, because identically God in his own being. The logical order and the real then are identical, and the genesis of knowledge follows the genesis of things; that is, in knowledge we know things themselves and as they are, not the mere images, species, or phantasms of things, and things as they are not. Consequently, the *primum philosophicum* must be the *primum ontologicum*, and as God creating is the *principium* in the ontological order, so God creating must be the *principium* in the order of science. To deny

God the creator in the order of science is as really to deny all knowledge, as to deny him in the ontological order is really to deny all existences. Psychology, then, strictly defined, can no more be the basis of ontological science, than the soul can be the physical basis of all existences. Utterly impossible, then, is it, that the natural history of the soul should be the true basis of theology. Theology, on the contrary, is the true basis of the natural history of the soul. Instead of its being true that we know God only in the soul, it is only in our knowledge of God that we can know the soul itself. We must study, not God in the soul, but the soul in God, as all masters of spiritual life uniformly teach; and it is only in proportion as we know God that we ever do know ourselves,—the natural history of the soul, her wants, her sorrows, or her aspirations.

The reason why some learned and good men, whom we love and venerate, shrink from admitting that the *primum ontologicum* is the *primum philosophicum*, is their supposing that they who assert it hold that we have a distinct and conscious knowledge of God prior to our knowledge of existences or consciousness of ourselves, which manifestly is not the fact. The *primum ontologicum* is undeniably the formula, God is, and is the creator of all things or existences distinguishable from himself, as faith teaches us all. In proving that the genesis of knowledge follows the genesis of things, and therefore that in every intuition the immediate object apprehended is God, we have proved that this formula must be the *primum philosophicum*. But while we assert intuition of God in every intellectual act, and that the soul in the intuition really apprehends God, we yet maintain, as St. Augustine says, that it does not intuitively advert to the fact that what it thus apprehends is God. Though it really apprehends God intuitively, it does not take note intuitively that it apprehends him. It comes to know this only subsequently, by means of reflection on the intuition repeated in language, the indispensable instrument of all reflection. To be able to say to others or to ourselves, God is, and is the creator of the world and all things therein, demands, besides the immediate intuition, both instruction and reflection; and to *prove* that God is, to him who rejects instruction, demands reasoning, and not seldom long and intricate processes of reasoning, of which St. Thomas has

given us, in his *Summa Theologica*, most admirable specimens in his five well-known arguments for the existence of God.

The question between us and the Peripatetics is not as to the necessity or the legitimacy of these arguments in a controversy with atheists, but as to the principle on which they as arguments are conclusive. They could not prove the existence of God, if we had no intuition of God, if in the act or fact of knowledge or intellectual apprehension we did not along with the apprehension of that which is not God apprehend also that which is not ourselves or creature,—that which is increate, independent, real, necessary, and eternal, on whose creative energy we and all other creatures depend, and without which neither we nor they could either begin or continue to exist. The real office of the argument in the case is not strictly to prove that God is, but to prove that what we thus intuitively apprehend is God. As a matter of fact, in arguing against atheists we use the very arguments and method used by theologians in all ages and of all schools. We have invented or discovered no new method or argument, and we have not the temerity to assume that the Fathers and Doctors of the Church have never understood how to combat atheism. We do not believe in modern discoverers. We use the syllogism precisely as others use it, only we deny what some few pretend, that we can conclude in it matter which transcends the matter of intuition. Demonstration does not supply new matter; it only clears up and establishes the matter already intuitively apprehended, and never enables us to assert any existence not apprehended in the intuition. From our intuitions of what are really creatures, we demonstrate the existence of God, but solely because in these intuitions there is always intuition of that which is not creature, and which therefore is God. The real demonstration is in detecting this intuition, and showing that its object is God the creator. Here the basis of the demonstration is this intuition, really and truly intuition of God, an ontological, not a psychological intuition.

The doctrine we oppose is, that the existence of God is concluded from the pure intuition of creature, or that his existence or being is a deduction from the simple intuition of created existence, or recognition of ourselves as thinking

subject. Its error lies in assuming that God may be concluded from *data* in which he is not given, or in which there is no intuition of his being or attributes. It is a principle of logic, that there can be nothing in the conclusion not contained in the premises. If God is not contained in the premises intuitively given, or rather intuitively evident, he cannot be concluded from them. They who fall into this error do so by confounding proof with knowledge, and the intuition of God with the intuition of creature. They take in their reasoning the complex fact as a simple psychological fact; but as it really is a complex fact, and really does contain intuitive apprehension of God, they in point of fact, though illogically, arrive at the conclusion that God exists. This conclusion being true and evident *per se*, they cannot or will not be persuaded that they have not attained it by a strictly logical process. But having formally excluded God from their premises, from the intuitions from which they reason, the conclusion, on their ground, is logically unsound. The fact is, in all our intuitions which include intuition of the relative, the finite, the contingent, the temporal, we have always intuition of real being, of the independent, the infinite, the necessary, the eternal; and real being, the independent, the infinite, the necessary, and the eternal, are God, and if we have intuition of these, we have all that is meant by intuition of God. If we have no intuition or intellectual apprehension of these, we have no means of proving the existence of God. Without intuition of the necessary, for instance, we could not in the syllogism assert that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, and therefore could not reason in proof of any proposition whatever. All reasoning rests on the supposition of a necessary *nexus* between the conclusion and the premises, or between the effect and the cause. And if we have no intellectual apprehension of the necessary, how can we conceive even the possibility of this *nexus*? And yet the necessary is always God, for he is necessary being, and he alone is necessary being, since all that is distinguishable from him is contingent, created by him, and dependent on his free will.

We have enlarged on this point, because necessary to show the radical falsity of Mr. Francis Newman's principles, and the utter viciousness of his method, common to nearly all British and American neologists. Evidently we

do not mean that Mr. Francis Newman, in asserting that the natural history of the soul is the true basis of theology, admits, in fact, no objective reality, and therefore falls into absolute nihilism. Common sense and common tradition in general get the better of speculation, and even the wildest theorizers, by a felicitous inconsistency, seldom fail to recognize more truth than their theories can embrace. No man, can be totally depraved in a rational, any more than in a moral sense, and every one always retains some traces of the image and likeness of God to which he was originally created. Moreover, no man ever really divests himself of all traditional faith or science. What we mean to charge upon Mr. Francis Newman is, that he cannot consistently with his own principles and method assert any existence but the soul itself, and this is amply confirmed by the details of the book under review. Undoubtedly, as a matter of fact, there is an ontological element in the premises from which he reasons, but he does not distinguish it; he even denies it, and contends that his only ontological element is concluded from purely psychological *data*. Logically, according to his own principles, his *principium* or *primum philosophicum*, or point of departure, is the soul, which is therefore necessarily the subject of all his ontological or theological predicates. Analysis of the soul, however sharp or thorough, can obtain only the soul and its subjective contents. No man capable of any degree of reasoning can deny this; consequently, from psychological *data* alone, supposing it possible, which it is not, to commence with such *data* alone, it is impossible to conclude any God but the human soul. In the sense of his system, Mr. Francis Newman's God is simply an abstraction of himself, the several faculties, qualities, or properties of his own soul, taken abstractly, and carried up, in imagination, to infinity, and concentered in an imaginary perfect soul. Systematically considered, this is the only God of the majority of our modern metaphysicians. Their God is no objective reality, but a mere logical abstraction of themselves, and hence their reasonings to prove that God is seldom satisfy any one really troubled with atheistical doubts. Their arguments professedly proceed on the supposition, that we can conclude beyond what is contained in our premises,—that from intuition of the soul, without any intuition of an objective reality distinguish-

able from it, we can conclude that which is distinguishable from it, and in fact its creator and preserver. But reasoning never supplies its own premises, and can operate only on premises given; hence the premises are called *data*. They must be given, that is, intellectually apprehended, prior to reasoning, and must be intuitively evident, or science is not possible, and the reasoning concludes nothing. If intuition supplies only psychological *data*, gives us only the soul for our premises, or our *principium*, we can conclude only the soul. To conclude something beyond, we must have intuition of something beyond, and therefore to conclude God we must have intuition of that which is really God, although not without reflection distinctly known to be God; that is, he must be really given us in our *principium*, or intuitive premises. As Mr. Francis Newman does not concede this, but avowedly proceeds from purely psychological *data*, his system necessarily excludes God, and all objective reality, and is mere egotism, and in the last analysis mere nullism.

But our difficulties with Mr. Francis Newman's doctrine do not end here. The theology he proposes to construct from the natural history of the soul is natural theology, that is, what we call philosophy; and as he derives it from the *natural* history of the soul, and denies all supernaturally revealed and all traditional *data*, it is evident that he proposes to construct it by the independent operations of his natural reason alone. He then assumes two things. First, philosophy is an independent discipline, and secondly, reason by her own light and energy, without the aid of tradition or the light of faith, is competent to construct it. We can admit neither of these assumptions. Philosophy is not properly an independent discipline, and it is not possible without faith or supernatural revelation to construct for even the natural order a complete and coherent system of philosophy, or of natural theology.

Others than Mr. Francis Newman, it is true, maintain that philosophy is and should be an independent discipline, and that it can be constructed by natural reason alone. Some go so far in this direction, as to maintain that moral obligation may be asserted even on the supposition that there is no God, and that a respectable code of atheistical ethics is not impossible. But all moral obligations, even in the natural order, and the natural relations of

men, are resolvable into the single obligation to worship God in the way and manner he prescribes, or to render unto him, as our Final Cause, the tribute of our whole being; and therefore no moral obligation is conceivable without God. The atheist may practically observe some of the precepts of the moral law, but if there were no God there could be no moral law, and therefore no morality; as an atheist may be a geometrician, but, as St. Thomas says, if there were no God there could be no geometry. Morality does not consist in fitness, propriety, or utility. Its basis is not the Greek νόμος, but the Latin *lex*, which imports on the one hand authority which has the right to command, and on the other a subject bound to obey. It implies the Supreme Lawgiver and the obligation of obedience, and therefore is inconceivable without God; for neither men nor nature have in themselves any legislative authority, or law-making faculty.

No doubt, as a matter of fact, the atheist has the conception of justice, or sense of duty, and therefore, to some extent, does hold himself bound to observe what is due from man to man, as well as from man to society; and this we suppose is all that they really mean, who assert the possibility of atheistical ethics. But this conception of justice, or of duty, is manifestly an inconsequence in the atheist, and wholly incompatible with his atheism; for the denial of God is really the denial of justice. God is justice, and justice in itself, and therefore there can be justice aside from him only by participation of his justice. Doubtless, the atheist can have the conception of justice without any distinct or reflex conception of God, but not without a conception of that which really is God, though he may not take note or even deny that it is God. The conception depends on the intuition of God, which, as we have seen, is an element of every intellectual act. The fact that even the atheist has it is not a proof that atheism and morality are compatible one with the other, but that no man can wholly divest himself of the virtual conception of God, or make himself really, truly, and consistently an atheist; for let him do his best, there will always be at the bottom of his thought intuition of God.

We therefore deny the possibility of atheistical morals, and we even go farther and deny the possibility of constructing a code of natural ethics, theology, or philosophy,

by reason alone. We say nothing in the present discussion of the purely industrial, or strictly material order; but aside from that order, whatever he may be within it, man is neither an inventor, nor an original discoverer of truth, and is restricted in his knowledge to what has been taught him, and at first immediately by God himself. This is as true of that portion of his knowledge which pertains to the natural order as of that portion which pertains to the supernatural order. What man in the pride of his heart calls his progress in philosophical, ethical, political, and social science, is but a forgetting, is but his departure from truth, and unhappy fall into error. He walks securely only as he walks in the path of instruction,—in the light, only as he walks in the wisdom of the fathers in primitive tradition, under the guidance of its Divinely assisted and protected guardians.

The truth man has been taught from the beginning is twofold,—truth pertaining to the natural order, and truth pertaining to the supernatural order; but both were taught by supernatural revelation to the first man,—save further explications of the supernatural subsequently made by our Lord and his Apostles,—as two parts of one whole, and in the Holy Scriptures they are never found separated, or even formally distinguished from each other. In the Holy Scriptures philosophy is never disengaged from theology, or reason from faith; or if St. Paul, for instance, sometimes distinguishes philosophy, and seems to speak of it as an independent discipline, it is only to condemn it, as the folly of the gentiles, to declare its impotence and vanity, and to bid the faithful to beware of being spoiled or deceived by it. The sacred writers and even the Doctors of the Church treat the two orders of truth uniformly as one complex body of truth, neither able, in the present providence, to subsist without the other, as they always treat man himself as a being with a single, never with a twofold destiny. The man of Christian theology, though a natural creature and endowed with reason, exists only in a supernatural providence, destined either to a supernatural recompense or to a supernatural punishment. He has no natural destiny, for he is not in a state of pure nature; and if no natural destiny, it is certain that he can have no independent natural discipline. Every such discipline must be adapted to an order which does not exist, and to a purely imaginary man.

Let it not be objected, that we confound the natural and supernatural, and therefore identify either faith with philosophy or philosophy with faith. We no more confound the natural and supernatural, than the theologian confounds nature and grace, when he says nature accomplishes nothing without grace, and grace always supposes nature. Reason and faith stand in the same relation to each other in which stand nature and grace; and as man cannot fulfil even the law of nature without the assistance of grace, so reason cannot construct for even the natural order an adequate philosophy or theology, without the light of faith, as all imply who attempt to prove from reason alone the necessity of supernatural revelation. Yet as we distinguish in the meritorious act, without separating them, the part of nature and the part of grace, since there is no such act without the concurrence of both nature and grace, so in the truth transmitted us, or presented for our assent, we distinguish, but also without separating them, a part belonging to the natural order, and a part belonging to the supernatural order. The two parts are distinguishable, but both must mutually concur to make either the perfect theologian or the perfect philosopher. Theology is mutilated without the rational element, indeed inconceivable, as grace would be without nature; and philosophy without the light of supernatural faith, or separated from the revelation of the supernatural order, would be unable even to state its problems, and would fall not to the level of reason merely, but far below it.

The natural and supernatural truth are distinguishable, but not separable, first, objectively, in that they pertain to two different creations, and, second, subjectively, as to the conditions on which we assent to them, or affirm them. The natural is evident *per se*, or intuitively evident, to natural reason; the supernatural is not evident *per se*, and is assented to or affirmed by us only on the authority of God revealing it. The former is reason or philosophy; the latter is faith, and, when drawn out by reflection and its several propositions placed in their logical relations with one another and with reason, supernatural or Christian theology. So, in saying both are originally given supernaturally by Divine revelation, and therefore in admitting no distinction between them as to the mode or manner in which they are made objects of the reflective under-

standing, we do not, as some suppose, fall into the absurdity either of basing philosophy on faith, or faith on philosophy. We give a supernatural basis for faith, and a rational basis for philosophy, which is all that is required to save science on the one hand, and faith on the other.

The point to be observed here is, that, while we adopt the ordinary distinction between faith and reason, theology and philosophy, we reject the doctrine contended for by rationalists, that the principles of philosophy are originally *discoverable* by natural reason. These, when they admit Christianity, distinguish the two, by defining faith or theology as embracing all the matter supernaturally revealed, and philosophy as embracing all those first truths which are not only evident to natural reason, but discoverable by it. But we deny that the principles of philosophy are ever distinctly discoverable by natural reason, although they are when stated intuitively evident to it. We make a distinction between being intuitively evident when presented to reflection, and being intuitively discoverable and presentable to reflection. We assert, indeed, against the psychologists, direct intuition of the ontological principles of all philosophical science, but we do not assert, nay, we deny, that reflection takes the principles immediately from intuition, because intuition is always indistinct and indeterminate, and because man is not a pure intelligence, but an intelligence united to a body, and has never in this life that sort of intuitive vision of intelligibles which supersedes reflection as essential to distinct science. Intuition affirms the principles, but does not teach them, or present them as objects of distinct and reflex thought. It is itself a universal and permanent fact, inseparable from the human intellect, and is really what is ordinarily called reason, when reason is distinguished from the intellectual faculty, and from the habit or act of reasoning. The real purport of what we affirm in affirming it is, that reason as so distinguished, instead of being a faculty of the soul, is a real intuition by the soul of the intelligible world. The importance of this, in settling the question of the validity of science, or of our cognitions, is very great. All demonstration rests, in the last analysis, on reason as thus distinguished. If, as most modern philosophers maintain, we assume reason to be a faculty of the soul, we assert only a psychological basis of certainty; and we may ask

the value of this basis, and what is the voucher for reason itself. Having only reason, a psychological faculty, with which to answer, we are involved in a paralogism from which there is no escape but absolute scepticism. But understanding that it is not a faculty of the soul, but a real intuition of the intelligible world, affirming simply, not itself, but the object apprehended, we can ask no such questions, and scepticism becomes absurd and inconceivable. Proof or demonstration is then conclusive; for it rests on immediate intuition of the principle, and therefore on a real ontological basis.

The instrument of distinct science is reflection, in which the mind returns upon or rethinks the matter of the intuition; and the instrument of all reflection in the intelligible order, as distinguishable from the sensible, is language, — a sensible sign by which the primitive intuition is repeated, or its object presented anew to the mind and held there till the mind distinctly seizes it. The principle when thus presented, or re-presented, is immediately evident, or immediately affirmed, by virtue of the primitive and permanent intuition. With all the intuition of the intelligible we claim for man, he would be practically unable to make any distinct affirmation either to his own reflex consciousness or to others, if deprived of language, and of all direct or indirect instruction through the medium of words or signs of some sort, repeating to reflection the matter of intuition. Hence M. de Bonald was right when he asserted that man cannot think, or, as we say, *reflect*, without language, and thus refuted those who allege that language is a human invention. Language is as essential to reflection as the algebraic signs are to the algebraist, and as man evidently could not invent it without reflection, it must have been a Divine creation and given to our first parents by their Creator. God in giving to the first man language must have given him the understanding of it, that is, infused into him with language the significance of language, or the knowledge of the truth it contains or is fitted to signify, and therefore all the principles of moral, philosophical, political, and social science that belong to our order of intelligence, — the principles of the whole science of the natural order, or what is evident *per se* to natural reason; in like manner as through the infallible language of the Church he has given us in addition all the truth he has revealed of

the supernatural order. Both orders of truth are alike taught us or communicated to us through the medium of language, and both have been preserved by language, and transmitted in substance from the first man by tradition from hand to hand even down to us, unseparated, in their unity and integrity, through the patriarchs, the Synagogue, and the Christian Church, but out of the Church altered, broken, corrupted, and travestied, as it is in all gentilism and heresy.

In the view taken here, two errors are avoided, which have vitiated much modern speculation. M. Cousin claims for man intuition of the intelligible, of what he calls absolute idea, or ideas of the Infinite, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, that is, of the principles of all science; but he supposes the reflective understanding takes them immediately from the intuition. This is the grand error of our modern Transcendentalists. It implies that man knows all that is intelligible to him at once, and distinctly, by direct and immediate intuition, thus denying the possibility of error, and claiming infallibility for every man. It places the new-born babe and the full-grown man, the simple rustic and the ripe scholar, on the same level as to knowledge. Hence instruction, study, reflection, reasoning, become quite superfluous, for all knowledge is obtained by immediate and open vision, than which nothing is more false or absurd. The error lies in supposing that reflection discovers its principles immediately in intuition, or, what is the same thing, that intuition itself distinguishes and determines its objects. This error is avoided by the doctrine that reflection takes its principles from language, as represented through the medium of words, and only finds them affirmed by immediate intuition.

M. de Lamennais fell into an opposite error, by denying that any thing is evident *per se* to natural reason, and reposing the principles of science for their certainty on faith. This seems to us to be the error of the estimable M. Bonnetti, with whose general spirit and tendency we sympathize not a little. He maintains that we know the principles of philosophy, that is, distinctly apprehend them, only as they are supernaturally revealed and taught us through the medium of words. Thus far we go with him; but is what is taught formally assented to on the authority of the teacher or revealer? Then it is received on testimony,

and philosophy is identified with faith, and science is denied to be possible. But if science be impossible, how establish the credibility of the testimony, or the competency of the authority? Nay, how do we apprehend or take cognizance of the principles taught, or of the fact that they are taught at all? Deny to man all power of knowing, deny that any thing is evident to him *per se*, and he becomes as little the subject of faith as of science. There must be somewhere, in some form, a *nexus* between science or reason and faith, or faith itself becomes wholly unreasonable, and therefore impossible. M. Bonnetti's doctrine, as we understand it, demolishes science to make way for faith, as Lutheranism demolishes free-will to make way for grace, and loses both in an inevitable and universal scepticism, as Lutheranism loses grace by leaving it no subject. This fatal consequence is avoided, by understanding that the truths taught us pertaining to the natural order, and constituting the principles of philosophy, do not rest, when taught, on the authority of the teacher, but are evident *per se*, or intuitively evident, affirmed by primitive and unailing intuition.

Understanding now that the principles of philosophy are obtained neither immediately from direct intuition, nor by way of induction from psychological *data*, but from language in which, so to speak, they are incarnated, it is evident that the method of philosophy or of natural theology cannot be, as Mr. Francis Newman assumes, that of psychological observation and induction, or the natural history of the soul. Nothing is more fatal than the Baconian method applied to philosophy, to the moral and intellectual sciences, and it is due to the memory of Bacon, a great though not a good man, to say, that he himself proposed his method as applicable only to the purely physical sciences, and expressly asserted its inapplicability to the moral and intellectual,—a fact his English and American disciples generally remember to forget. The Baconian method in the physical sciences, which are only secondary, is legitimate enough, because those sciences deal with sensible objects, which can be observed and distinguished without the medium of language, so long as they remain in their proper sphere below philosophy and under its dominion; but it is inapplicable in the region of philosophy, which deals solely with principles, that is, with non-sensi-

bles, or intelligibles [*intelligibilia, νοητά*], it is inapplicable, because the object cannot be observed and studied in the intuition, since to all observation an object sensibly represented is essential, and in the intelligible order language is the only sensible representation possible. In philosophy, then, the only proper method is to take the *principium* or *primum philosophicum*, that is, the *primum ontologicum*, from language, and proceed by way, not of observation, but of ratiocination, bringing every conclusion in the last analysis to the test of intuition. This is what we call the synthetic as opposed to the analytic, and the ontological as opposed to the psychological method.

It is evident that if, in philosophizing, we must take our principles, that is, the ontological *data*, from language, we can take them only as we are taught them, for it is only by instruction that we do or can learn the signification of words. Words are no signs to us, but unmeaning sounds or characters, till we are taught what they signify. Hence philosophy or natural theology is not possible by the independent operations of individual reason alone, and no individual deprived of all instruction and left to the operations of his own individual mind could ever attain to philosophy or natural theology, either as to its principles or its conclusions. Instruction is indispensable; the elders must instruct the juniors, as we assert in sending our children to school, or in providing masters for them. But the elders, for the same reason, cannot teach unless they have been taught, and hence there must have been an unbroken series of instructors or teachers till we arrive at the first man, and him God himself must have instructed, — since for him no other instructor is conceivable. So in philosophy, as well as in faith, we must assert Divine revelation and tradition, and whoever denies the former or breaks the thread of the latter fails in philosophy as much as he does in religion. To deny revelation and break away from tradition is the way, not to philosophize, but to remain fools all our life long. In philosophical science, as in Christian dogmata, the method of ascertaining or knowing what is to be held is one and the same, namely, that of instruction, of learning from the teacher, though in the latter we take the truth learned on the authority of the teacher, because it is not intrinsically evident to reason, and in the former on the authority of the intuition, or its intrinsic evidence.

But to true philosophy, then, as well as to true religion, it is necessary that language from which we take our principles should be preserved and handed down to us in its unity and integrity, and that the teachers have an infallible understanding of its sense. If language has become corrupt, as indeed our modern pantheists are corrupting it, or if the teachers have lost its original sense, in whole or in part, philosophy is vitiated in its source, and serves only to mislead. True philosophy becomes impossible, and we have for schools of philosophy only schools of sophistry, error, and vain speculations. But as language is preserved, even as to the natural order, uncorrupted, in its original purity and integrity, only in the Church or orthodox society, and as its original sense is retained unimpaired only in the Divinely assisted and protected teachers of the Church, it is evident that it is impossible to have sound philosophy out of the orthodox society, and that schism and heterodoxy in an ecclesiastical or theological sense involve schism and heterodoxy in a philosophical sense. The gentile philosophy was schismatic and heterodox, and deserves no respect any farther than it follows primitive tradition. It contains many fragments of truth, but it is always, systematically considered, even in its two greatest masters, Plato and Aristotle, radically false, for it always mistakes the fact of creation, the creative act of God, by which the world and all things therein are created from nothing. Gentile philosophy has no knowledge of the first verse of Genesis. Gentilism itself was the Protestantism of the old world, the falling away of the nations from the patriarchal traditions, as Protestantism is the gentilism of the modern world, the apostacy of the Protestant nations from the traditions of the Church; and neither, how much soever it may philosophize, ever attains to sound philosophy. Either may have its schools, sects, or systems, but they only recall the confusion of tongues at Babel. No sound philosophy is ever to be looked for out of the Church, because out of her language is confounded or corrupted, and the chain even of scientific tradition is broken.

But even in the bosom of the Church it fares no better with those individuals who attempt to disengage philosophy from theology, reason from faith, and study to build up, distinct from the supernatural theology, a system

of pure rationalism. We have even amongst ourselves a great diversity of philosophies or philosophisms, and not seldom do we find men able to preserve their orthodoxy only at the expense of their logic, as in the case of the excellent Abbate Rosmini. The reason of this is obvious enough. When a Catholic waives his theology, and turns his back on the supernatural light of faith, and enters upon the field of independent philosophical speculation, he foregoes all the advantages of his Catholicity, and places himself on a level with the ancient Greek or the modern Protestant, and there is no reason conceivable why he should succeed better than a heathen or an infidel. Moreover, success is impossible in the very nature of the case, because man since the Fall is neither in the state of integral, nor even of pure nature. In his present state, he has no natural destiny, and his reason does not suffice for his reason, nor his nature for his nature; otherwise we could never conclude the necessity of supernatural reparation from his present infirmities, and it would not be true that medicinal grace is necessary to enable us to fulfil the law of nature. Every system of pure rationalism denies this, and proceeds on the assumption that man has a natural destiny, or at least, that in thought we can abstract him from the supernatural providence in which he now exists, and construct a system of philosophy, of metaphysics, and ethics, that would be true and conformable to his intellectual and moral state, were he, as he is not, and probably never was, in a state of pure nature. Every such system proceeds, then, from false or at least unreal premises, and can at best end only in falsehood or vain abstractions. The only safe way of reasoning is, to reason from man as he is, and not from him as he is not, and what is wanted is a discipline adapted to his present state, to his actual condition in the present providence, not a discipline adapted to some imaginary state or condition, which is not and cannot be real.

The grand heresy of our times is rationalism, — rationalism in religion, in politics, and in morals; natural theology is set up against revealed, the state against the Church, and morals against religion; and all this has originated, not in the denial of supernatural revelation outright, but in attempting to assert the independence of reason in the natural order. The state did not begin to assert its independ-

ence by denying the Divine authority of the Church, or what is the same thing, its obligation to be Christian, but by disengaging the temporal from the spiritual, and asserting its supremacy in its own order, — claiming at first to be only the friend and ally of the Church, then her protector, and then her master and oppressor. Just so has it been in the philosophical order. Abelard, the father of modern rationalism, only sought to disengage philosophy from revealed theology, to erect it into a separate and independent discipline, supreme only in its own order. His philosophy would be the friend and ally of Catholic theology, would even serve her by vindicating her titles; but, under pretence of proving her titles, it assumed the right to sit in judgment on her dogmas, and therefore to be her judge and master. The movement, thanks to St. Bernard and the Roman See, received a check for a time; but ere long it manifested itself anew; and, strengthened by the political rationalism of Louis of Bavaria and Louis the Twelfth of France, and by the revival of Greek literature, it gradually became formidable, mastered some of the later scholastics, disputed the empire of the schools in the sixteenth century, won the victory in the seventeenth, and enjoyed its triumph in the eighteenth in the worship of an infamous prostitute as the Goddess of Reason. This tendency to rationalism manifests itself now everywhere, though not without some earnest voices to protest loudly against it. Unhappily, it is not confined to persons out of the Church. In the Church even we find men deeply affected by it, and, as they cannot indulge it in matters strictly of faith, they seem resolved to indulge it to the utmost extent in all else. But it would be well to bear in mind, that to contend for a system of rationalism in regard to matters *extra fidem* is not only to prepare a rival to faith, but to assume that there is a body of truth, and therefore a real good, for man without faith, which is not true, and thus, instead of weakening, to strengthen the very world, the flesh, and the Devil, which as Christians we are compelled to renounce and to wage unremitting war against. Let it not be supposed that we are to cure the prevailing disease of our times by homœopathic prescriptions. The maxim *similia similibus curantur* is of as little value in relation to moral as to physical diseases, and as in the latter all trustworthy practitioners adhere to the principles of

medical tradition, so in the former all sound Doctors rely on the Church and her teaching.

St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and all the great Doctors of the Church, are able reasoners, and some of them now and then, it is true, seem to recognize a *quasi* independence in philosophical discipline; but it will be found that they accept and use philosophy only as the rational element of theology. They use reason in the service of religion, and whenever they discuss questions of pure reason it is always with an eye to supernatural theology, and by the supernatural light of faith. They regard philosophy, not as the independent ally of theology, or, as we Yankees say, "help," but as the *ancilla*, or *slave* of revelation, with no independence or will of her own, and bound to do the bidding of her mistress. They compel her to serve, and to serve faith, her mistress, not herself, or mere rationalism, whether a rationalism assumed to be above or below faith. Hence, although we always find them making a free and noble use of reason, we never find in them a philosophy disengaged from theology, and presented as a separate and complete body of independent rational truth. They are Christian theologians, and philosophers only in that they are Christian theologians. They have true theology, and therefore they have always sound philosophy, that is, sound reason. But all, whether in or out of the Church, who undertake to build up an independent philosophy, that is, a system of pure rationalism, are sure to fall into grievous errors, even as to the rational order itself.

We repeat that it must be so, because man is in a supernatural providence, not in a state of integral, or even pure nature. Being in a supernatural providence, if the words mean any thing, he has no natural destiny, that is, no destiny lying in the plane of his nature as it now is, or to which he can attain by his unassisted natural powers. Manifestly, then, his nature has no purely natural good, and therefore does not suffice for itself. It follows necessarily, then, that his reason alone cannot construct a system of rational truth complete and coherent in its own order, for truth is only the intellectual phase of good. Philosophy deals with principles, and last principles as well as first; it embraces always ethics, and ethics have always reference to final causes. If man has only a supernatural destiny, his final cause cannot be in the natural order, and

consequently simple natural ethics must be impossible and absurd; and so then must also be the philosophy that not only asserts, but undertakes to teach them. What is the significance of a system of doctrines constructed in relation to the state of pure nature, and on the supposition that man has a natural destiny, when it is conceded that the state of pure nature does not exist, and that there is and can be no natural destiny?

As nature subsists, though in a supernatural providence, questions of reason will arise, and must of course be solved; but they must be solved under the conditions of the providence in which we are, that is, in relation to supernatural theology. All rational questions needing to be solved can be solved, one after another, when taken up in connection with the dogma or theological principle to which they are related. When the revealed truth raises the question of pure reason, then is the time to settle it, because then it is raised in the form in which it can be settled, and reason is then, and then only, in the proper state to settle it. It is only by the light of Catholic faith that we can truly state even rational problems, and reason cannot solve them unless they are truly stated, that is, proposed to the understanding according to the truth of things. Who has not found that, in discussing a point with another, the chief difficulty is to make him understand the state of the question, the precise point in issue? A question properly asked is already virtually answered, unless a question as to simple matters of fact. But it is only Catholic faith that can rectify our point of sight, or place us in the position from which even questions of reason can be seen in their real character and relations; for it is only from the point of view of supernatural faith that we see the natural universe in its real order, in the real relations of the several parts to one another, and of the whole to God as its first and as its last cause. We could not philosophize at all without the principle that God is, and creates the world and all things therein, and creates them for himself, as final cause, or *finis propter quem*; and this principle, although when stated in language and subjected to reflection, it is evident *per se* to natural reason, could never have been distinctly known or practically available without supernatural revelation, and is attainable by us only from tradition as embodied in the Catechism.

Clearly, then, Mr. Francis Newman's doctrine, which is not only rationalism, but mere psychological rationalism, cannot be even entertained, and would deserve no respectful consideration as a system, even if it were conceded that we have received no revelation of a supernatural order; for without revelation and tradition, by reason alone, man is utterly unable to construct even a complete and self-coherent system of rationalism, and for the best of all reasons, because he does not exist in a purely rational order. Our preliminary difficulties in the way of Mr. Francis Newman's theory are of themselves conclusive against it. We have no occasion to go beyond his title-page. That asserts his principle and method. His principle being false, and his method vicious, his theory, though it may contain by a happy inconsistency some slight traces of rational truth, must be, as a theory, utterly worthless, and, as far as it goes, mischievous. It is entirely unnecessary for us to take it up and examine it in detail. It is clearly antichristian and repugnant to sound reason, and having refuted it in principle, we may dismiss it as unworthy of any further consideration; for a man who starts wrong, and travels in a wrong direction, is pretty sure never to reach the goal.

In fact, in what we have said we have had no special reference to Mr. Newman as an individual author. We have aimed to discuss rather the general question the principles and method of his book raise in the mind of the theologian. Our purpose has been to refute his psychological rationalism, and to vindicate the ontological method of philosophizing, not for the sake of substituting ontological rationalism in the place of the psychological, but for the sake of demolishing rationalism altogether, and bringing the student back to tradition and the method of the Catechism. What we really oppose is every system of pure rationalism, whether psychological or ontological. Logic, which teaches us to use and to make a good use of reason, we respect, we demand, and consequently we honor reason; but we have, and we want, no philosophy any further than it enters as the rational element of true Christian theology. We have never known any good purpose answered by your independent philosophies or philosophisms. The attempt to disengage the rational from the supernatural element, and to give it an independent disci-

pline, whether it be in the form of Gallicanism, natural ethics as distinguished from revealed religion, or metaphysics as disjoined from supernatural theology, never comes to any good, and we have never yet met a system of philosophy, that is, of pure rationalism, ancient or modern, that we could not push logically either to pantheism or nihilism. The spirit that leads men to attempt the separation is at bottom a schismatic and heretical spirit, and we owe to its prevalence most of the schisms, heresies, and moral disasters of the last three or four hundred years, and we wish to protest not only against its effects, but against the spirit itself. They who cherish it are unwilling to admit the universal supremacy under God of the Church, but wish to have at least a subordinate sphere in which they can assert human independence, and be as gods knowing good and evil without having learned them. Let our readers ponder well, whether the spirit that dictates the wish is Christian or Satanic.

For ourselves, we aimed to be a consistent rationalist, to spin all knowledge, spider-like, from our own bowels, till we found the thing was impossible. There was for us no alternative but rationalism, and with it nihilism, or the Catholic Church and tradition. We were never able to comprehend, with our Anglican friends, a *via media* between truth and falsehood. Nihilism, therefore, pure rationalism, is pure falsehood, for pure falsehood is simply absolute negation. Then Catholicity must be true; for nothing else is or can be. We must then take the Church as supreme, and as supreme in the natural as well as in the supernatural order. Then nothing is independent of her, and as the vicegerent of God on earth she has authority over all disciplines, and in every department of life. Her appropriate sphere is universal, and whoever seeks in any thing to act as independent of her, sins against the very providence of God in which he is placed.

God has made us, and not we ourselves; he has made us for himself, to know, love, and serve him here, and to be happy with him for ever hereafter. This is our only end, the end of all life, and for this end and this alone we are to live. If we live for this end and for this alone, there is and can be nothing else for us to care for. The earth, society, the state, instruction, education, are valuable only in relation to and as they subserve this end. The state,

though it deals directly only with temporal matters, is bound to manage these matters themselves with sole reference to this the only end of man, and woe to the state that forgets it, that imagines itself free from the law which binds it in its temporal enactments to consult only the spiritual good of its subjects, for sooner or later it will fill up the measure of its iniquity. "The wicked shall be turned into hell, all the nations that forget God." Here is the most fearful condemnation of the rationalist politics that have reigned throughout all modern nations if we except Austria, and even her we cannot wholly except, and the bitter fruits of their madness are they now beginning to reap. The functions of the state are indeed secular, but it is bound to discharge them in relation to a spiritual end, and the spiritual end man himself is bound to seek. All life, individual, social, political, is by the law of God subordinated to this end, and has no legitimacy, no right, no morality, but as rendered subservient to it.

How it is to be subordinated and made subservient to this end, God has not left us to find out by our individual reason; he himself has condescended to teach us in his revelation, and continues to teach us by unfailing tradition, of which he has made the Church the depository, the divinely assisted and protected keeper and witness, teacher and judge. It is to her, that is, to her pastors, and especially to her chief pastor, the successor of St. Peter, that, directly or indirectly, all individuals, states and nations, subjects and rulers, must repair to learn their duty in the natural order and in the spiritual, for God has made her the judge of both laws, the natural and the supernatural, and in her courts made them but one law. She is the keeper of the consciences of princes and peoples in all things, for she alone has received from God authority to teach and declare his law. This is what we must concede if we concede the Church, or even truth at all. Men of the world, haughty statesmen, and proud philosophers may reluct at this, may turn away from it, and say they will never submit to an order so humiliating, so fatal to human independence; but that will not alter the truth, and it will still remain true that true wisdom and sound reason approve it. The Church is Catholic, for she subsists through all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth. We may learn sophistry and error outside of her;

we may have pride and slavery without her; but truth and freedom, real virtue and beatitude, only in and from her. Happy are they who as docile children delight to sit at her feet and learn the gracious truths that fall from her lips, who wish to be humble, faithful Christians, and desire nothing more.

ART. II. — *De la Restauration Française. Mémoire présentée au Clergé et à l'Aristocratie.* Par B. SAINT-BONNET. Paris: L. Hervé. 1851. 8vo. pp. 424.

THIS is certainly an able and interesting work, opportune, and well fitted to exert a great, and upon the whole a salutary influence, in the present crisis of European thought. Its author is evidently a man of faith and conscience, who has studied the social problems of the age long and profoundly, with deep earnestness and rare intelligence. He has characterized our moral, social, and economical wounds, probed them to the bottom, traced them to their origin, and prescribed the only possible remedy, namely, a hearty return of the age to Christian faith, and the practical observance in every department of life of Christian principles and maxims.

The remote cause of the present frightful state of the civilized world is, no doubt, to be looked for in the prevarication of Adam, in which man sought to substitute himself for God, and to make himself his own final cause; but the more proximate cause is the revolution effected in European thought and practice at the epoch of the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, and the revival of Greek studies and literature in Western Europe. The prevailing opinion of the world has been, and is, that the four centuries then commencing have been centuries of unequalled progress, and that the revolution then effected was entirely in the interests of true civilization. These centuries are applauded, are boasted as the most glorious in the annals of our race, those in which mankind have best understood their true destiny, and most successfully accomplished it; and whoever should venture to set himself against them, or to hint that the progress effected in them has been

in a downward direction, or more specious than real, would be almost universally branded as an enemy to his kind, as a barbarian, or as a lunatic.

This should create no surprise. Men of the world always judge with the world's judgment, — according to the principles and maxims of their age; and seldom incorrectly, if their standard of judgment be conceded. The human race may be now and then afflicted with lunacy, but it is never an idiot. An idiot is one who has just premises, but cannot draw from them just conclusions, that is, one who cannot reason; a lunatic is one who has false premises, but who is, nevertheless, able to draw logical conclusions from them. His insanity is precisely in his inability to seize and hold true premises. He binds a wisp of straw around his hat and calls it a crown, picks up a mullen-stalk and calls it a sceptre, ascends a mole-hill and calls it a throne, and proceeds to issue commands and proclamations coherent and proper, if he were, as he assumes he is, a real king. Assuming the principles or premises asserted by the revolution of which we speak, mankind reason coherently, and even sanely, in concluding that they have really been advancing in true civilization with unprecedented rapidity for the last four centuries; for it is undeniable that these centuries have been remarkably successful in reducing those principles to practice, and in drawing from them their last logical consequences.

But it is undeniable, and now conceded by many, that the revolution effected in the middle of the fifteenth century was a reaction, in every department of life, of ancient Paganism against Christianity, and the progress since effected has been simply a progress in the restoration of the ancient heathen order. This reaction commenced in philosophy, literature, and art, and passed into the political order under Louis the Eleventh and Louis the Twelfth of France, Henry the Seventh of England, and Maximilian the First and Charles the Fifth of Germany. From the political order it passed into the religious order, under Luther and Calvin, and the paganized princes and nobles who protected them; and it now, under the modern industrial system, triumphs in the economical order. The modern world, in philosophy, literature, art, politics, religion, morals, and economy, is in principle nothing but the reproduction of ancient heathendom. The simple question,

then, to be settled, in order to determine whether the world in applauding or we in condemning it are to be counted the lunatic, is whether Christianity or Paganism is the true social and religious order. If Paganism is from God and the true civilization, we are the lunatic, and unquestionably ought to be shut up in Bedlam; but if Christianity be true civilization, be from God, and the Gospel is not a cheat, nor our Blessed Lord an impostor, but what he professed to be, then the world is the lunatic, and they who glory in it are laboring under a most deplorable hallucination.

One thing is now certain; the revolution in favor of heathenism has been sufficiently developed to enable all who retain any portion of their wits to see its real character and tendency. Enough has already been experienced to prove that the happy results originally counted on are not likely to follow. The world expected on returning to Paganism to recover in some form the Eden lost by the prevarication of Adam, and at every successive step in its progress it has exulted as if on the very eve of recovering it. The restoration of Paganism was at first complete only in principle, and it has been only gradually, after successive struggles, that it has been practically realized. Christian civilization, the growth of fourteen centuries, effected by the labors and heroic sufferings of so many saints and martyrs, was not to be uprooted in a moment, especially as the Church remained to inspire and defend it. A direct attack on the Christian order in its totality would in the beginning have been imprudent, and defeated itself. It was necessary to divide in order to conquer, to begin by detaching the secular from the spiritual, the human from the Divine. This has been now in a great measure accomplished, and the revolution has finally passed from the order of ideas to the order of facts, and in Catholic nations as well as in Protestant. Philosophy has been disengaged from Christian theology; literature and art have been sundered from Christian faith and piety; religion from the Church; morals from religion; politics from morals; industry from virtue; earth from heaven; man from God. The whole secular order is divorced from the spiritual, and civilization is shaped to man simply as an inhabitant of this world and a creature of mere animal wants and instincts. Nevertheless, the lost Eden has not been recovered, and, to

all appearance, no advance has been made towards its recovery. The separation of politics from morals, and the assertion of the strictly human origin of power, and the absolute independence of the state, have resulted only in anarchy and despotism, not in establishing liberty, as paganized statesmen madly dreamed; philosophy disengaged from Christian theology has become miserable psychology, and results in pantheism or atheism, scepticism or absolute nihilism; literature and art, disengaged from Catholic faith and piety, remain sterile, or bring forth only monstrous births, watery sentimentalism, or gross sensuality; morals sundered from religion become dull routine, heartless conventionalism, all-absorbing selfishness, flimsy sentiment, or unrestrained licentiousness; religion declared independent of the Church sinks into a matter of private reason and mere private caprice, and disappears in gross superstition, wild fanaticism, or cold indifference; and the emancipation of industry from morality, and moulding the whole economical order to the satisfaction of man's sensual wants, have resulted in impoverishing modern nations, and reducing the great mass of the people to the most abject misery.* The divorce of the secular order from the spiritual, the human from the Divine, the boasted achievement of modern progress, has undeniably resulted in the dissolution of society itself. There is absolutely, except the Church, no society now existing, no social order now standing; for that is not society which is sustained only by chicanery and armed force, or which like ours is only a huge mob, acknowledging no law but its own arbitrary will. Disband your great European standing armies, and there is not a single European state that could maintain even the semblance of social order for a single week. Our gain in substituting heathenism for Christianity has been

* The apparent exceptions to this statement are this country and England. In this country the full effects in the economical order of the heathen reaction have not yet been fully experienced by the *free* population of the United States, but it is owing to accidental and temporary causes fast disappearing, such as the youth of the nation, and the vast extent of rich lands unoccupied, and capable of being procured and rendered productive at comparatively a trifling expense. In England herself there may have been no real decrease of capital, but in considering her economically she includes Ireland and India, in both of which the poverty and destitution of the people are such as were unknown, except with the slave populations, if even with them, in the ancient heathen world.

the loss of all spiritual life, all religious faith, all morality, all intellectual freedom and greatness, all loyalty, chivalry, and nobility of sentiment, all political wisdom and all political liberty, all real social order, and, for immense numbers of the poor people, all honest means of subsistence, nay, of the means of subsistence at all. The whole annual income of France, for instance, if equally distributed among the thirty-six millions of Frenchmen, would give to each only between nine and ten cents a day.

Here is where modern progress has brought us. Here is the stern reality that now stares us in the face. Mad as the world is, it cannot be satisfied with this result. Nay, it does not even profess to be satisfied with it, as its heavings and commotions, its insurrections and revolutions, its Communistic and Socialistic theories and schemes, daily and even hourly put forth, amply prove. Never was the world more uneasy, agitated, discontented; and it acknowledges that all it has thus far gained has been a dead loss, unless it be regarded as the necessary condition of attaining to a state not yet attained to. Every body, or almost every body, feels, and feels in his heart and all through his frame, that it is impossible to remain where we are, that we must either push on in the direction we have been rushing for the last four hundred years, or recoil and retrace our steps.

Precisely here comes in our author, and shows, on the one hand, that to advance is impossible without precipitating ourselves into the Socialistic abyss, and, on the other, that, if we recoil and retrace our steps, it is impossible to find a stopping-place short of the Church. The only alternative is now either Socialism or Catholicity. No compromises, no *via media* schemes, no heathen premises with half-Christian conclusions, can now avail any thing. A great man, and for the moment one of the most useful men of society, M. Proudhon, has stripped of all disguises, and with an invincible logic given the thought of the age its precise formula, *LA PROPRIÉTÉ, C'EST LE VOL*, Property is robbery. None of the usual subterfuges of sophists and demagogues, such as Protestantism, liberalism, and moderate democratism, can now be resorted to, for this bold man, with his clear head, iron nerves, and invincible dialectics, has laid them bare, and revealed the age to itself. Nothing therefore remains but Socialism or Catholicity. This assumed or established, the author applies

himself to prove that Socialism is the inevitable result of the Paganism we have fostered, and that it is intrinsically repugnant to all civilization, being in direct contradiction to all the laws of Providence, intellectual, moral, social, political, and economical, and that, on the contrary, Catholicity is adapted to all the real interests of man and society, has been the creator of all the capital of the modern world, is the sole civilizer, and, if submitted to, amply sufficient to redeem us from our present frightful state, to reëstablish social order and political as well as moral freedom, by inspiring virtue, consecrating labor, and inducing moderation in enjoyment.

This is what the author aims to prove; how true and just it is, in our judgment, we need not to inform our readers, for in one form or another we have for years been doing our best to set it forth and to establish it. But the author must permit us to say, and we do so, with great respect and deference, that, in developing and proving his thesis, he uses language, and sometimes adopts, at least in appearance, principles, borrowed from the very heathen schools against which he so nobly and so ably protests. It may be that we do not always catch his precise meaning, and also that what seems to us objectionable comes less from the unsoundness of his thought than from his neglect to state his meaning with the requisite clearness, distinctness, and precision. Nevertheless, we are not able to explain him always in harmony with the Catholicity he professes.

The fundamental distinction between Christianity and heathenism is, that the former asserts God as man's sole first cause and his sole final cause, and the latter asserts man as his own final cause. The one commands us as the rule of life to seek God in all things, and to do all for him; the other bids us in all things to seek ourselves, and to consult in all only our own pleasure. Heathenism was first preached in the Garden by the serpent, who summed it all up in the promise, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil,"—a promise which, though a lie, and made by the father of lies, this age holds to have been true, not hesitating to maintain that the serpent promised the truth, and that man did, by eating of the forbidden fruit, really become as a god. In heathenism man takes the place of God, and stands as the sole end for which he is to live. But man cannot assert himself as his own final cause

without also asserting himself as his own first cause, from which it must follow, either that man is in the strictest sense God, or that man makes himself. But as to assert that man makes himself, and as to hold that man is absolutely God, is too open an outrage upon common sense, heathenism in our times compromises the matter by conceding that God creates the germ, or at least man is given in germ, but is left to develop and complete himself by his own efforts. This developing and completing himself from the original germ is what our age calls progress, and hence progress in the heathen sense implies that man is joint creator, or in part at least the first cause of himself.

Progress in this heathen sense is, as somebody has said, the Evangel of the nineteenth century. We find it asserted everywhere, in theology, ethics, politics, metaphysics, and in universal cosmology. All modern science, in so far as it deigns to recognize a creative God at all, recognizes him as creating only the germs of things, which are completed by their own internal law or force. As to the material universe God created only the gases, which from their own intrinsic force have developed in globes, suns, stars, minerals, plants, and animals. Man is only the last term known to us of a social development which begins in the lowest and rudest form of animal life, and the civilized man is only the development of the savage. Religion is only the successive development and growth of a vague sentiment of the human heart called sometimes a sense of dependence, a sense of the infinite, and Christianity is only the product of this sentiment successively working its way upward through fetichism, polytheism, monotheism, and reposing in a grand syncretism of all preceding religions. Even men who have not the least suspicion of their own orthodoxy carry the same principle into Catholicity, and maintain that Christian doctrine itself was revealed only in germ, and has been formed, completed, in the course of time by development. All proceeds on the assumption, that God never finishes any thing, never creates any thing but the mere germs of things, or reveals any thing but the germs of doctrine, leaving them always to the creature to complete. This is the grand thought of all modern science, and the illustrious author of the *Essay on Development* only applies to the supernatural order, to the formation of Christian doctrine, the principles which the author

of the *Vestiges of Creation* applies to the natural order, or to the formation of the universe, and his well-intended justification of his conversion is after all only an ingenious but undesigned attempt to harmonize unchangeable Christian doctrine with the modern heathen doctrine of progress. So all-pervading is this heathen doctrine, that very few of us are able entirely to escape it; and men whose faith and piety are unquestionable give utterance to principles which need only to be developed to be pantheism or nihilism. These men will not themselves so develop them; the grace they have received, and with which they freely concur, will save them from that; but who can say that others may not come after them who will develop them, and push them to their last logical consequences?

Now we do not suppose that our author in any thing he says intends this heathen doctrine of progress, but he certainly says some things which seem to us to involve it. He, indeed, expressly states that God is our final cause, the end we are to seek at all times and in all things. This is much, and, if consistently maintained, is every thing. But he tells us, man is placed in this world not to satisfy his wants, which is true enough, but to grow, and rise in being by the efforts they awake in his soul (p. 5). "Man is born," he continues, "neither free nor perfect; but simply with the capacity to become so. He brings only his germ. The germ of the apple, for instance, does it not envelop apples? If it withstand the winds and drought, above all, if grafted, as we are, by society, then it bears fruit." "Open your eyes, see that infant in its long clothes. That infant is man. Idiots, lunatics, do not become, they only remain such. Man is born an idiot, without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of his soul." "God has given to men only the capacity to acquire liberty, will, memory, reason, and the other faculties, but only in proportion as they acquire them, so that the inequality among men comes from the fact that they have not all acquired them in equal degrees." (pp. 181, 182.) Over and over again he both asserts and implies that man makes himself, and is the product of his own labor and virtue. He reasons continually on the supposition that man commenced his career in space and time, not merely without political or social liberty, but without liberty as free-will, the principle of moral responsibility, and

had to create his liberty and constitute himself a moral agent. To form his *moi* or personality four thousand years of heathenism were necessary, and the reason why our Blessed Lord was not sooner incarnated is, that the human person, human freedom, human responsibility, was not sooner formed. The Gospel could not have been sooner given, because there was not sooner a human person to receive it, and hence heathenism was a sort of necessary preparation for Christianity. So also he contends, or appears to contend, that Protestantism is a necessary preparation for Catholicity. Protestantism is the religion of personality; it can begin human nature, but cannot complete it. Man forms his personality to offer it to God. Protestant nations are those to whom God has offered half the task, because not prepared for Catholicity, which undertakes human nature on all points at once. This old human nature, though ransomed by four thousand years of suffering and slavery, cannot bear at once the flood of Catholic light and virtue. Though Christianity from the first day triumphed in the Byzantine Empire, the human mind would not adhere to it; and Islamism has saved a people to civilization that else had irrevocably returned to barbarism; and on the decline of Islamism, we shall, perhaps, see them pass under the Aurora of some Protestant sect before arriving at the noonday of Catholicity. (pp. 395, 396.)

The author assumes that man commenced a mere infant, and that the savage is to be regarded as the primitive man. Men were first hunters, then shepherds, and then agriculturists. The earth, as man received it from his Maker, was empty and void, barren sand or naked rock, and he had not only to make himself, but the soil by which he makes himself. As a matter of fact, God, indeed, assisted man in the beginning, made him certain advances; but these are to be considered in the light of temporary loans, to be redeemed in proportion as man forms his own personality, and is able to subsist by himself on his own products. Even Christianity is given to man only in germ, and left to be developed and completed by his own intelligence and virtue, because God cannot outrun man himself, or travel faster than the race. These statements, principles, reasonings, scattered all through the volume before us, and some of them repeated almost to weariness, if

words are to be used in any relation to their plain and natural sense, prove that the author does not wholly escape the errors of modern progressists and developmentists, but does, in some respects, at least, assert progress in what we have termed the heathen sense.

Let us not be misunderstood; we do not condemn progress in every sense. Progress is certainly recognized, demanded, and assisted by our holy religion. But progress in what? We may regard the universe as presenting two cycles, the one the procession by way of creation, not emanation, of existences from God as their first or efficient cause, and the other their return, without being absorbed into God, as Indian pantheism teaches, to him as their final cause or last end. God has created all things, and has created them for himself alone. These two cycles are presented alike in the primitive creation or natural order, and in the new creation or supernatural order, that is, Christianity. In both orders progress in the second cycle is admissible and commanded. But progress in the second cycle is simply moral progress, not physical, a progress in *doing*, not a progress in *being*. It is a progress not in making ourselves, nor in completing ourselves physically, but in fulfilling the end for which God has made us, — in a word, a progress in moral perfection. This is the progress of which St. Paul speaks, when he speaks of pressing forward towards the mark of the prize of the high calling in Christ Jesus, the progress for which we were all made free moral agents, for which the law was given, Christian truth revealed, the Church founded, and the sacraments were instituted, after which every Christian aspires, and the saint successfully strives. This progress is very admissible, and we cannot insist too strenuously on it, or have too much of it.

But in the first cycle, that of creation, there is no progress by the agency of the progressing subject admissible, because God is sole creator, and creates by himself alone; and this alike whether we speak of the natural creation or of the supernatural. Creation *ad extra*, or placing existences in space and time, may or may not be progressive, according to the will of the Creator; all we mean to deny is, that it is progressive in any sense by the agency, will, or concurrence of the creature. In the first cycle God is sole actor, for the action of second causes in all cases, in so far

as the action of second causes, is in the second cycle, or return to God as final cause. Their action never reacts, and completes themselves physically, nor can it ever create any substance or entity. God himself creates all things from nothing by the sole energy of his word, and each after its kind, with a specific and determinate nature, unalterable physically, except by his own will and omnipotence. Thus is it in the first cycle of the natural order. It is the same in the first cycle of the supernatural order, as really and as truly a creation as the natural order itself. *Gratia est omnino gratis*. We can do nothing of ourselves to merit grace, for all merit is of grace. All in this order that pertains to the first cycle is the pure creation or free gift of God, without any merit, effort, or activity of ours; hence Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism are heresies. In the second cycle we of course are active, and to merit must concur actively by grace with grace; but in creating, procuring, conferring, or infusing the grace, we have no part or lot. Determining what shall be revealed, what shall be taught and believed as Christian doctrine, and revealing and teaching it, pertain exclusively to the first cycle, and therefore to God alone. Consequently the development or gradual formation of Christian doctrine by the activity of the human mind, or believing subject, cannot be supposed. Development of Christian doctrine there undoubtedly has been, and if the Gospel were provisional, if it looked to a more perfect religion, as the law looked to Christ, we would add, development there may be. The whole Christian doctrine was revealed in substance to our first parents, but nobody pretends that it was revealed to them as fully and as explicitly as it is possessed by us. But the development, explication, or completion of the primitive revelation has not been affected by the agency of the human mind, supernaturally assisted or unassisted, but by inspiration, by Divine revelation through prophets and apostles, that is, by action of the Holy Ghost in the first cycle. What is to be denied is not the progressiveness of past revelation by Divine agency, but the development and growth of doctrine by the mental or moral action of the faithful.

Here was the radical error of the distinguished author of the *Essay on Development of Christian Doctrine*, an ingenious work, indicating severe intellectual labor, rare speculative powers, extensive erudition, and much honest

endeavor, but which undeniably transports human activity into the first cycle, the peculiar province of God, and makes man joint creator with the Holy Ghost of Christian doctrine. It should excite no surprise that the learned author fell into this error at the time of writing his Essay, for he was not then even a Catholic, and, as he himself confesses, "his eyes were dim, and could but employ reason in the things of faith." He was led into his error by the false philosophy of the age, which asserts that the mind apprehends truth only under subjective forms, and by his Protestantism, which misapprehends the real character of those new definitions and further explications of the faith opposed by the Church to novel heresies and errors as they arise. Confounding the simple belief of the truth with the intellectual process of comprehending it, he fell into the mistake of supposing that heresy has always an honest origin, that it always springs from the necessary and laudable effort of the mind, an effort which every true believer must make, to ascertain and comprehend the truth, and that it always presupposes the faith on the point it contradicts was previously unknown even to the pastors of the Church;—a sad mistake, for the Church has never hesitated as to the faith to be opposed to the novel heresy, which proves that she knew it prior to the heresy, and the heresy never originates in ignorance of the faith or in an honest endeavor to ascertain it, but in the desire to establish a favorite theory, or to follow one's own private judgment. If Dr. Newman, now that he knows something of Catholic theology, and can take St. Thomas for his guide, were to review the Fathers, he would probably find that the theory he has adopted to reconcile their teachings with the actual faith of the Church, or to explain what he regards as their discrepancies and variations of doctrine, is as unnecessary as it is historically, philosophically, and theologically false and inadmissible; and were he to reëxamine his theory itself, he would find, we doubt not, that he has throughout, unconsciously, mistaken development and growth of heresy for development and growth of Christian doctrine. In the sense of further explications or new definitions of the faith explicitly held from the beginning by the Church, though not by every individual pastor, *contra errores insurgentes*, as St. Thomas says, development is certainly to be asserted; but in the sense of evolving by

the action of the faithful new articles, dogmas, or propositions of faith, unknown to the primitive pastors of the Church, and not proposed to primitive believers, it cannot be asserted, especially on the ground, that the human mind can apprehend and believe truth only under special aspects, and as it subjects it to its own formative process; for it gives to the mind a share in the formation of Christian doctrine. It is as to doctrine precisely what Semi-Pelagianism is as to merit; for it assigns to revelation, the Divine action, in the formation of doctrine, the precise office that Semi-Pelagianism assigns to grace in the formation of Christian character. Semi-Pelagianism developed is pure Pelagianism, and pure Pelagianism developed is pure heathenism, the last word of which is Socialism.

Now it is precisely progress in this first cycle that modern heathenism asserts, and the real error of the age is in attempting to do God's work, and in neglecting its own. The more advanced portion of the age, they who best represent its spirit, reject the supernatural order altogether, and assert progress in the first cycle simply of the natural; the less advanced portion, who wish to be considered as remaining within the pale of Christendom, admit the supernatural order indeed, but they show their sympathy with the age by asserting that God creates and reveals it only in germ, and we are to complete it by our own intelligence and virtue. But do we know what it is to assert progress in the first cycle? It implies, as we have seen, that man, in part at least, is his own first cause, the joint creator of himself, and this, which is a manifest absurdity, implies that God is not our sole final cause. God is our sole final cause only in that he is our sole first cause. If he is not our sole creator, we are not bound to seek him as our ultimate end in all things and at all times. Thus to seek him is to render unto him the tribute of our whole being as his due; but we cannot so render unto him the whole as his due, unless he has created the whole. What we have ourselves created, supposing it possible for us to create something, is our own, and we owe it to no one. We may, *pro tanto*, live for ourselves, and therefore are not bound, as our author and Christianity assert, to live for God alone. "Man forms his personality," says the author, "to offer it to God." This has a pious sound, but if man is the author of his own personality in whole or in part, he

does not owe it to God, and then in giving it to God he offers God something he has not received from God, and in crowning it God crowns, not his own gifts to man, but man's gifts to him. This is not Catholic doctrine. God is our sole final, because our sole first cause. To deny that he is our sole first cause is to deny Catholic faith, to subvert the foundation of Christian morals, and to assert in principle the very heathenism our author so bravely, and for the most part so successfully, combats.

The author is correct in saying that idiots do not become, but simply remain such, though not in affirming the same of all lunatics, *aliénés*; for men of intelligence and virtue have been known to become insane. It is not true to say that man is born an idiot, without any of the faculties of his soul, and with only the capacity to acquire them, for idiots are precisely those who are born without that capacity, in the only sense in which we can be said to possess it. It is, moreover, a grave error to maintain that any man is born without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of the soul, and only with the power to acquire them. The soul, strictly speaking, does not and cannot acquire its faculties, for they are it, and indistinguishable from it. Faculties are distinguishable in the soul, not from the soul. They are not accidental to the soul, but essential, and enter into its very substance or entity. To suppose it *in potentia* to any one of them is to suppose it *in potentia* to them all; and to suppose it *in potentia* to them all is to suppose it to be itself *in potentia*, a merely possible soul, without any actual existence, — a soul which God indeed may create *ad extra* if he chooses, but which he has not as yet so created. The soul may be *in potentia* to acts, but not to faculties.

In a certain sense the infant is no doubt the germ of the man, but only as to the body, not as to the soul, which is properly the man. The soul is born with all its faculties even in the idiot, and is no subject of development or growth, for it is a simple, immaterial substance; and hence it is not by development and growth, but by infused grace, that man is able to aspire to a perfection above the plane on which he is born. In passing from infancy to manhood the soul does not grow; only the bodily organs grow, and their development and growth fall within the second cycle, not the first. To assume that the soul grows be-

cause these material organs grow, is to confound the soul with the body, and to assume that the faculties of the soul are simply bodily developments, which is rank materialism. The soul, being in a manner inexplicable to us united to a body, has no ordinary way of manifesting itself externally except through bodily organs; but it in no sense depends on them for its faculties or intrinsic power to operate. Moreover, even since the Creator has willed to perpetuate the race by generation, as to the body, rather than by renewed creations, if man born in the bosom of society were born only in germ, it would not follow that the race began as a mere germ, and that the law which governs the race is that of development and growth; for the new-born child is not a new mankind, nor a renewal of mankind, but the continuation of the race, and presupposes the race already existing in its maturity.

The author cannot maintain that man is born without liberty in the sense of free will, and that he is not created, but makes himself, a responsible being. Free will is essential to man. The author himself terms it *le moi*, the personality, and therefore it is the last complement of man's rational nature, without which, unless supplied by the Divine personality, as in the human nature of Christ, that nature has no subsistence. Yet man, as yet insubsistent, gives to his nature its last complement! Free will is a *vis*, and therefore an *ens*; can man create not only an *ens*, but his own *ens*, or rather *existens*? It would require, we apprehend, somewhat more than four thousand years of heathenism to enable him to do that. If man is born without free will, without responsibility, or even the principle of responsibility, how will the author explain original sin, and the baptism of infants? If the child is not born with free will, a real person, he is born simply a thing or an animal. Can a mere thing or a mere animal be born a sinner, and be the proper subject of baptism? The author can hardly be aware of the heretical consequences his doctrine, that men are born idiots, without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of the soul, necessarily involves.

There is something unpleasant to us in the doctrine that heathenism was a necessary preparation for Christianity, or that Protestantism is a useful preparation for Catholicity. The author seems to us to lose sight in his theorizing

of the salvation of individual souls, the bearing of heathenism and Protestantism on the world to come, and thus incurs the very guilt he charges upon the age. Those false and heretical religions are fatal to the souls of all who adhere to them, and it does not seem to us compatible with what we know of God, that he should make it necessary for generations to live and die in a state of sin and damnation, in order to prepare the way for succeeding generations to live and die in a state of justice and salvation. We would respectfully recommend to the author's meditation the assertion of St. Paul, that without faith it is impossible to please God, and the Catholic dogma, which so many in our days forget, or attempt to explain away, that out of the Church no one shall ever be saved.

Moreover, the author mistakes the duration of heathenism as the prevailing order of society. He speaks of its having endured four thousand years before the birth of our Lord. No doubt it was in the world from the time the serpent seduced Eve in the Garden, but it was formed and carried away the nations not till about the time of the calling of Abraham. The primitive patriarchal religion even in the time of Abraham does not appear to have been generally abandoned by the nations, and idolatry was probably general only in Chaldea. Melchisedech king of Salem, worshipped the true God. So did Abimelech king of Gerar, and so also Pharaoh king of Egypt. But let this pass. Heathenism, we are told, prepared the way for Christianity by constituting human liberty, the personality, or free will; but this cannot be true, for the origin of heathenism was precisely in the abuse of free will, in the perverse activity of human personality, in egotism or pride, and necessarily supposes the personality already formed. Protestantism again is, the author says, the religion of personality; yet, with his permission, not, as he supposes, the religion that forms the personality, and so far so good, and failing only in that it does not offer the personality to God after having formed it; but a religion that springs from the personality substituting itself for God. It is simply apostasy from the Church, as heathenism was from the primitive or patriarchal religion, that is, simply heathenism under modern conditions. It is a grave mistake to suppose that an apostasy from the truth is a preparation for the truth. Christianity in its substance is older than hea-

thenism, and has come down to us, not through the line of the gentiles, as the author's St. Simonian friends maintain, but through the Patriarchs, the Synagogue, and the Catholic Church. Protestantism is not the dawn of Catholicity, but its setting; and if it retains some rays of light, they are only such as gild the evening clouds after the sun has sunk below the horizon. Mistake not the evening twilight, which soon is swallowed up in darkness, for the morning twilight that ushers in the day. Catholicity is prior to Protestantism, not its development. Truth is before error; God before man; orthodoxy before heresy. This old human nature, of which the author speaks, is undoubtedly unable to bear on all points at once the flood of Catholic truth and virtue, but who asks it to bear it? Nature alone assuredly is unequal to the splendor of Catholic faith or the sublimity of Catholic virtue, but what then? The author should not have forgotten that Catholic faith and virtue are not expected without grace, that sufficient grace is given unto every man, and that, though we can do nothing of ourselves, we can do all things through Christ strengthening us. The Catholic never reasons well when he forgets to make any account of grace.

We cannot accept the author's doctrine that the savage was the primitive state of mankind. It is not historically true that men were first hunters, then shepherds, and then agriculturists. Cain, the first-born of Adam, was an agriculturist, and offered in sacrifice the first fruits of the earth; Abel, the second-born, was a shepherd or herdsman, and offered the firstlings of his flocks. Some suppose Lamech was a hunter, but the first hunter distinctly named is Nemrod, who is also represented as a great builder of cities. It is the opinion of theologians that men did not eat flesh till God gave them permission to do so after the flood. There is no evidence that Adam, immediately after his expulsion from the Garden, or that Noah and his family, immediately after the deluge, fell into the savage state, and all the monuments of antiquity that remain tend to prove the reverse. Universal tradition ascribes civilization directly to the Divinity, and those nations that have in process of time become civilized always confess to having borrowed their civilization from nations previously civilized. Thus the Greeks ascribe theirs to Egyptian and Phœnician colonies. Nations once civilized have been

known to lapse into the barbarous or savage state, but there is no instance on record of a savage tribe, by its spontaneous efforts, having risen from the savage to the civilized state, and the author himself maintains that the savage state is unprogressive. The savage is the degenerated, not the primitive man, and no more the inchoate civilized man than the heretic is an inchoate believer.

These considerations sufficiently refute the doctrine which appears to be authorized by the plain and natural force of M. Saint-Bonnet's language; but we are free to confess that it is not impossible but that, in some respects, we have drawn a meaning from his language which he does not himself distinctly intend. Though as a writer he is bold, vigorous, and striking, he is not remarkably clear, precise, or exact. He writes as if he held logical precision and technical exactness in lofty disdain; and he appears to aim at moving the heart through the imagination still more than through the understanding. His words are familiar, and his sentences for the most part simply constructed, but what he really means by them we are often at a loss to determine. He is a disciple of the modern Romantic School, and, like Chateaubriand, sacrifices at times distinctness of thought and exactness of doctrine to æsthetic effect. The Church in the Catechism is always clear, distinct, exact, and precise in expression, and in reading the brilliant pages of the author of *Les Martyrs* and *Le Genie du Christianisme*, we often wish that he had taken the pains to learn it. His errors, although never springing from his heart, are but poorly atoned for by the charms of his style and the fervor of his sentiments. We are old-fashioned enough to prefer orthodoxy to highly excited sensibility, felicitous phrases, or happily turned periods. In his own mind, in his own understanding of his words, it is not impossible, after all, that our author is, for the most part, defensible. The chief errors we seem to find in his pages grow out of his neglect to distinguish the meaning of his terms, and to distribute his assertions according to their respective categories. He usually says what he means, but we suspect he does not always mean what he says. He expresses his meaning, but at the same time something more, or something else.

The author certainly uses the word *liberty* in the sense of free will, *le moi*, personality, the principle of moral re-

sponsibleness, and just as certainly uses it for the perfection which is acquired by the right exercise of free will, and that, too, without in the least distinguishing the one sense from the other. In the sense of free will, liberty is the person, enters into the essential definition of man, and pertains to him in the first cycle, or to his physical nature. To say that liberty in this sense is acquired, or that in this sense man is born without liberty, is false, and involves all the consequences we have indicated. But to say that liberty, as the exercise of free will, as sanctity, as "the liberty of the sons of God," of which the Blessed Apostle speaks, is acquired, or that in this sense man is born without it, is perfectly true, for he is born a sinner, and not even with the capacity to acquire it without grace. The author confounds the two senses and reasons as if the two were one and the same sense, and hence asserts the error along with the truth.

Man, the author says, is born neither free nor perfect, but simply with the capacity to become so, and if he were born free and perfect the Socialists would be right. The question as to freedom we have just disposed of. As to being born perfect, we must distinguish. In the first cycle, in his physical nature, in his essential qualities or attributes, man is most certainly born perfect, that is, perfect in his kind, perfect man, though not, of course, perfect God; that is, again, he is born with the full complement of his nature as pure nature; but in the second cycle, in the moral order, he is not born perfect, for he is born a sinner under the dominion of Satan, as the Church teaches expressly in her Councils, and in exorcising and baptizing the newborn infant. The author confounds these two senses, and so asserts the error with the truth, and fails to negative, except in part, the doctrine of the Socialists. The error of the Socialists is not in asserting that man is born perfect as to the first cycle, for that they do not assert; but in asserting that he is born perfect as to the second cycle, that is, without sin, pure, holy, in no need of pardon or redemption. The author contradicts them in this last doctrine, it is true, but agrees with them in the former, which, if possible, is the more fatal error of the two.

The author makes an analogous mistake in regard to all our faculties. He uniformly confounds the faculty in the first cycle with the faculty in the second; that is, the fac-

ulty as it enters into the essential definition of man with its exercise, or the perfection attainable by its exercise. Man is born, he says, without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of his soul. God has given him only the capacity to acquire them; and men possess them only in the degree in which they acquire them; and hence the inequality which exists among men in society comes from the fact that they have not all acquired them equally. Hence the origin of ranks and social inequalities. They express the varying degrees in which individuals have acquired their faculties. Here is a truth and a falsehood. As they enter into his essential definition, man is not born without his faculties; as they mean simply the perfection acquired by their exercise, of course he is born without them, and possesses them only in the degree in which he acquires them. But whether social ranks and distinctions are always in the ratio of virtue is another question, to which we shall have occasion to return before we close.

What we regard as the author's errors originate mainly in this confusion of thought, this confounding of faculty with the perfection attainable by it, of the actor with the act, being with doing; but it is only simple justice to him to say, that, though he fails to distinguish the truth from the falsehood in his expressions, and even in his reasonings, the truth is that which is uppermost in his mind. When he tells us man is born an idiot, without any of his faculties, it is only fair to presume that it is faculty in the sense of the perfection that comes from its exercise that he chiefly intends. When he says that man makes himself, his real though not distinctly stated meaning is, that man makes himself morally, which, though rather commonplace, is strictly true, for a man's morality or virtue is always his own act. This is true, notwithstanding his moral perfection of himself is not possible without grace moving, assisting, and elevating him, because the grace by which he perfects himself is in the first cycle, and is not his act, but the principle of his act, and only physically completes him, so to speak, as an actor under God's *gracious* Providence. If man makes himself morally, that is, developes and completes himself in the second cycle, he must make morally, as to the same cycle, whatever enters into him as its necessary condition. Thus, though he has

nothing to do with creating, procuring, conferring, or infusing grace, yet, to obtain the perfection that is by it, he must by it concur voluntarily with it, and by this concurrence make it his, or, what is the same thing, the perfection that is by it his perfection. So of the globe and all the things pertaining to it, necessary to his perfection; he must himself morally make and appropriate them. Hence man makes both himself and the soil of the globe he inhabits; that is, in order to attain the end for which God has made him, man must make a right use of his free will, both in regard to himself and to all not himself, and can no more become perfect by immorality in the economical or industrial order, than in any other department of life, which is undoubtedly true. Man must use, and not abuse, both his faculties and the world.

Keeping in mind these distinctions, we may proceed to a more particular analysis of the volume before us. The work is directed against the Revolutionists, Socialists, Liberalists, and Communists of the day. It is divided into three books, the first on Capital, the second on Order, the third on Aristocracy; and it is designed to show that the economical, social, and political doctrines approved by the age, and contended for by the classes named, if reduced to practice, must result in the destruction of all virtue, all capital, all government, all society, and of man himself, save as a mere savage. It undertakes to do this by showing the conditions of capital or property, its relation to individual virtue and the constitution of families, the relation of families to the aristocracy and social order, and the relation of the aristocracy to government, to the constitution, preservation, and progress of society, or the continued increase of capital and virtue. Capital founds man, the freeman as distinguished from the slave, man founds the family, families found the aristocracy, and the aristocracy found and direct society, while capital itself is founded by virtue, and virtue by religion. To destroy religion is to destroy virtue, to destroy virtue is to destroy capital, to destroy capital is to destroy liberty or the freeman, to destroy the freeman is to destroy families, to destroy families is to destroy the aristocracy, to destroy the aristocracy is to destroy government, and to destroy government is to destroy society, and to destroy society is to drive men back to the savage state. The labor of the au-

thor is to show that all these elements act and react on and produce one another, and that civilization is only the result of their mutual action and reaction, and can be produced, preserved, or restored only by the presence and concurrence of them all. Consequently, to attack religion, virtue, capital, individual freedom, family, aristocracy, or authority, is to attack civilization, nay, man himself.

The author starts with the important assertion, that the radical error of the age, under an economical as well as a theological point of view, is the assumption that man is here simply to enjoy, that the end of production is the satisfaction of his desires, and therefore that in all his efforts and arrangements he is to consult the greatest possible consumption. Man is not placed in this world to satisfy his wants, but to grow, — morally, — by the efforts they awaken in his soul. The end of production is not consumption, but moral growth, the establishment of man in his liberty, his individual independence, and the development and completion of his moral faculties. In consequence of the Fall, man has now to make this independence for himself, and he makes it by virtue of capital. But such is the disorder of his nature that to acquire capital without effort, or to possess it without labor, is morally destructive. Wealth acquired by idleness or robbery only corrupts him, while wealth acquired by labor renders him moral. Hence, as God has made capital necessary to the production and maintenance of liberty or manhood, he has made labor necessary to the production of capital; and therefore has placed in man hunger, thirst, and other wants, for the purpose of forcing him to labor.

Capital is not, as Jews and merchants formerly imagined, a surplusage of coin laid by, but what man has produced over and above what he has consumed, and consists in the soil he has created and fertilized, his dwelling-houses, barns, out-houses, fixtures, utensils, implements of agriculture, mechanics' shops and tools, provisions, clothing, mills, roads, governments, laws, institutions, manners, customs, habits, education, instruction, &c. Capital is the product of labor, and labor decomposed is sorrow and liberty. Sorrow or pain, *douleur*, excites liberty or activity, and man labors or works, and produces.

Man has had to produce all by his own labor, — himself and the very soil of the globe. The world when he re-

ceived it from his Maker was, under the economical point of view, empty and void, barren sand or naked rock. Its soil was not yet created, its surface was not yet clothed with verdure, for the rains had not descended to water it, since as yet there was no man to till it. Man had not only to make himself a freeman, but the very soil of the globe, without which he could neither make himself nor even subsist. True, his Creator came to his aid, made him certain temporary advances, placed him in the East in a warm climate, under a clement sky, on a fertile oasis, where he could live with scanty clothing, and on the spontaneous productions of the earth. But this was only a provisional order, and in no sense the law by which man was to subsist on this globe. These advances were only temporary loans to liberty, indispensable in the first instance, but to be redeemed or withdrawn in proportion as man acquires his liberty, and becomes able to stand by himself and subsist on his own products, and therefore not to be considered in determining the great economical law by which capital is created, and liberty constituted. "En dehors de l'absolu il y a la liberté. Bien qu'elle ait eu commencement, elle repose sur la grande loi ; il faut qu'elle soit par elle-même. Sa première mise de fonds lui est retirir tous les jours, afin que son moi lui soit propre." We are therefore to proceed as if no advances had been made, and to consider the law to be precisely what it would have been, if man had really been cast a mere germ of a man upon the barren sand or naked rock, and left to create the soil, and complete himself by his own efforts, or the efforts to which his inherent wants impel him. Without these wants he would not labor ; without labor he could neither grow nor subsist. But if he wastes his faculties as fast as he develops them, consumes as fast as he produces, he creates no capital ; for capital is the excess of production over consumption. Hence the conditions of capital are want, — sorrow or pain, *douleur*, — liberty, and abstinence ; that is, labor in producing, and moderation in consuming.

Man is naturally averse to this moderation. He is naturally inclined to produce only to satisfy his wants, and — as his wants always more than keep pace with his means of satisfying them — to consume all he produces. To practise this moderation therefore demands an effort against nature, the virtue of self-denial, not possible with-

out religion. Religion is indispensably necessary to produce this virtue of moderation, and it produces it by teaching us that the end of production is not consumption, is not to satisfy wants, but to prepare man for the future life, to form his personality that he may offer it to God. Hence, in the last analysis, religion is the essential basis of capital, and through it of liberty, family, aristocracy, government, order, and society. As religion depends on the Church, the clergy are the real producers of capital; and as a matter of fact, the modern world while it listened to the Catholic clergy had augmented its capital fivefold over that of the ancient world, and has found it diminishing in proportion as it has ceased to respect them, abandoned the Church and her maxims, and returned to heathenism. So great has been this diminution of capital in the principal European nations during the last century and a half, that they are, unless they immediately retrace their steps, on the eve of being forced to reëstablish slavery, the resort of antiquity to supply the deficiency of capital.

Man constitutes his liberty, and therefore his virtue, only by the creation of capital, and in proportion as he creates it. Capital, as the indispensable condition and as the product of liberty and virtue, is always in proportion to merit. It is acquired by individuals in various degrees, according to their respective degrees of merit. Hence in society we find a distinction of ranks, such as people, burghers, nobles, saints, and the several ranks express the various degrees in which capital, and therefore personality, liberty, and virtue, have been acquired. Every rank is the expression of the degree of merit acquired by its members. The superior ranks owe their superior rank to their superior merit. The aristocracy of a nation are its merit, its capital, its virtue, its religion, and the more numerous and powerful they are, and the higher they are elevated above the people, the more wealthy, virtuous, and meritorious is the nation. A nation that can no longer produce an aristocracy, or that has lost its aristocracy, whether by democratic revolution or by their adopting the manners and sentiments of the people, has ceased to be progressive, has become a spendthrift, is obliged to live on its capital, its past savings, which must be soon exhausted, and, if left to itself, cannot fail to lapse into the barbarous or savage state.

The aristocracy, the superior classes, are the saved prod-

ucts, the hoardings of a nation. In like manner as capital is indispensable to production are they indispensable to national progress. They are literally the capital of the nation, at once the producers and the product of its virtue. A nation without an aristocracy can no more be productive, than labor can be productive without capital. Religion founds virtue, virtue founds the aristocracy, the aristocracy founds capital, and through it society, and society founds man, or is the essential condition of man's development and completion of himself. This is the order.

The people of themselves found nothing; they have never constituted and never can constitute society, because they are precisely those whose liberty or virtue is least developed, and who are nearest the infancy of the race, the least advanced from the savage state. To turn towards them, as is the fashion of the day, to find the institutors or restorers of society, is to turn towards brute matter. The present deplorable condition of the European nations springs from the vices and faults of the aristocracy, who have abandoned their order in adopting the manners and sentiments of the people, or, in a word, have ceased to be aristocrats, and made themselves *people*, or at best mere burghers or commons. The question as to social restoration, especially as to the restoration of French society, turns entirely on the fact whether the aristocracy have still remaining capital and virtue enough to resume and perform the proper offices of their order, and as to France in particular, whether the *Bourgeoisie*, who by the revolution of 1789 wrested power from the hands of the old *Noblesse*, are able to take their place, and discharge the proper functions of a true aristocracy. If so, European society will be restored; if not, the great European nations must fall into the condition of savages, or of the barbarous tribes that now roam over the sites of the once renowned empires of the old Asiatic world.

This is a brief and a very unsatisfactory analysis of M. Saint-Bonnet's work, and can give no adequate conception of its value to one who has not read the volume itself, the great merit of which consists in its details, in its treatment of particular or special questions, rather than in its general theory; but we have given as faithful and as full an analysis as our time and space have permitted. To our apprehension there is much and important truth in the

volume, but also much error, growing out of what is to us a painful confusion of thought, a careless blending together of distinct categories. We agree entirely with the author as to the essential elements and conditions of society; but as to the production or evolution of these elements and conditions, if we understand him, we must differ from him. Is the author treating of the historical origin and constitution of society, or of its mere logical origin and constitution? Is he describing the action and reaction of the several social elements in society regarded as already constituted and in operation; or is he pointing out how in the historical order these elements have been successively developed from original germs, and combined into a civilized society? We confess we are unable to say which he is really doing, and he seems to us to do sometimes the one and sometimes the other, without noting that both are not one and the same. As we understand the author, he is obliged throughout to obtain the cause either from the effect or in producing it. He assumes that man starts as a mere germ, to be completed by self-development, and yet he makes completely developed manhood the essential condition of that self-development. Man is virtually cast a mere germ upon the barren sand or naked rock, and compelled to make himself and the soil of the globe by which he subsists and makes himself. Man, the author tells us, makes the soil, the soil makes the climate, the climate makes the blood, the blood makes the man, and thus man makes himself. But how make the soil before he himself is made? How get the effect before the cause, or convert it into the cause of itself? Capital is given always as the essential condition of religion and virtue, and yet it is declared to be the product of religion and virtue. Savages remain savages because they have no capital. They cannot cease to be savages without capital, and cannot acquire capital without ceasing to be savages. The human race began in the savage state, and the *people*, or lowest class, in civilized communities, are those who remain in that state or who have advanced but a step beyond it. The aristocracy have been produced by an advance beyond it, and yet no advance beyond it is possible without the aristocracy, but by their aid. We do not see how the author has contrived to get his aristocracy, or the human race out of the savage state.

The necessity of the aristocracy — we use the word in a good sense — we cheerfully concede; that they raise the people, not the people themselves, and found, preserve, and govern society, we hold to be indubitable. Society without an aristocracy, without diversities of ranks and conditions, is absolutely inconceivable, and what your mad European and some American democrats propose as society, constituted after their principles of *liberty, equality, fraternity*, is only the negation of all society. But we are unable to reconcile this with the author's doctrine that mankind began in the savage state, that the aristocracy have been evolved by man's labors at self-development, and that the *première mise de fonds* of liberty are to be regarded only in the light of temporary loans, to be daily withdrawn as man's personality is formed. Holding with the author in the former doctrine, we are obliged to dissent from him in the latter. We are obliged to hold that the adult is prior to the infant, the aristocracy to the people, civilized society to the savage state; and that the advances made by the Creator in the beginning are to be regarded not as temporary loans simply, to enable the race to start, but as a permanent grant of capital to the race; and therefore, that the economical law is not that of the creation from nothing, but the preservation and right employment of capital. Consequently, when individuals or nations have exhausted their portion of the original capital, or advances made by the Creator, their only resource is in those who have retained their portion, and properly employed it. This capital, in so far as essential to individual virtue and social well-being, was originally invested with the priesthood as its trustees, who were thus constituted from the beginning the true and only real aristocracy, the first fathers, institutors, and directors of the people, or of society.

No doubt, M. Saint-Bonnet concedes the fact of the primitive advances, but, if we understand him, they are to be regarded as merely accidental, and the law which governs the race is that of self-evolution and self-subsistence. He seems to suppose, because individuals born in the bosom of society have a progress and grow from infancy to manhood, we must, in considering the law of civilization, assume that the race itself began originally in infancy, and has had an analogous progress or growth. The race, indeed, exists not without individuals, but yet it

exists, the author's conceptualism to the contrary notwithstanding; but abstracted from individuals it has no destiny. It returns to God as final cause, but only in individuals; consequently, only individuals have, or can have, any progress. The physical conditions of this progress pertain solely to the first cycle, and must therefore be given outright by the Creator; for man creates only morally, that is, by the physical aid of the essential conditions of progress morally concurs with them. These conditions, under the present point of view, are expressed by the word *society*. Individuals can be born only in society, and it is only in society that they can subsist, grow, and accomplish their destiny. Consequently, society, and whatever is essential to it, must be instituted and exist before the race can begin to propagate and continue itself by the generation of individuals, or by the production of man in germ, as M. Saint-Bonnet considers the infant. Man as the race must therefore have been man before he was a child, and the race, that is, mankind on this globe, must be conceived as commencing, not in infancy, but in adult age, in complete and vigorous manhood, as we know from faith was the fact. God created our first parents, not babies, not savages, but full grown, and gave them to start with all that is essential to the institution and conservation of the highest civilized society. Thus we must always proceed on the principle that man started, not from the lowest, but from the highest level of human society, and with the means of raising individuals, as successively born, to the same level. The aristocracy which founds society, civilization, elevates the people, and renders virtue possible and actual, was given in the beginning, was originally in Adam, and during the whole continuance of the primitive or patriarchal order, in the patriarch, in the *pater-familias*, who was both priest and king.

In process of time the priest and the king have been disengaged from the *pater-familias*, and separated into a sacerdotal class and a royal class. The king has gradually become the king and nobility, the secular prince and the secular aristocracy; but the clergy, the king, and nobility were all in Adam, and whatever virtue or capital they represent is only the virtue or capital with which mankind started in him. The aristocracy have always subsisted in the race, and never been evolved from the people, or ob-

tained as the result of the growth or progress of individuals. They subsist always in society, engaged or disengaged, as its essential elements, and no society is conceivable without them, any more than an individual man is conceivable without reason and free will. The moral progress of man is not in creating them, is not in becoming them, but in submission and obedience to the principles they embody and the laws they administer. Consequently, though the aristocracy have been disengaged and become in some respects distinct classes in society, we are not to consider them the product of acquired virtue, and must still assume them as existing and in full vigor at the moment God placed the human race on this globe; and therefore we must take as our point of departure society constituted, civilization or social perfection realized, or placed by God in advance.

We thus, when we reason of the human race or of society, place the point of perfection in the beginning, not in the end, in God's work, not in man's. For individuals in a moral sense we place the point of perfection in the end, and regard it as the product of individual effort under the social conditions which God has provided. Hence we do not fall under the necessity of supposing self-production, which is inconceivable; that man makes the aristocracy, the aristocracy make society, and society makes the man. The aristocracy, in our sense of the word, subsist from the beginning, therefore from the beginning society exists, is constituted; and therefore from the beginning there subsist all the necessary conditions of individual growth, all the conditions necessary for the individual to fulfil his destiny, that is, return to God as his final cause. We have nothing to do with founding society, or founding an aristocracy to found it. God has done all that for us.

M. Saint-Bonnet holds that social ranks and distinctions as they actually exist are determined by virtue or merit, and simply mark the several degrees of moral progress made by the members of society. He recognizes four different ranks, the people, burghers or commons, nobles, and saints. The people are the lowest, the poorest, the least virtuous, those who have advanced least in forming their manhood, and remain nearest infancy or the savage state. The burghers, *la Bourgeoisie*, are those who have risen a degree above the people, the nobles those

who have risen a degree above the burghers, and saints are those who rise above the nobles, those who have reached the goal, attained to perfect manhood. Every individual, in his own person or that of his family, must pass successively through these several degrees in order to become a saint, must be successively people, burgher, noble, and then saint; for he can be a saint only by these successive purifications of his blood. Sometimes a rare individual goes in his own person through all these successive purifications, and from one of the people becomes a saint; more ordinarily, however, a man of the people becomes, by his virtue, accumulation of capital, and the purification of his blood, a burgher, and founds a respectable burgher family; in process of time, a member of this burgher family by a similar process raises himself to the class of nobles, and founds a noble family; after some generations, perhaps, a member of this noble family in the same way rises to be a saint, and it may be to found a family of saints. Saints are generally from the ranks of the nobility.

This is too fanciful for our taste. In our mode of considering social ranks, the lowest are not those who have not yet risen to manhood, but those who have fallen below it, and the highest are not those who have acquired, but those who retained, their original rank of freemen. The aristocracy may be replenished or recruited by individuals from the people, but, as a social order or class, they are never to be regarded as people developed and completed, any more than believers are to be regarded as heretics developed and completed, or Catholicity as the development and completion of Protestantism.

Moreover, we are not prepared to concede that the true aristocracy owe their rank either to their blood or to their personal merit. We are too much of a republican to believe that God has created two races of men, one noble and the other ignoble, and men themselves cannot create races. The most subtle chemical analysis can detect no difference between the blood of the noble and that of the people. M. Saint-Bonnet himself places, very properly, the clergy at the head of the aristocracy, and calls them the first or chief aristocracy; and the clergy, under Christianity, are taken indiscriminately from all classes of society, and it is fair to presume that, if blood were a matter of importance, the Church would make it a condition in can-

didates for Holy Orders. Our Lord selected his Apostles, not from the highest, but the lowest class of their countrymen, poor fishermen and despised publicans. It does not appear that St. Peter was distinguished for his blood, nor is the aristocracy, the aristocracy that founds and directs society we mean, always such in consequence of personal merit. It is an aristocracy of office, position, education, science, and manners, an aristocracy which does not make itself, but which God mediately or immediately institutes for religious, moral, and social purposes. The efficacy of the sacraments does not depend on the personal merit of the minister. Aristocracy is an office, a trust, and they who hold it are responsible for the manner in which they discharge its duties. This is certainly true of the clergy, and was originally true of the secular nobility, and the great and deplorable fall of modern society was effected when the title became expressive of a social rank without an official rank or corresponding employment. The feudal nobility was not a mere titular nobility, and England shows some relic of her old Catholic wisdom in restricting the title of noble to the members of her House of Peers. The author either takes blood and merit in an unauthorized sense, or else he pushes his theory to a ridiculous extreme. As a matter of fact, the clergy, the only real aristocracy, are in personal merit infinitely superior to any other class of society, but some of them have not led very edifying lives, and their efficiency in respect to civilization, as in respect to salvation, is in their office, in the doctrine, the sacraments, the discipline of which they are the ministers, not in their personal virtue.

The author attributes the savage state to the lack of capital, and the lack of capital to the lack of security. The savage has no security that if he sows he shall reap.— and therefore sows not and fails to make the soil, the soil fails to make the climate, the climate fails to make the food, and so he himself remains unmade. But savages have among them all the social ranks and distinctions ordinarily found in civilized communities. Our American Indians have their priestly, their royal, and their noble families. How happens it that their aristocracy do not establish this security, found society, and raise their people to a civilized state? Nay, this very lack of security is exaggerated. The depredations of one tribe upon another are not

more common than the depredations of one state upon another among modern civilized states, and there are few civilized communities now to be found in which internal police, according to the Indian sense, is better maintained than in the bosom of the tribe itself. The reason is obvious enough why our Indian aristocracy fail to establish society. It is not in the lack of capital, unless we use the word in a sense which begs the whole question, nor in the lack of security, nor yet in the lack of blood; but in the lack of the true religion and the orthodox clergy, the only civilizers. Send the Catholic missionary among them, let him preach Christ crucified to them, catechize and baptize them, and feed them with the bread of angels, and they become good Christians, even saints; and that too in the first generation, without any change as to material capital, the soil, the climate, or the blood. Here is a fact that suggests to us a strong doubt as to M. Saint-Bonnet's theory of capital and blood. The saint, according to that very theory, is highest in the social hierarchy, and the most perfect form of developed manhood. Yet here is your poor savage, by faith and the sacraments, with no other change than they imply, becoming a saint, and rising to the topmost round of civilization. Many a congregation of savages, converted by our humble, laborious, and self-sacrificing missionaries, in all the really Christian virtues can put to shame not a few of your European kings and nobles. Yet nothing in their condition that comes properly under the head of capital has been changed. They live mainly by fishing and hunting, as did their ancestors.

The early Christians, the saints and martyrs, who by their faith, their piety, their zeal, their charity, and their heroic sufferings conquered pagan Rome, and planted the cross in triumph on the capital of the world, were seldom gathered from the secular nobility or the nominally superior classes of society, but chiefly from slaves, the poor, and the ignoble. - For you see your vocation, brethren, that not many are wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble; but the foolish things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the wise; and the weak things of the world hath God chosen that he may confound the strong; and the mean things of the world, and things that are contemptible, hath God chosen, and things that are not, that he might destroy the

things that are; that no flesh should glory in his sight. But from him are ye in Christ Jesus, who is made to us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption, that, as it is written, He that glorieth may glory in the Lord.* This was true not only in the beginning, but it is the settled order of God's providence in advancing his kingdom in this world. He chooses always the course opposed to that which human wisdom opposes. The Blessed Apostle makes no account of material capital; he says nothing of its being necessary, in order to attain to sanctity, that man should make the soil, the soil the climate, the climate the blood, and the blood the saint. Capital and blood, except the blood of Christ that cleanseth from all sin, do not appear to have been regarded by him as of any importance at all, in the process of making saints. The reason probably is, that sanctity is not a plant of natural growth, nor a product of natural culture. The Apostle always places it in the supernatural order, and teaches that it is from God through Christ Jesus, who is made to us wisdom, and justice, and sanctity, and redemption, and therefore not through human culture and development, through man's labor making the soil, the soil making the climate, the climate making the blood, and the blood making the saint. This process of making saints the Apostle certainly does not recognize, no doubt because he received no notice of it in the revelation of Jesus Christ. It is probably a recent development.

The author tells us that, notwithstanding the Apostolic labors of St. Francis Xavier and others in India, Japan, and China, Christianity could not take root there, and the holy missionaries failed entirely to establish there a Christian civilization, and because the blood of those old effete nations would not bear it. He thinks that those nations can be converted and made Christian nations only by carrying there the European, and perhaps the French flesh, which has for eighteen centuries been nourished by the *flesh* of Christ.

"Le Christianisme n'entrera vivant au Japon et ailleurs, que lorsque des masses de Chrétiens vivants iront porter leur sang dans les veines épuisées de ces peuples. Il n'a été donné à la morale de commencer des races que

* 1 Cor. i. 26 - 31.

chez nous, loin du soleil, loin de toutes les avances faites par la nature aux premiers humains. Désormais la race cérébrale a fait trop de progrès pour qu'on puisse racheter un peuple à notre degré sans le faire communier à notre chair. Malgré ses efforts, sa vie, sa sainteté, son martyre, Saint François-Xavier n'a pu laisser une civilisation Chrétienne au Japon. Par de révolutions peu prévues, cette chair *humaine*, à laquelle la chair du Christ sert de levain depuis dix-huit siècles, ira porter son ferment de vie dans la chair esclave des enfants de Sem et de Cham. Et d'ailleurs, si l'Orient eût pris le premier le Christianisme, c'eût été le Christianisme rêveur avant d'être le Christianisme pratique des peuples occidentaux. L'amour s'y fût formé avant la personnalité; le sol humain n'y eût pas reçu un assez profond labourage; il n'aurait pu fournir la sève au monde Européen, comme il est appelé maintenant à l'en recevoir. Saint Pierre fut établi avant Saint Jean, bienque ce dernier soit, aussi, celui que mon âme préfère." — pp. 398, 399.

It is true the author cites in this passage M. Enfantin, late sovereign pontiff of the Saint-Simonian religion; but he cites him in a manner which proves that he adopts it, and adopts it as showing the reason why Christianity has not maintained its ground in the East, and why the Oriental nations still remain out of the pale of Christian civilization.

M. Saint-Bonnet contends that the order of Providence is, that in this world all should be distributed according to merit, and that men are people, burghers, nobles, saints, and nations are savage, barbarous, civilized, Christian, most Christian, according to their several degrees of merit. As merit proceeds from the will, from the activity of man, God is obliged in the order of facts to follow man, and therefore Christianity cannot precede or go before man's merit. What the author really means by this is to us uncertain; but certainly, as he not seldom applies his principle that all is according to merit, that principle is one which as a Catholic he cannot hold; for it is rank Pelagianism, the dominant heresy of the age. A man does not become a saint because he merits to be a saint. Did not St. Paul say, "By grace I am what I am"? Is grace of merit? Is not grace always gratuitous, even by the very force of the word? Man prior to grace cannot merit grace, nor even prepare himself for it. The beginning and

end of his sanctity are of pure grace. Even by keeping the precepts of the natural law man does not positively dispose himself for grace; he only removes the obstacles which actual sins interpose to its operation. The author in his brilliant theorizing seems to us to forget this important Catholic doctrine. By making all depend on merit, instead of the free grace of God, by representing man as making the soil, the soil the climate, the climate the blood, and the blood the saint, he gives man the right to glory in himself, whereas the Apostle allows him to glory only in the Lord. The author, too, we suspect, is a little *carnal* in his views of the influence of the sacred body of our Lord received in the Blessed Sacrament. We are not aware that it works a revolution in the blood or flesh of the race. Its influence we had supposed was spiritual, not carnal. The Old Adam remains even in the saint, as long as he lives, and the child of saintly parents is born a child of wrath as well as the child of infidels, and in administering baptism to either the Church observes the same rites and ceremonies. The Christian transmits no Christian virtue with his flesh. Now, as before the coming of our Lord, every one of us must say, "I was conceived in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." The Christian graces and virtues are personal, and affect solely the personal character; they do not enter into human nature, and become the natural inheritance of the race. The Son of God assumed human nature *in individuum*, not *in specie*, and he was not, and is not, converted into flesh; he only took human nature up to himself. The author seems also not to remember that the virtues by which, according to him, wealth is accumulated, are not Christian virtues, and have no necessary connection with Christian sanctity. Sanctity is not in their order, and they, or any of the secular virtues, are never its germs. The author could not fall into a graver mistake than to suppose that the saint is the natural development or complement of what he calls *people*.

Slavery, in the ancient world, the author says, was a sort of *forced* Christianity, and justifiable because necessary to supply the deficiency of capital, to break down human pride, and to produce the Christian virtues of patience and resignation. But where is the justice in reducing one portion of mankind to slavery that the other portion may be free? Why is it necessary that a freeman should consume

more in proportion to what he produces than a slave? If it is not, there was no necessity of slavery to supply the lack of capital, and it was no real substitute for capital. Did slavery tend to humble or to exalt the pride of the slaveholders? Were the *forced* virtues of patience and resignation *Christian* virtues? If they were, and slavery is favorable to their growth, why does the author represent it as one of the chief glories of the Church that she has abolished slavery throughout the European world? St. Augustine teaches us that slavery pertains to the penal providence of God, originates in sin, and may serve, like all the sufferings of this life, as a salutary penance, if properly submitted to.

Labor, says the author, is not for wants, but wants are for labor, and labor is to prevent wealth from being a great evil. But what is wealth for, if not for wants? Wealth acquired by idleness or robbery, that is, without labor, always corrupts. How, then, does the author defend hereditary wealth against the Socialists, since wealth inherited is not acquired by the labor of him who inherits it? Wealth acquired by immoral means, no doubt, proves that corruption already exists, and with just as little doubt it tends to extend or increase corruption; but is it true, on the contrary, that wealth acquired by labor always tends to make the possessor moral? If so, the Chinese, the Scotch, the English, and the Anglo-Americans should be the most moral people on the globe, instead of being, as they are, the most immoral, if we speak, as the author must be understood to speak, of Christian morality. In fact, labor for the accumulation of wealth for the sake of gratifying sensuality, or for its own sake, as the miser accumulates it, is itself immoral, and repugnant to Christian sanctity. Labor in itself considered is neither moral nor immoral. It is a punishment imposed upon the human race, and, like all punishments in our probationary state, may or may not have a moral effect, according to the temper in which it is borne, and the end to which it is directed by the will of him who bears it. As a general rule, wealth, however acquired, is a temptation and a snare.

But we are exhausting our space, and most likely the patience of our readers. We do not regard our author as a profound or an exact theologian, but we do think him an able political economist, and wise and just in his political views and observations. His practical remarks on our cur-

rent politics deserve the highest praise, and we are really grateful to him for having demonstrated in an unanswerable manner, that all labor bestowed on the fabrication of luxuries adds nothing to capital, but really diminishes it, and thereby demonstrating that our modern industrial and commercial system, so much applauded, tends to impoverish instead of enriching the nations that have adopted it. Here, and in most of the special questions he treats, the author shows extensive knowledge, rare sagacity, and just thought, which, notwithstanding its errors in a theoretical point of view, give to his work in the actual state of things a very great practical value. We hope to return to his views of some of these special questions hereafter; for we would not have our readers infer that we hold either the author or his labors in light esteem, because we have found in his volume some things to censure. He has bravely combated the modern enemies of society, he has exposed most satisfactorily the fallacies of the Socialists, and vindicated the absolute importance of the Church as the first and only source of civilization, order, and society. If he has erred, it has not been with malice; the sincerity of his faith is unquestionable, and his heart is in the right place.

The errors we have indicated may be traced to the same causes which came so very near leading the excellent Balmez astray, which make us tremble for Padre Ventura, which engulfed the brilliant De la Mennais, and have stranded the proud and philosophic Gioberti. They come, when they come honestly, as in the case of our author, from the attempt to combat the enemies of religion and society with their own weapons, or rather from the habit of considering Catholicity in its relation to society and civilization, instead of considering it in its relation to the supernatural destiny of man, or the salvation of the individual soul. We are, perhaps, in danger of falling ourselves into the very heresy we are combating. Our religion is just now opposed in the name of man, of liberty, of society, of the earthly well-being of mankind, as our Blessed Lord himself was by the old carnal Jews, who rejected him, and crucified him between two thieves, because he came as a spiritual prince, to save men's souls, not as a temporal prince, to found an earthly kingdom and secure prosperity to his followers. We meet them on their own ground. It is an undeniable fact, that the Church has founded modern

civilization, and has been the source of all the real well-being of modern nations. We hasten to bring forward and prove this fact, and having done so, we say to her enemies, *Therefore* return to the Church, and love and obey her as your mother. M. Saint-Bonnet sees — what is most true — that there is no good for us even in this life, unless we live for God and heaven, and he adds, *Therefore* live for God and heaven, not reflecting that, if *therefore* we live for God and heaven, we do not live for them, but for this life alone, and are still carnal Jews expecting a temporal Messiah and an earthly paradise. The Church secures us the real goods of this life precisely because she does not propose them, because she makes no account of them, and subdues in our hearts the desire to possess them; precisely because she proposes only God and heaven, concentrates our affections on another life, and entirely absorbs us in the great work of saving our souls, of making our calling and election sure. God and heaven are gained by being sought; earth, by being rejected, despised, trampled on.

We seek the reason of the lapse of nations once Catholic into heresy, infidelity, barbarism, in extrinsic causes, now in this civil or ecclesiastical policy, now in that particular national vice or corruption; and we seek to win them back to their duty and to salvation by a variety of extrinsic motives, addressed to the dominant tendencies of the age. All this is natural, but we suspect not altogether as wise and as prudent in God's eyes as in our own. When individuals or nations break away from the Church, the reason is, that the natural pride of the human heart and the love of the world have gained dominion over them, and in most, if not in all, precisely in consequence of temporal prosperity. "The beloved grew fat and kicked. He grew fat, and thick, and gross: he forsook God who made him, and departed from God, his sovereign." And we can recall them to faith only in proportion as they are humbled, and we can make them feel that they have souls, souls exposed to eternal damnation, and which cannot be saved out of the Catholic Church. The world is bad, but not, after all, so bad as in the days of St. Paul; and yet he went forth to correct it, not with speech of man's wisdom, not with systems of political economy, nor human philosophies, nor with long arguments to prove the adaptation

of the Church to the earthly wants of society; but with the word of God, as the humble minister of the Gospel, resolved to know nothing, in the midst of the corrupt and abandoned world, but "Christ and him crucified." The germ of all the evil that afflicts individuals and nations is in the individual human heart, is born with us, and loses not its vitality of death so long as we remain in the flesh. It is only by Catholic faith, sacraments, and discipline that it can be repressed or prevented from sprouting forth and bearing its poisonous fruit; and these, by repressing it in the individual heart, and generating in the same heart the dispositions and virtues requisite to eternal salvation, do all that can be done to remove even national evils, and secure temporal well-being. Here is the conclusion of the whole matter, and they after all who confine themselves solely to the eternal destiny of the individual, without once thinking of the bearing of their labors on this world, are under God the true founders of nations, promoters of social order, and reformers of society. God's ways are not ours, but it is only as we follow his ways that we can succeed.

Works written to show the civilizing influences of Catholicity, its absolute necessity as the founder and preserver of society, the assertor and only real defender of liberty, may do great good in removing prejudices, and the various impediments to the reception of the truth placed in its way by the false liberalism and mad Socialism of the age. And so far as they are fitted to have this effect, we are grateful for them; but the more exclusively even such works are written from the point of view, not of an earthly destiny, but of our supernatural and eternal destiny, which after all, *in hac providentia*, is our only destiny, the more really serviceable will they prove. The fault of most of the works of this sort which fall under our notice is, that they consider God and heaven from the human point of view, in their bearing on man and society, not man and society from the point of view of God. Their authors proceed from man, society, history, to the Church, not from the Church to these; that is, they start with man, with psychology, and not with the Catechism, and really seek to develop the Church from man and society, instead of man and society from the Church: or if they go not so far astray as this, they still assign to man an earthly destiny, distinct, and in

some measure separable, from his heavenly destiny, and then attempt to consider the Church solely in her relation to this earthly destiny, — Gioberti's grand error in his *Del Primato*, — sometimes under the special aspect of philosophy, sometimes under that of literature and art, and sometimes under that of politics and political economy. The fate of De la Mennais, Hermes, and Gioberti, not to say of Rosmini and Ventura, is the best evidence we can ask of the dangerous tendency of this method of considering our holy religion. By the Catechism, which, as we learn more, becomes more precious to us, and by the Holy Scriptures properly read and meditated in the light of the Catechism, we are placed at the point of view, if we may so speak, of God himself, and see things, as far as we see them at all, as God sees them, as they are, and become able to judge them with his judgment. Seen and judged according to Divine revelation, we can represent them in their true light, and then in that light in which alone their representation becomes effectual for good.

God has placed the Church in the world to redeem men from sin, and elevate them to himself. He has placed her here as the Divine and essential element in society, and without her no true society is practicable, or even conceivable. He has enriched her with the infinite treasures of his love and his wisdom. In the patriarchal form, in the synagogue, or as the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, she subsists in all ages and nations, and is in each the Divine assistance requisite to enable man to return to God as his last end, to save his soul, and thus fulfil his only destiny. In her is the necessary capital, the *première mise de fonds* of liberty, the blood that forms the true aristocracy; nay, the true aristocracy itself, that institutes, preserves, or restores society. She through her clergy can preserve the old civilized state, restore the state when fallen into the condition of the modern European nations, and civilize the most barbarous and savage tribes, by insisting, and because *insisting*, only on the things which pertain to the salvation of the individual soul, if she be obeyed and her instructions followed. If individuals and nations submit to her, and, according to her instructions, seek only the eternal salvation of the soul, all will go well with them; if they will not, there is no help, there is no good for them; and they shall be turned into hell, and the greater

their temporal prosperity the deeper will be their damnation. Here is the settled order of God's providence, let men wrangle, fight, dispute, speculate, reason, as they will. So we need not trouble ourselves with philosophical, political, social, or economical problems as such. Let us once acquire the virtues indispensable to salvation, and these problems will solve themselves, or cease to need solution. We must be Christians, not heathens or carnal Jews, or else there is no good for us.

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- ART. III.—1. *Hungary and Transylvania. With Remarks on their Condition, Social, Political, and Economical.* By JOHN PAGET, Esq. From the new London Edition. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard. 1850. 12mo. 2 vols.
2. *The City of the Magyar. Or, Hungary and her Institutions in 1839-40.* By MISS PARDOE. London: George Virtue. 1840. 3 vols. 8vo.
3. *Souvenirs et Scenes de la Guerre d'Italie, sous le Maréchal Radetsky. Souvenirs de la Guerre de Hongrie, sous le Prince Windischgrätz et le Ban Jellachich.* Par le COMTE GEORGE DE PIMODAN. Paris. 1851.
4. *Hungarian Military Sketches.* London: Williams & Norgate.
5. *War in Hungary.* By MAX SCHLESINGER. Translated by J. E. TAYLOR. Edited by FRANCIS PULSZKY. London: Bentley. 12mo. 2 vols.

ONE more chapter on Hungary remains to be written, in order that our readers may thoroughly understand our judgment concerning the affairs of that unhappy kingdom. We have shown that the cause of the Magyars was not a republican cause, and that it was not a good cause. The popular errors with reference to Hungary may be summed up in those two points. We have now another question before us, and it is, How came the people to be so grossly mistaken about the Hungarians? We will briefly answer this question, and it will lead us into a discussion more grateful to our feelings than our former thesis was, inasmuch as it is always more pleasant to praise than to blame, where the subject-matter allows us to bestow honest

praise. In our previous articles, we accepted as guides, either Magyar authors, or writers who are intensely Magyarized, because we were aware that direct evidence, given by them, that the Magyar cause was not republican, and that it was not good, could scarcely be rejected, even by the most earnest patrons of Magyardom. For the views now presented by us, we lean upon the authority of almost every person who has ever written a line concerning Hungary. As we have to say something in favor of the Magyars, however, it is as well to quote, not only Magyar testimony, but also the evidence of authors who are not Hungarian. The English works whose titles we have given at the head of this article, although they are not new to the public, are sufficiently trustworthy, and they will answer our purpose as well as the others, written before the sound of Russian cannon had ceased to reverberate among the Carpathian Mountains.

The public error with reference to Hungary was not, as every one knows, merely a speculative error. It was reduced to practice, and not always of the most creditable nature. The mistaken notion which prevailed here, in America, led to an intensely partisan stand in favor of the Magyars. Two honorable Senators, both shrewd statesmen, both candidates for the Presidency, debased themselves so far as to pander directly to the popular frenzy. One called for a suspension of diplomatic intercourse with Austria; the other made complimentary speeches to Magyar refugees, and wrote radical letters to the Austrian ambassador. Both thought, or seemed to think, that the pro-Magyar feeling was so strong in this country, that no candidate for the Presidency could safely disregard it. And the wind that blew to Austria Senatorial threats, and letters on the "manifest destiny" of the United States, reached Massachusetts, and was strong enough to frighten Old Harvard out of her propriety, and to sweep a professor who had endeavored to resist the popular feeling from his chair. And the consequences of the radical mistake made by most Anglo-Americans, unpleasant as they were, did not confine themselves within American limits. American travellers in Austria were closely watched; obstacles to their entrance into the empire were multiplied; one, a spy employed by our government, came near being hanged; and quite recently another, who, if not a spy, was cer-

tainly a very imprudent person, passed several days in an Austrian prison. A popular error which leads to consequences like these is a grave matter. It is time that it should cease, and, if we mistake not, it is rapidly going its own way.

The causes which led to a firm persuasion, on the part of so many, this side of the Atlantic, that the Magyar war was a just war, and that it was waged on democratic grounds, — and led, also, to the earnest sympathy for the Magyars which was so freely manifested amongst us, — may be summed up under three heads. Radicalism is gaining ground, in truth, it may be said to possess the ground, in the United States. The public mind, and the public institutions, which are supposed to represent that mind, are becoming exclusively democratic, with a rapidity which, however grateful it may be to democratic propagandists, is sure to please the enemies of genuine republicanism, and the men who never tire of saying that the great American experiment will fail. It pleases them, as it pleases the prophet to see the fulfilment of his predictions hastening with a rapidity greater than he had reason to expect. In the last number of our Review, the attention of our readers was directed to the cheerless fact, that, while our Constitution presents a balance of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements, the democratic element is fast eliminating the others. Exponents of this elimination may be seen almost as often as our legislators meet, our courts sit, or a popular movement is made. One effect of the radical principles which alone we seem willing to recognize as American principles is, to bring about a total change in our theory of government. Power is no longer from God; magistrates no longer rule by his grace. The Vigilance Committee at San Francisco are not many years in advance of their Eastern brethren, if they are an hour in advance of them, in basing public action upon the assumption that the process of elimination is completed by the democratic element of our institutions; — upon the doctrine that in the mob, whether well or badly dressed, resides the power which creates legislatures and courts of justice, and which holds suspended over the guilty, and, it may be, over the innocent, that sword which only God unsheathed, and placed in the hands of the lawful magistrate, for the terror of evil-doers. The spirit which

establishes at San Francisco the Vigilance Committee, and proclaims the absolute sovereignty of an irresponsible mob, is also strong, fearfully strong, in our midst, and our apathy is the apathy, our blindness is the blindness, which goes before death when it comes like a thief in the night.

This change in our notion of government leads to a result which may place us, as it once placed France, in the attitude of a natural enemy of every civilized government on earth. The question whether a perfect form of government should be monarchical, aristocratic, or republican in its principal elements, is a question which cannot well be settled in the abstract, that is, from a comparison of mere ideas. In the concrete, no one of the three is absolutely superior to the others. Rulers and people can save their souls, can obtain the first and final end of society, under any one of the three forms. Each is in harmony with the natural law, and, of course, with the positive law of God. Wherever any one of them is established, is in possession with its historical rights, is the legitimate order, it will be found to be the best form for the people who live under it; it exists under the Divine sanction, and it is to be respected as the just expression of the right of that people to government, order, and law. A republican form of government is the exponent of American right to an organized society, a monarchical form is the expression of Austrian right. That government is the best for a people which best enables them to fulfil the end for which society exists.

These are elementary truths; but the American mind has made such vast progress that it is beginning to regard plain, elementary truths as recondite axioms, quite unintelligible to good democrats, and only to be granted, or perhaps comprehended, after an elaborate argument. Hence it is necessary that grave writers, even, dwell upon them at every fitting season. It may be said of Protestants, that one can safely give them the credit of knowing every thing excepting the plainest principles of religion. It may, judging from present appearances, soon be truly said of most Anglo-Americans, that they are excellent judges of every thing excepting the science of government.

The notion which at this time prevails among our people is, that no other than the democratic form of government is legitimate. All other forms are inadmissible, or

at best mere preparatory institutions, designed to conduct the affairs of society until the people become able to govern themselves. As all power resides in the people, or is derived from them, it follows that government is only an agent whose business it is to execute the popular will, or, at farthest, a corporation holding certain powers in trust for the people, until these can resume the management of their own concerns. It follows that any movement, which tends to make the people sovereign in fact, as well as in theory, is a just, a legitimate movement. Governments, as such, have no rights, they have only duties. The people, as such, have no duties, they have rights. It cannot be asked of a revolutionary movement in the direction of democracy whether it be just; the only question is, Is it prudent? Is it time?

It is easy, therefore, to conceive why so many amongst us favored the Magyar cause. That cause was supposed to be a democratic cause. It was certain that the Hungarians were in arms against Austria, and that the government of Austria was monarchical. These simple considerations settled the whole matter. The people, in similar cases, have forgotten to ask what are the character, motives, and number of the rebels, whether their grievances be real and their statements true. These and the like topics are unnoticed. The case for the government is not allowed a bare hearing, far less a fair trial. The whole matter is settled by an *a priori* argument, according to which government must always be in the wrong. Why, then, waste time in listening to its defence.

Of the American sympathizers with Hungary, probably nineteen twentieths have arrived at a conclusion by the foregoing *a priori* argument against Austria. Unfortunate men! They do not see, or seeing, they rejoice, that the same argument is urged against our own government by Free-Soilers and radicals of every hue, and that it is urged with a fearful efficacy. The steam-engine is the exponent of our type of civilization. Steam and fire, if good servants, are bad masters. The ascendancy of steam is terrible on earth, as the ascendancy of fire is terrible in hell.

Had the American people thoroughly understood the character of the Hungarian rebellion, had they known that it involved a war of races, that it was an intensely aristocratic movement, and that the great mass of the inhabitants

of Hungary were likely to fare no better, and perhaps worse, under independent Magyardom than under Austria, they would not, possibly, have wasted so much time, breath, and sympathy upon the Magyars. But they knew not these things; neither are many quite willing to believe them now.

The press, of course, is, in a great measure, responsible for this curious specimen of national ignorance. To a certain extent, the newspapers may be excused. Hungary is a distant kingdom; it lies on the frontier of civilized Europe, and in 1847 Americans knew as much about it as they knew about the southern slope of the Caucasus. No American traveller, and but two or three English tourists, had written about Hungary. Paget, Miss Pardoe, and one or two French travellers who had visited that romantic land, testify strongly and repeatedly, not only to the fact that Western Europe knew nothing of Hungary, but also that even the tourist might spend a year in the country without learning much about it, so strange, so anomalous, according to our notions, is the state of society in Hungary. To get any information worth having, the traveller was obliged to avoid the common error of visiting only the places and persons named in his letters of introduction. We can appreciate the magnitude of this difficulty, when we remember how hard it seems for Englishmen, whose institutions do not differ generically from ours, to gather and to convey to their countrymen a tolerably accurate notion of the state of our society. To understand that it is difficult to obtain the most common information concerning interesting events transpiring in other countries, it is enough to point to the fact, that a popular commotion of some sort has disturbed the island of Cuba for nearly two months, and, notwithstanding the letters, despatches, and other documents which have filled the columns of the papers for the last few weeks, it is not easy for the closest observer to know, at the time we are writing, whether the revolution has taken place in Cuba, or within the limits of the United States. It will probably turn out that there have been a few petty fights on Cuban ground, but that the war of independence was fought and won in American printing-offices, and in the New York and New Orleans Cuban club-rooms. Why, any good Whig or Democrat, who reads only his own partisan journal, is a living

and—it is a comical circumstance—an unconscious witness of the difficulty of obtaining correct information concerning political events which happened in his own State. Each man gets, from his favorite paper, the most distorted accounts of things done and said by the other party. The foreign journalist, who reads both papers, and who sometimes believes both, is, perhaps, less in the dark than our free and enlightened voter is concerning events which transpired almost in his very presence.

All this does not precisely demonstrate that the conductors of American newspapers are dishonest, it only leaves room for a surmise of that nature; but it proves that editorial honesty and editorial dishonesty are terms which are rapidly losing their meaning, on account of the objective absence of the thing signified, and they are words which may be soon too antiquated even for the best dictionaries. The old system of publishing newspapers, which was based upon the idea of personal, moral responsibility, has almost disappeared. Modern progress has left it far behind. The management of a newspaper has become, strictly, a thing amenable to the laws or customs of trade. It is as marketable, as subject to quotations, to the prices current, as cotton and indigo are. Immense sums of money must be invested in its establishment. In the estimate of its worth, no considerations touching its honesty or truthfulness are allowed to enter, and if they were, they would not be intelligible. Its value is estimated from the number of copies sold and advertisements inserted, from the amount of dividends paid, and from the par value of its shares. Hence the successful editor must be a speculator, a gambler. He must watch the current of popular feeling, popular passion, as closely, and for the same reasons, as the merchant watches and calculates the receptivity of the market for his cottons and sugars. It is clear enough that the editor who does not obey the laws which now govern the newspaper trade, is a fool according to current notions. He is poor, he always will be poor, and he deserves no better fortune. The editor must bow and bend, not only his knee, but his whole body, before the mob, which exacts a homage, a sycophancy, compared to which the habits of courtiers in the presence of absolute European monarchs are manly habits. If he refuses to pay this tribute, he is likely to perish for want of bread. Why should he hesitate to pay it, when he can

make it build for him palaces, win for him fame, and open to him the doors of legislative assemblies? Why should he not pay it, when others, in every walk of life, yield it without hesitation, or die of hunger when they refuse to pay it? The politician who scorns to flatter the popular passions need not look for office; the merchant, need not expect to sell his goods; and both are fortunate if they experience no other effect of their imprudence in neglecting to pay servile court to the idol which, by a strange confusion of terms, is sometimes called the public will.

Now if we bear in mind the fact to which we have already referred, that our notions, our national tendencies, and the changes in our institutions all indicate the advent of unmixed democracy, and therefore of the worst tyranny, in America, we shall be prepared with an apology for the course pursued with reference to Hungary by the American press. When a WEBSTER thinks that it is necessary to conciliate the spirit of democratic propagandism, under pain of losing votes, what can the poor editor do? The truth about Hungary could not be told in his columns; the people would not believe it, they would not like it, they would not buy his papers, and he would go to bed supperless. Truth is powerful, no doubt, but so is an empty stomach. And the motives which led him to tell the people news which pleased them about Mexico, California, and Cuba, which urged him to say nothing about the guiltiness of our dealings with our neighbors, and which induced him to talk about the manifest destiny which is to extend the blessings of freedom to every inhabitant of the northern continent by exterminating the natives, and planting the hickory flag-staff in the soil made fat by their bodies, led him also to tell the American people that the Magyar cause was a just, a republican, and even a democratic cause.

The poor soul, notwithstanding the enormous amount of money invested in his paper, labored under singular disadvantages when he came to talk with his patrons about European politics. Being a tradesman, a merchant in news, a speculator in fancy intelligence stock, he had to sell only the wares which were sent to him by his European agents or correspondents, and, as happens often enough with other European goods sent hither for sale, his wares were of an inferior quality, made expressly for the Amer-

ican market. This is literally true. The foreign news manufactory is as real an entity as the Birmingham or Brummagem depot of imitation wares. Let any person observe, in the column of foreign news, the names of the papers to which American editors are indebted for their latest European intelligence. These are certain Paris, London, and Liverpool journals. It is now a notorious fact, that in these offices the manufacture or adaptation of news for particular markets is reduced to a most elaborate system. The reader of an American paper gets, in reality, his news from a fellow comfortably seated in a printing-office at Paris, with a pile of newspapers, in all languages and of every political shade, before him. When he knows who his customers are, he can send them just the news they wish to hear. He tells the American that the Magyars are entitled to American sympathy, because they are democrats. He tells the Englishman that the Magyars are entitled to English sympathy, because they are aristocrats. And the establishment of weekly steamers and of telegraph lines has only increased the difficulty. There was a time when correct news could be obtained from Europe; but that was forty years ago, when American institutions were not quite democratic, when American readers of newspapers were comparatively few, and when it was of no use to arouse in them a false sympathy in behalf of European vagabonds, because long voyages made the sympathy of too old a date to be of any use. But now the Atlantic has become narrow, and America a great nation. Hence, American ideas about European affairs are of some importance, and, that those ideas may be of the required sort, the foreign news-manufacturer sends, and the steamer and telegraph carry, such intelligence as may appear to the democratic supreme committee suitable for the American market.

Besides, our journalists do not understand the Magyar language, and few are able to read German or Latin, and hence the papers published in Hungary are, to them, sealed documents. It was not safe, or expedient, to copy from the few English or French journals which professed either to be neutral or to oppose the Magyar pretensions, because, in the first place, no one would read their extracts; then it was, *a priori*, certain that such extracts would contain false, because anti-radical statements; and finally, because readers would buy their papers at another office.

In France and in Italy the true character of the Magyar struggle was pretty accurately understood. In England the press succeeded in making the people believe that the movement was precisely similar to the English struggle which resulted in the accession of William III. We all know what stories the American press poured into our willing or unwilling ears. It is certain that an honest attempt, on the part of an American, to get a true notion of the real state of things in Hungary, involved more trouble than most men were willing to undergo.

All this forms a curious illustration of our boasted American freedom. We fear that, in some other important respects, our freedom is a chimera, or at best an *ens rationis*; but let that pass. We are far more dependent upon Europe than we were in 1770, and our dependence has assumed a form which, if it be not slavery, is wonderfully like it.

There is yet another cause which can be assigned for the popular errors with reference to Hungary, and this is more creditable to Americans, as well as to the Magyars, than the others are. We referred to this branch of our inquiry when we observed that our present discussion is more grateful to our feelings than our former essays were, inasmuch as it permits us to bestow praise without the sacrifice of truth.

The Magyars are, in many respects, a most interesting people, and their many noble qualities may well challenge for them the good-will, and, to a certain extent, the admiration, of Americans. Our countrymen were not wrong in praising the Magyars; they erred in their approval of the cause in which the Magyars were engaged. In one point of view, something may be said in favor even of that cause, as we shall presently see. If it had been undertaken at another time, in another spirit, by other leaders, with a different scope, it would not, in our opinion, have been opposed even by an Austrian statesman.

The Magyar is either a soldier or a shepherd,—we mean the true Magyar. When he is compelled by his poverty to wear the livery of a servant, the "*Nemes ember vagyak*," "I am a nobleman," is ever at the end of his tongue, and as he says it he twirls his mustachios, strikes his spurs, and very plainly intimates that he is a soldier, only for the moment relieved from duty. Now the shepherd and the

warrior are characters whom the poets, from Homer to Tasso, have delighted to celebrate.

Miss Pardoe characterizes the Magyar country gentleman as hospitable, haughty, ostentatious, fond of luxury and splendor, sincere and frank, with a high feeling of honor and courage. The Magyar peasant is warlike, bold, and courteous; of melancholy temperament, and greatly inclined to indolence, preferring a rifle to a plough, and a gallop to labor in the fields. He is proud of his nation and of the antiquity of his descent. When brought into the presence of a superior, unlike the Slave, he takes off his hat and stands erect.

In truth the Magyars are a primitive people. With the vices, they have all the virtues of chivalrous times. Feudal institutions have long since disappeared from Western Europe; but the Magyars have in Christendom no brethren in blood, and this circumstance, together with their intense national pride, may account for the fact that a state of society which is now historical for the old nations of the Continent should be still cherished in Hungary.

What has become historical is already good material for romance. Most of the best romances in our language, and, indeed, in all languages except the Magyar, describe times, scenes, and men which have long since passed away. It is curious, it is pleasant, to read about men and things now existing, existing too in Christian Europe, which are like the things and men whom we are accustomed to look upon as belonging to bygone, romantic ages. The Magyar is at once a living being, and the creature of a pleasing dream. This, we take it, is one of the causes which have won, somehow, our sympathies in behalf of the children of Arpad. Heroes of romance and of song know the way to the heart, and the heart is not always that of a woman either. Americans cannot spare time to be ideal, or to live in any other than an atmosphere of facts and dollars, but they like to hear of other people living higher up in an ideal world, and to see them there. It is true that a close inspection of the Magyar destroys much of the illusion which distance creates; but enough of antiquity, of romance, and of positively good, solid material remains to make him an interesting character. No man wins the love of those with whom he is thrown into friendly contact as the Magyar wins it. So say all travellers, and our own limited experience inclines us to believe that it is so.

The primitive manners of the Magyars belong to a type of civilization which we are accustomed to regard as less advanced than ours. They care little for commerce, and all the efforts of Count Szechenyi, and of other Magyar noblemen who have studied English customs, cannot suffice to make them understand that, in order to be better able to cope with Austria, and to be regarded as a nation in Europe, they must be merchants as well as soldiers. The internal resources of Hungary are vast, almost beyond description. Americans would make the country, if it were theirs, the mistress of Europe. But it would be as profitable to talk of commerce to the knights of the Round Table as to the true Magyar. He despises the Germans as much for their commercial habits as for any other habit of theirs. He allows others to trade for him, and is satisfied with such internal improvements as God has vouchsafed to the country. The German, we mean the Hungarian German, whose paradise is a counting-house, while he profits by the indifference of the Magyar to commercial affairs, cannot understand it. He regards him as only half-civilized, and calls him a *betyar*, a groom.

Property is most unequally divided, of course, as it was in all countries in the feudal ages. We have in a preceding article explained the land tenure, so that here it is only necessary to repeat that land can be held only by a nobleman, that is to say, by a Magyar, or a Magyarized Selave, or alien. Prince Esterhazy is the greatest landholder in Hungary, and his title-deeds date as far back as the year 1300. His lands cover an area of twelve hundred square miles, or about a thirteenth part of the whole kingdom. His peasants number three hundred and sixty thousand. He possesses the *jus gladii*, — the power of life and death; and therefore is entitled to keep soldiers in his pay. His armory contains weapons for two regiments, one of cavalry and one of infantry, each twelve hundred strong. At the time of Miss Pardoe's visit, in 1840, his dungeons contained twenty prisoners. His estates equal the kingdom of Wurtemberg in size, and they contain one hundred and thirty villages, forty towns, and thirty-four castles. His acres, however, bring him a revenue averaging only about twelve cents each, in all, \$700,000 a year. His sheep are numerous enough to employ 2,500 shepherds. The mere recital of these facts throws more light upon the state of Hungary than chains of argument.

Out of the ninety-seven towns and villages in the county of Arva, the family of Phurzo possessed eighty-two. The last Count left these to his daughters and their descendants. The property has never been divided, and it is administered by one for the benefit of the rest of the heirs, numbering upwards of sixty. Yet the revenue is not more than \$60,000 yearly. These revenue returns prove that the peasant is not very profitable to his lord.

A few of the great estates, belonging to magnates who have visited England, are in comparatively good condition, and several agricultural societies have been established of late years, which promise well. But the greater portion of the land is treated according to rules which were old even three centuries ago. The Magyar leaves the land nearly as God made it.

Every nobleman, that is, every Magyar, should, according to the Hungarian theory, hold land. Yet every Magyar does not. Some have sunk into the peasant condition. Many follow mechanical employments. Still the Magyar will divide the land until further division becomes impossible. Whole villages are sometimes seen, inhabited chiefly by poor nobles, the descendants, probably, of an old Magyar who possessed the entire property. Now it is subdivided to an almost absurd degree of attenuation. Each poor noble holds a piece of land a few hundred feet in length, and just wide enough to give room for a small cottage.

According to the Hungarian law the holders of land are supposed to be descendants of the Magyars who conquered the country. The land belongs to the king, and it is held on the tenure of military service. Hence, land cannot be sold, legally, although the law is sometimes evaded; but the purchaser cannot secure his title. On the failure of male heirs, the land reverts to the king, only two or three exceptions existing to this rule in the case of female fiefs. The king is bound to bestow this land thus returned upon an Hungarian subject. This person may not be noble, in which case the gift ennobles him. In this way, some Slovacs have become Magyarized. These laws concerning land will show why the Magyar clings to even his tiny spot, scarcely large enough for a cottage ground, with such an enduring embrace. *Fundo ne inhereat onus*, — No burden can be attached to the land, — was a law of Hungary.

It secured the owner from the burden of paying taxes, and it made land in Hungary a more important possession than in any other European country. At the same time, the law rendering the sale of land illegal, and making the land itself free from burden, brings its disadvantages to the magnates. They are prodigal, and the least in the world of a mercantile spirit. They are often in want of money, and the Jews are not always willing to lend it, as only personal security can legally be given. Still, this law is evaded, and it is probable that Jews hold the title-deeds of many impoverished magnates, although with an uncertain grasp. There are upwards of a hundred and sixty thousand Jews in Hungary, and in the late war they were liberals, of course. This arose partly because of their hereditary disposition to make mischief in Christian nations, and partly, doubtless, in order that they might possess land once owned by the magnates of the kingdom.

In a country where the land is held in this primitive or feudal way, feudal concomitants are sure to obtain; and among them, the primitive virtue of hospitality. Accordingly, the Magyars are the most hospitable people in Europe. Almost every page of our English authorities bears strong testimony to this point. The stranger is always welcome to a Magyar house. Excepting in the great cities, there are no taverns in Hungary where a traveller can possibly stay an hour. There would be no earthly use in building them, for no one would, or rather could, patronize them. The nearest Magyar noble would not permit it, and a refusal of his hearty invitation would make of him an enemy for life. The traveller, after a few hours, feels as though he had known his kind entertainers for years. There is no dash of worldliness in their hospitality; it comes from the warm Magyar heart. Two or three anecdotes will illustrate this matter better than encomiums can.

Paget, with a friend, was travelling in Transylvania, and they came near the house of a Magyar as the snow began to fall. There was no public house in the village. They hesitated not, however, to throw themselves upon the hospitality of the Magyar; but when they reached the house, they found that he was not at home. Nevertheless, the servants opened the dining-room, offered the travellers

every thing in the house, and all this as a matter of course. The horses fared as well as their masters. The coachmen gave them double feed.

At Thoroczko, Paget found a miserable inn. His servant was a Magyar, and Miklós knew that a countess lived not far distant, at whose house he thought that better fare could be had than at the inn. So he endeavored to persuade his master to visit the countess; but Paget, this time, refused. A servant of the countess passing through the village, and hearing that a stranger was at the inn, stopped to ask who had arrived. Miklós scrupled not to tell the servant, that his master would visit the countess on the following day. Then Miklós informed his master that the countess had sent her servant to invite him to her palace. Paget discovered the lie that evening; nevertheless, he went the next day to the chateau, where he found that the lady expected, not only him, but all travellers, to visit her on their way. Miklós, being an Hungarian, could not understand why his master was at times unwilling to ask admittance into houses where he would be received as if his family and that of his entertainers had been allied for twenty generations.

Mrs. Pulszky tells an amusing story in point.

The Baron Palocsay, grandfather of the present magnate, notwithstanding his generous hospitality, often found himself without visitors, particularly in winter, as his castle was situated on a lofty and bleak eminence. This lack of visitors annoyed the Baron, so he was in the habit of sending out in search of guests, when there were none at his table. His servants went to the high road, and when they saw a travelling-carriage, they forced the travellers to turn to the castle, where the Baron, without listening to their protestations, entertained them for three days in the most princely manner, because, as he said, the Hungarian has a right to keep his guests for three days; if they are willing to remain longer, it is a great honor to the host.

Mrs. Pulszky testifies that many Magyars retain this notion, and, when practicable, they enforce it. She mentions the case of a friend of hers, who went to the house of a Magyar with the intention of making an ordinary visit. His visit lasted seven years.

She observes, also, that visits for several months are by no means unusual, and that persons who come with three

or four children frequently apologize, not for their visit, but for not having brought with them their whole family.

And this primitive spirit is by no means confined to the wealthy Magyars. Paget (Vol. I. p. 105) says, that one of his friends was benighted near Füred. A poor carpenter offered him shelter. A bed was prepared, and the traveller groped his way to it, through the dark, for the people were too poor to buy candles. He found that he was not alone. A coughing on one side, cries on the other, a cackling and rustling of feathers above, and a butting of horns below, continued at intervals through the night. When daylight came, he found that he had been sleeping with two women, half a dozen children, a hen and chickens, and a huge goat. In fact, the carpenter had given his own place to the stranger. A bit of black bread and a little goat's milk was all the poor man could offer him for breakfast; but the sturdy Magyar firmly, though respectfully, refused compensation of any sort.

It is scarcely necessary to add, that there will be no taverns in Hungary while the Magyars are masters of the land, and that the roads are, and always were, bad. Miss Pardoe remarks, that the traveller in Hungary must make up his mind resolutely to fling from him every feeling of hyper-fastidiousness, both as regards roads, horses, drivers, and accommodations; to brave delay, disappointment, and even danger; and to prepare himself to do battle with inconvenience of every description. The roads are made by the compulsory labor of the peasant, and he deposits there whatever rubbish he can the most readily collect. The stone bridges are in ruins; the wooden bridges are no better, being made of planks thrown carelessly together along beams resting on wooden piles, and unsecured by a single nail. There are four ways of travelling. The first is the government post, on the high roads. This is seldom used, because of its slowness. The second is the peasant's post, running between Pesth and Vienna. The method commonly adopted is, to bring out the *Norspann*. This is a compulsory post, furnished by the peasants. By law they are compelled to furnish horses to the Magyar nobles, and to travellers who have obtained a written order from a nobleman. A certain sum is paid to the peasant, and he must forward the traveller to the next station, where another peasant must provide horses, if required.

The fourth method of progress is by the open peasant cart. A fifth must be added, for travellers are sometimes forced to resort to it; we mean, to trudge on foot. But there is not in the world a more beautiful country than Hungary, and the traveller who overcomes all these obstacles will be amply repaid for any amount of toil.

Persons who desire to make primitive manners their study will find abundance of food for meditation in Hungary. The manners peculiar to every age, from the last century back to the time of Noah, may be seen in that country. Paget speaks of a place, a little beyond Stuhlweissenburg and not above forty miles from Pesth. It is a cluster of villages, at least one of which is inhabited entirely by noblemen, untitled of course. Every one of the houses is subterranean, only the roof being visible. They are mere holes cut in the ground, and covered with straw.

Although few noblemen have now the historical right to flog their peasants, yet the peasants do not escape. The sentence of a county or town officer is required, to make the punishment legal. The peasant is bound to the flogging-block, and the Haiduk gives the blows with a hazel stick, about the thickness of the finger. Great skill is required to inflict the greatest pain with the least bodily injury. Some of these hardy fellows, says Paget (Vol. I. p. 230), laugh at the punishment, and it is a point of honor among them to bear it without flinching. Nothing renders the young peasant so irresistible to his mistress as his heroic support of the five-and-twenty blows.

The cholera broke out in Hungary in 1831. The Slovak peasants, believing that the nobles had poisoned them, rose, and brutally murdered every Magyar they could catch. Paget saw one gentleman who had been beaten for several hours, and then had hot ploughshares applied to his feet. The lord lieutenant of the county, while attempting to quiet the crowd at another village, was dragged from his horse, and, but for the interference of a Slovak peasant, would have been savagely butchered. When order was restored, about fifty Slovak peasants were hung in chains. Their bodies remained exposed for several years, but each body received a new dress annually, from surviving friends. This story is an epitome of the state of affairs between the Magyars and Slaves. On one side, unutterable contempt; on the other, a hatred that

defies description. And travellers are generally found to pity the Slave, but to uphold the Magyar withal. Paget, even, testifies that he could not but feel some contempt for the Slovak peasants of Hungary. There is something in them which, notwithstanding the hardship of their position, inclines the stranger to say that the proud Magyar, although he may err in opposing Austrian measures for the benefit of the peasants, is right in refusing them equality with himself.

Bathing in society seems to be the established mode at most watering-places, and Paget was horrified when a young lady invited him to bathe in company with a score of noble females. Yet this practice is condemned by many Magyars, and with reason. In the churches, there is a complete separation of the sexes. The men sit on one side, the married women on the other, and the maidens crowd around the steps of the altar. So in ball-rooms in the interior. The gentlemen stand in the middle of the room, the ladies sit in a row all around. There is no mixture except for the purposes of dancing. Paget mentions, that, when he offered to accompany ladies with whom he danced to promenade the rooms, his conduct was regarded as sadly heterodox. At another party, where he found the company in two distinct circles, the women at one end of the room and the men at the other, he, supposing that it was a national custom, was about to join the men, when the lady of the manor told him that the gentlemen congregated together only because they found their own society more agreeable than that of the ladies. Of course, this state of things cannot be universal, but it is a significant index of the state of society when it is so frequently noticed in the interior. In the large cities such things have long since been changed, whether for the better we cannot tell. Paget and others mention, that, at many assemblies, while some were dancing, others were singing, and others smoking. Tobacco-smoke frequently drove the women from the rooms. Combs, too, were ostentatiously used, even when ladies were quite near. At one of these parties, a countess observed to Paget that women in Hungarian society must submit to such scenes. Men, she continued, prefer their pipes to our drawing-rooms. The woman who should attempt to civilize them would be exposed to neglect and insult. The capital is

worse than anywhere else. Paget, however, observes that he did not find these scenes universal. The misbehaving men were mostly country squires. The ladies were high-born absentees.

The pious salutation, "Praised be God!" "Praised be Jesus Christ!" takes the place, among the simple Hungarians, of our "Good morning!" "How do you do?"

Paget observes that in no country is the behavior of the child to the parent more respectful than in Hungary. From infancy the child is taught to kiss the parent's hand as its ordinary salutation, and the morning and evening greetings are considered matters of duty, and scrupulously observed. The married daughter places her mother at the head of her table, and receives her blessing as she leaves for the night. It is common to see grown-up sons preserve absolute silence in the presence of their fathers, and even sacrifice their political principles at the parent's bidding.

The condition of the Hungarian women merits a passing remark. Paget (Vol. I. p. 210) remarks that at Schemnitz an exhibition of public flogging takes place every Sunday morning, and that it rarely happens that some women are not among the sufferers. The conduct of the men at ball-rooms may already have induced the surmise that Hungarian notions about women are as conservative, as old-fashioned, as their notions are about most other things. The Magyar country-women are worse clothed than the men; where they can afford it, however, they wear knee boots, and sheepskin jackets. The covering for the head is a handkerchief. Unmarried country girls wear their hair in a plait hanging down the back. Married women tie it up. Peasant women, throughout Hungary, are very unwilling to change the costume of their ancestors. A sentiment of shame, says Paget, is attached to any change, and especially to an imitation of the higher classes. The saying with them is common, that an honest Hungarian peasant girl should wear the same clothes as her grandmother wore before her. Paget (Vol. I. p. 297) quotes several Magyar love-songs, which indicate some of the duties of an Hungarian wife. The lover says that he should like to drive six oxen in the plough, if his dove would hold it, and four horses in a sledge, if his rose would hold it up. This last duty must be performed by some one, as the roads are so bad that the sledge would empty its load into the ditch if

it were not occasionally held up at one side. The girl, far from resenting this exposition of the services expected from her, answers that her dove shall have a clean shirt, if she be obliged to soak it on Saturday and wash it on Sunday. He shall have a cake, if she have to beg the flour and manœuvre for the butter.

Miss Pardoe (Vol. II. p. 103) mentions a visit made to the county jail of Buda. There were many women confined there, and two thirds of them for the crime of child-murder. She observes that this crime is very prevalent in Hungary, and on one occasion she asked a friend of hers, a judge, to explain the matter. He answered, that the cause was twofold, poverty and shame. There is no law to enforce the support of an illegitimate infant by its father, and the mother is frequently unable to maintain it. Divorces, says Paget, are far from uncommon among the Protestants, and they are seldom regarded as disgraceful occurrences. Most divorced women marry again quite as well as before. Inveterate dislike, ill-treatment, impossibility of living together, or the employment of threats or force to bring about the marriage, is, in law, a sufficient reason. The woman retains her property and her rights unimpaired.

Women have rights in Hungary. The widows of magnates can send a deputy to sit, though not to vote, in the lower house of the Diet. In the county meetings, the widow of a noble can send a deputy to act in her name. An Hungarian lady never loses her maiden name. During the life of her husband all actions at law, in which she is interested, are conducted in her name. Her husband has no control whatever over her property, and, if she chooses, she can retain the management of it in her own hands. A maid, however, remains a minor, and a ward of her nearest male relation, no matter how old she may be. Women, as one may suppose, after hearing all this, are as interested in political discussions as the men.

It is the fashion, says Paget, for two ladies to walk and sit together, and this custom is not confined to young ladies; so that, go where you will, there is a third person in the conversation. This is a praiseworthy regulation of fashion.

The administration of justice is as old-fashioned as every thing else. Paget (Vol. II. p. 272) observes, that it is

the custom for both plaintiffs and defendants to make private visits to the judges before trial, in order to instruct them about the causes. An Hungarian boasted that the courts were better than in old times, for, said he, the judges do not like to take bribes openly now! The delays of justice in Hungary are proverbial, even in criminal cases. Paget saw at St. Benedek a number of old men in chains. They had been confined only a few months, and their offence was, that they had stirred an insurrection, fifty years before. The process against them had lasted half a century. No doubt this is an extreme case. The fault is not in the law, but in the executive. Corvinus and Joseph decreed that trials of right of possession should end within a year from the opening of the case. Yet trials often last in Hungary longer than a lifetime. Almost the only persons who obtain justice, precisely because suits may last so long, are the Jews. They will buy up all the products of the land of a magnate, paying in advance a ruinously low price. It frequently happens that suits are moved to recover the goods, so that the Jew, after robbing the indolent noble of two thirds of his property, is compelled to disgorge the remaining third.

Manorial courts existed by law until the Diet of 1836; and, although illegal, there is no question but that they exist to this day. The Magyars are the most odd conservatives the world ever saw. It is no new thing with them to disregard a law providing even for a change which they themselves regard as beneficial, because it is a change. This remark will apply to several customs noticed in this article, which have been declared illegal since 1836. Where the law providing for an alteration can be evaded, it is most religiously done.

The jurisdiction of the manorial courts extended, in civil matters, to all cases under the value of thirty dollars, and, in criminal cases, to the infliction of twenty-five blows. The lord sat in judgment, either in person or by his representative. The manorial court settled differences between the peasants, and between peasant and lord. In the latter case, the lord judged a case to which he was a party. Where the dispute was between peasants, the system might have been a tolerable method of administering justice. There was a right of appeal to the county court, but only after the infliction of the twenty-five blows, or the

payment of the money. This court was a patriarchal hall of justice; the peasants did not like it; the Magyars did.

Paget saw, at the castle of Thurzo, the flogging-board, and the Haiduks preparing to punish some peasants by order of the bailiff. Here was the great defect of this court. Bailiffs were too often the judges. Where the question was between peasants, the parties were commonly satisfied when their lord sat in person. The jurisdiction of his court, under the revised law, does not extend to the infliction of corporal punishment, nor to disputes between peasant and lord. These were to be decided by a court of five disinterested persons, of whom the lord nominated three. It is difficult to say what has become of these courts, as well as of some other peculiarly Magyar institutions, since 1849, but the probability is that, at least in the interior, they remain unchanged. With a people like the Magyars, much time is required before innovations can become settled practice. The Urbarium of Maria Theresa, the greatest innovation ever introduced into Hungary in behalf of the peasants, required a probation of nearly a hundred years.

With regard to the prisons, Miss Pardoe, who (Vol. II. p. 78, *et seq.*) gives a satisfactory account of them, observes that a culprit must be thoroughly hardened who allows himself to be incarcerated for the second time. The only care taken of the prisoners is, that they shall not escape. This last observation tells the whole story of Hungarian prisons. Accused persons are treated with less consideration than condemned criminals are. The Magyar is old-fashioned in every thing, — his prisoners were treated precisely so five hundred years ago; in what are they better than their fathers?

Miss Pardoe says, that when Pesth was nearly destroyed, in 1838, by an inundation of the Danube, scarcely a theft was committed. Paget (p. 293), speaking of the shepherds of Hungary, says that robbery is a part of the shepherd's duty, and according to his dexterity in preventing others from robbing him, or in robbing others in return when robbed, is he valued by his master and respected by his companions.

It is scarcely necessary to say, that, among this primitive people, trade, internal improvements, science, art, and edu-

cation are in a primitive state. A few men like Count Szechenyi, however, have already introduced important changes in each of these particulars. Gold, silver, iron, copper, sulphur, salt, soda, alum, potash, saltpetre, coal, wood, hemp, tobacco, hides, tallow, horse-hair, bristles, gall-nuts, rags, spirits of wine, wool, corn, and exquisite wines, are found, manufactured, or produced in great abundance, and yet Hungary has scarcely any commerce. This is partly owing to Austrian restrictive laws, but chiefly to the peculiar non-commercial character of the Magyars, and to the stationary nature of their customs, laws, and institutions. No merchant, says Paget (p. 318), can go into the Hungarian market with the same confidence he would in other countries. He can neither enforce the fulfilment of a contract, nor recover a debt without great difficulty and expense. A modern merchant might as well go into the English market as it was in the time of King John.

The water-mills on the Danube are made each of two deck-boats, containing the mill-works, with the water-wheel between them. Until 1836, the only means of transit by the river, from Linz to Vienna, was the Kehl-hammer. This is a flat-bottomed boat, a hundred and twenty feet long, and roofed in. It is immaterial which end goes first. Six oars, four at the sides, and one at either end, propel the craft. Passengers carry their own provisions, or starve. Now there are steamboats on the Danube, thanks to the Count Szechenyi. Still, the river arrangements are primitive enough. The Hungarian never uses the sail.

The agricultural societies, established by Szechenyi and other Anglomaniacs, have effected some change in farming operations, but not much. The ground, when poor, is left fallow every other year, and crops are never changed. The plough is one-handed, the fork being the branch of a tree. The corn is trodden, precisely in the Mosaic fashion, as soon as it is cut. Green crops are neglected; barley is rarely found. Irrigation is almost unheard of.

Since the violent attack of the Emperor Joseph, the Magyar language has been cultivated with some care, and Szechenyi has established an academy for its development. There are several famous poets and novelists in Hungary. There is little good music. Painting and sculpture have

been neglected; specimens are rare in the best palaces, but the ubiquitous hand of Szechenyi has brought two or three native artists into notice. Hungary possesses few scientific works, or men of high scientific attainments. The exceptions are men who were educated abroad. There are a few good museums, created by the Szechenyi family, of course. Paget complains of the University, that it is too national. He thinks that there are questions of greater importance than whether Adam was a Magyar, or Homer a Slovak. Perhaps he is right. There were published in 1838 works to the number of 433. Of these, 221 were in the Magyar tongue, 99 in German, and 84 in Latin; 29 were Gazettes, of these one in Latin. Upwards of two hundred were religious and scientific works. Of these, more than one half were sermons and academical dissertations in medicine. About 150 were works of fancy. Paget says that almost every work of merit, published in London or Paris, is to be found in the bookstores of Presburg. This gives a good idea of the state of education in Presburg, but not in the whole country, as Paget supposes. He believes that nine tenths of the Magyars can read and write, which is also an exaggeration. The Empress Maria Theresa did much for the cause of education in Hungary. Joseph introduced mixed or godless schools, but after his death they were closed. At present, nearly every village has its school. The schools are supported by the peasants. The Catholic schools are encouraged by the government. Others are formed, if the Protestants be numerous enough. If not, their children attend the Catholic school, without the obligation, however, of learning the Catechism. The branches taught are the same as in all good common schools, with the addition of moral maxims, history, and Latin grammar. The Catholics, besides their ecclesiastical seminaries, have about eighty academies and colleges. The Protestants have several Latin schools, a few academies, and three colleges. Notwithstanding all this, education is primitive in Hungary. The reason is, the Catechism is taught, or, as Paget expresses it, the higher mental faculties are not developed. God save Hungary from the development of the higher faculties! That development brought forth the Europe of 1848. The Hungarian rebels were Protestant Magyars, Poles, and Jews. The magnates and the Slaves of Hungary proper are Catho-

lies, generally. Some of the latter are schismatic Greeks, and a few are Lutherans. The untitled Magyar nobles are Calvinists. Paget (p. 106) observes that the Protestant clergy are liberal, because oppressed.

These untitled nobles are a sturdy race of men, and when they become Catholics once more they will form an important element in the future greatness of Hungary. Paget mentions (p. 106) that they are chiefly Protestants, zealous, but not too enlightened, and capable of selling their votes. That is because their higher faculties are developed. We have described, in former articles, the privileges of these nobles. They can hold land, they can vote, and they were exempted from taxation. There are grades among them, of course, but they are chiefly "one house nobles," men possessing the hereditary rights of nobility, but in every other respect little above the peasant. (Paget, p. 244.) They are supposed, by law, to be the descendants of the common soldiers who followed Arpad. They are sometimes called half-spurs. They are, says Paget (p. 247), generally a proud, unruly, hard-drinking set of fellows, with higher notions of privilege and power than of right and justice, but they are brave, patriotic, and hospitable in the highest degree. Miss Pardoe, when at Pesth, witnessing a county election, expressed her surprise that the troops of coarsely clad, red-handed, and rude-looking agriculturists were among the nobles of the land. A Magyar friend described the half-spurs to her as a congeries of small landholders, herdsmen, vine-growers, wagoners, and pig-drivers. It is true that the term *untitled nobleman* means, in Hungary, only a freeman, but the half-spur considers himself quite equal to the proudest magnate of the land. The poorest would scorn an alliance with the richest Slave, and, if a coachman, no sum of money would tempt him to drive a Wallach into a Magyar town. His (Paget, p. 302) is the only language understood in heaven, and therefore the only one to be used in prayer. "Ah! my lady," said a Magyar nurse who heard her mistress pray in German, "how can you expect God to listen to you, if you speak a language he does not understand?"

The theory of the constitution is, that every Hungarian is born a soldier. His nobility and all his cherished privileges derive from this fact. He always appears at his assemblies armed. He enlists with the understanding that

he is to be a hussar, that he shall have a horse, wear spurs, and blue pantaloons. All, except the clergy, cherish with great affection a hairy upper lip. The moon, it is said, is compelled to rise in the theatres with a fierce Magyar mustachio. Paget saw men whose mustachios were a foot long, from tip to tip. He also mentions that he saw the very cattle formed like regiments, three or four deep, and in this order they fed. So one morning, near Debreczin, he saw a troop of several hundred horses, headed by the parish bull as drum major, gallop by, and file off each to his quarters as regularly as soldiers to their billets. When the Magyar officer enters a ball-room, he marches to the centre, draws up to attention, strikes his spurs together, bobs his head forward, faces to the left and bobs again, then to the right and bobs again. When the untitled noble serves as master at the table of a magnate, he is, says Paget, bewhiskered and bespurred as fiercely as if he were handling a sabre instead of presenting a knife and fork. The Magyar uniform is the finest in Europe. We need not say that in Europe there is not a better soldier. Some portions of Hungary have not enjoyed ten years of peace since the times of Arpad.

Paget says that there are more than two hundred English officers in the Austro-Hungarian army. It would be worth while to know how many of these, during the last war, remained faithful to their military oath.

Now what is to become of this noble Magyar nation? It descended, a thousand years ago, upon the plains of Hungary; it conquered the country; it was the terror of Europe for a space; it defended Southeastern Europe once from the Turkish scourge of God; it has passed under the dominion of three foreign houses, and it has not lost its liberties; it has successfully resisted the elsewhere omnipotent arm of Austrian centralization; numbering only four millions, it has for a thousand years defied, beaten, or enslaved the nations around or within its borders, and there it is, with its nationality as intense as it was in the days of Arpad. Does this glorious past seem likely to be lost in an inglorious future? Is the sun of the great Magyar nation to set in blood? Is the crown of St. Stephen to be laid, as a mere relic, upon the altar of a ruined Hungarian cathedral?

The Magyars are not republicans, in the modern accep-

tation of that term. We have accumulated evidence enough, on this point, in previous articles, and almost every peculiarity of the nation which we have noted in this paper brings new proof of the fact. The Magyars are a nation, an encamped army, of soldiers, and a well-ordered army cannot form a republic. There are among the Magyars many reformers, or liberals. But liberalism, as Paget (p. 20) well observes, is one thing in Hungary, and quite another thing in England. The greater number of the young nobles are liberals. Their liberalism is mainly a creed of one article, which is, that Austria is the root of all Hungarian evils. "I am sure," says Paget, "that they are anxious for the freedom and education of the peasantry, and yet it often appeared to us that they spoke of them, and to them, as though they belonged to a different class of creation with themselves: in short, all of them are reformers, but many of them seem eminently impractical in their ideas of reform."

Republicanism is well in its place; it is well in America;—God save it from American demagogues! But it is not well in a country where the manners, ideas, institutions, and the whole genius of the people are conceived in aristocracy and born in monarchy. Even in 1849, when the quarrel with Austria was at its height, when republicanism was in the ascendant at Paris, Vienna, Milan, and Rome, the revolutionary Diet, yea, even the Kossuth Diet, spurned, hissed the name of republicanism out of the sight and hearing of Magyardom. Only a few Gallomanists were found to speak in its favor. The deputies wanted an independent Magyar kingdom. Magyar republicans would cease to be Magyars. Republicanism has no more place in Hungary than monarchy in America.

So when we demonstrate that they are not republicans, we bring no accusation against them; we prove only that our countrymen are sadly ignorant of the true nature of the Hungarian struggle for independence.

In one sense—not in the modern sense, however—Magyardom is a republic. Every member of the nation is noble. The half-spur and the magnate are equal before the constitution, in the presence of the king. English writers contend that England is a republic in the same sense, and they love to compare the late Magyar struggle with the English revolution of 1688.

Our case against the Magyars, as well as against our own demagogues, was, that the cause of 1849 was a bad cause. It had some elements of justice, — the object may have been good, — but the end and the circumstances were bad, and this vitiated the whole cause. We have not space to repeat the heads of our argument, neither is it necessary. It is quite possible to yield a hearty admiration of the Magyar character, taken as a whole, without undertaking to defend it in each of its peculiarities. There is no question that the Magyar wins the love of those who meet him off the battle-field, and the respect of those who encounter him thereon; but that does not prove him a faultless being. With very great national virtues, the Magyar exhibits great national vices, and all of them were fully exhibited in 1849, as they always have been when a great question is before the nation. They had allowed their jealousy of Austria to place them in a highly impolitic position with reference to the Slaves around and beneath them. Nearly all the plans for the amelioration of the peasant condition originated, as we have seen, from the court of Vienna. That court had as little desire to emancipate the peasants, to make them equal with the Magyars, as the Magyars themselves had. Yet the suspicious sons of Arpad thought differently; they looked upon every act in behalf of the Slaves, emanating from Austria, as a covert attack upon Magyar liberties. This suspicion led them to oppose all such acts, where opposition was practicable, and so they committed the great error of exhibiting themselves as enemies, and the Austrians as friends, of the unfortunate Slaves. Independently of this circumstance, they were as willing as the court of Vienna to legislate for the benefit of the peasants. They cared as much for them as Austria did. But their intense nationality threw another difficulty in the way. They did not wish to be unjust to the peasants, but, regarding them as things of another creation, they did not precisely know how to be just to them. This led to another fatal error. The reforms proposed by Austria were practicable and safe. The reforms proposed by them were impracticable. Whenever they really did any thing, it was done after the plan emanating from Vienna, as was seen in the Diet of 1836–48, when the practicable reforms proposed, and partly carried, were based on the *Urbarium*, the peasant *Magna Charta* forced upon Hungary by Maria Theresa, nearly a

hundred years before. This led to another misconception. They appeared to the peasants as men who were compelled, by the force of circumstances, to adopt Austrian schemes of reform, after having resisted them for a hundred years. And so 1849 came and found the Slaves as evilly as ever disposed towards their Magyar superiors.

The same year found the Magyars in quite as impolitic a situation with reference to their dependencies. The Wallachs of Transylvania were, in the eyes of a Magyar, less than dogs. It was possible to conciliate them or at least to keep them quiet during the war, but the policy of Kossuth in their regard was stern and cruel. Three evil consequences followed this capital error. The insurrection of the Wallachs was quelled at the cost of seas of blood. General Bem, a man who might have checkmated Görgey, was detached from the main army, and sent, with a separate command, to Transylvania. The Russian invasion ensued.

The Magyar policy with reference to the Slaves of Croatia was equally blind. There is no doubt that Jel-lachich was an ambitious soldier; perhaps he was also an unfaithful subject. It is very possible, moreover, that some of the pretensions advanced by the Croats were wild and extravagant. It is certain that the Magyars were a superior people, and that the Magyars knew it. But, just at that time, when Slavonic nationality was as furiously asserted as ever Magyarism was, when even Panslavism was openly talked of, and, what was worse for that imaginative people, sung about and prayed for, when the northern congress of Prague and the southern congress of Agram had been held, the Magyars held the torch to the magazine of Slavonic gunpowder. Besides giving them worse than no representation in the Diet, besides asserting their undoubted superiority in every offensive way, they seriously tried to force their Magyar language and customs upon the Croats. The result was inevitable. Croatia flew to arms. The Magyars, in truth, did not know what a storm they were raising. They do not hate the Slaves, they do not despise them as one despises a *man*, — they regarded the Croat schemes as matter for contemptuous laughter, as pranks played by inferior beings; they looked upon them with feelings very like those with which a devout slaveholder regards the antics enacted by the black imperial court of Solouque.

To these fatal errors others were added. There was

never a great question before the nation, but the Magyars seemed to be struck with judicial blindness. In the face of Radetzky's victories, they demanded and obtained from an imbecile and frightened emperor things which he could not in honor grant, nor they demand. The Hungarian nation was always free. Magyardom may be exterminated, but it cannot be enslaved. Yet freedom and independence are two very different things. Massachusetts is free; independent of the Union it is not, ought not to be. Now if the Magyars, besides their singularly free institutions, also held the purse and sword of the nation, it would be independent, its connection with the empire would be a farce. It would do them little or no good, perhaps some harm, and it would certainly be almost fatal to the empire. The monarch, therefore, both as emperor of Austria and as king of Hungary, could not in honor grant the required privileges. If the Magyars were determined to be entirely *sui juris*, they could in honor, as honor now goes, have asked for what they did ask, and what they obtained. But then, in common honesty, they should have issued their declaration of independence in 1848, and not in 1849. As it was, they asked for things which would make the nation absolutely independent, and at the same time they swore that they did not want independence. This was not honest. It was as discreditable to the nation as the treacherous march of Kossuth to Vienna, and his infamous league with the democrats of that city, while he acknowledged Ferdinand as his emperor and king. Such dishonesty deserved the punishment which it received. The Magyars, honest, impulsive, and confiding as they commonly are, *never* failed, in their great national struggles, to submit their fate to the conduct of dishonest men, or of impracticable visionaries. It was always so, from Zapolya to Kossuth. And the consequence always was, that the nation divided, the magnates following one banner, the half-spurs rallying beneath the other. The *pars sanior et potior* never failed to win the day.

In our previous articles, we dwelt at some length upon the relations which subsisted between the Magyars and the Slaves. We demonstrated that the war was a war of races; that the Hungarian nation means the Magyar nation; that the Magyars as a body were free, and that the Slaves as a whole were serfs. We wish not, however, to be misunderstood. We did not, and do not, censure the Magyars

for this state of things, any further than to point out that the Magyar policy with reference to the Slaves was frequently unreasonable and oppressive. Our main object was to meet our own radicals, and to furnish well-meaning persons, who had been misled by the newspapers, with a full demonstration that such a state of things did exist in Hungary, even so late as 1848. We certainly did not say, and do not now, that the distinction of races and the peasant system should be entirely abolished in Hungary. These may, in honesty and in policy, be allowed to remain, with such amendments as Austria has always desired to introduce, and such as the Magyars perhaps would have adopted long since, were it not for their almost insane jealousy of Vienna. To them nothing good comes out of Nazareth.

The Slaves, in purely Slavic provinces, have among themselves the peasant system, as well as the Magyars. The difference is, that, with them, master and peasant are of the same race. This difference is of no great practical benefit to the peasant for the moment; it induces changes beneficial to him only after the lapse of centuries. We are not sure that the Slavic noble treats his dependents better than the Magyar does. There is less chance for a peasant to become a noble in Slavic countries, than there is in England for a common laborer to become a peer of the realm. Hence the transfer of the Slavic peasantry from Magyar to Slave masters, would be of little if any benefit to them. Their treatment would be little better; they would be little nearer to the enjoyment of the rights of freemen. The patriarchal system is as indigenous to Slavedom as it is to Magyardom. We are not sure, even, that a Russian serf may not, with reason, envy the Hungarian peasant.

By Austrian laws the Hungarian peasant is now free, but it is very possible that the court of Vienna will find the difficulties attending the execution of the law in Magyar territory so serious, that a partial return to the old system may turn out to be inevitable. The Hungarian peasants, after centuries of bondage, are less fitted for freedom than our Southern negroes are. This difficulty has perplexed Magyardom as well as Austria.

The peasants of Hungary are serfs, but not slaves. We speak of their condition previous to 1848, as we have done

throughout this article, using the present tense for reasons elsewhere given. They are not bound to the soil, hence they cannot be transferred with it. Their serfage is, therefore, of a mitigated form. They can and do acquire tenant right, precisely what tenants in Ireland are struggling for. Many of them are very wealthy. The account we have given, on another page, of the revenues of some magnates, proves that the lord realizes little from his peasants in the form of rent. The burdens to which they were subject have been elsewhere described. The Magyars were always sensible of the duty of treating them well, even when their own pride, jealousy, their Magyarism, in a word, stood in the way of relief to the poor serf, as it too frequently did. If the Magyars had resolutely enforced even their own laws, not their local customs, in behalf of the Slaves, the Hungarian peasantry would compare favorably with that of any Continental nation. Probably one reason why the court of Vienna so often and so resolutely interfered was, that so many laws in favor of the serf lay idle on the statute-book, so inveterate were local customs. The preamble of an old act declares that it was passed for the lord's interest, *ne omnis rusticitas, sine qua nobilitas parum valet, deleatur*. And another act declares that *nulla res magis florenti quondam Hungariæ statui nocuisse videtur oppressione colonorum, quorum clamor ascendit jugiter ante conspectum Dei*. The Ruler of nations answered their cry in 1849. If Magyars interpret that answer correctly, it will be well for the Hungarian nation.

Now Austria, Europe, cannot sustain the loss of this Magyar nation. As mere soldiers, the Hungarians are invaluable to the Old World. They were always brave, but their bravery in 1849 became almost sublime. Pulszky, Schlesinger, Pragay, Madame Beck, and other Magyar authorities, tell wondrous stories of the martial deeds done in that eventful war, and their stories are scarcely exaggerated, since they are confirmed, in all essential particulars, by Pimodan, the Austrian witness cited at the head of this article. He cannot understand *why* the Austrian troops were beaten, but, somehow, beaten they were, in defiance of all rule. Or, as an Austrian non-commissioned officer expressed it, they were not beaten, they only retreated. Pimodan tells the truth with great reluctance, but he tells it, because he is an honest, high-minded soldier.

Austria, Europe, cannot suffer the Magyar nation to die, because it is almost the only conservative nation left to the Old World. No two things can be more opposed to one another than Magyardom is to European radicalism. This latest product of the fires of hell curses almost every square inch of Continental ground outside of Hungary. There it was known by name, and known only to be ignominiously thrust out. Even Kossuth could not, or pretended that he could not, abide its presence. The conservatism of Hungary, as we have seen, is carried, in some things, to an unreasonable extent. But its existence, in the present state of Europe, challenges admiration and respect. It is the olive-branch found by the dove in the deluge of many waters. It is the symbol of the state to which Europe must and will return. Magyardom, then, may be made, if not the right arm, at least the sword wielded by the right arm of Europe, in the coming struggle between civilization and barbarism.

There is no probability that Austria will enslave the Magyar nation. It cannot if it would, and there are no signs of its desire to do it; there never were, unless in the days of the Emperor Joseph. The singular freedom of Magyar institutions renders such a thing almost impossible. The little democracies of our towns are supposed to be our best security that a central despotism will never be established in America. But the towns of Hungary are freer than even our little free democracies, as they are called. Every Hungarian has the right to be present, in person, at the Diet. But, as numbers prevent, deputies are chosen at the county meetings. These deputies are bound to vote as their constituents instruct them, or to resign, and this right is carefully guarded. Deputies have been known to deliver speeches, setting forth their own sentiments, and then to vote on the other side, in accordance with instructions received. The towns and counties elect their own officers, with the exception of the highest, who, as lord lieutenant, represents the crown, but who is powerless in local questions, while the elected county officers are omnipotent. Decrees, even of the king, approved by the Diet, can be, and have been, set aside by the county meetings, when they appear to clash with the county privileges or rights. *Cum honore seponuntur*, is the law term for the sturdy operation. It would be curious to see the constituents of Webster in-

structing him to vote for a certain measure, or resign, as it would to see a town in Massachusetts set aside a law passed by Congress, and approved by the President. Yet such things were done in Hungary.

There is no probability, either, that Magyardom will ever be absorbed in any other nationality. It has successfully battled for existence a thousand years, it has withstood rude shocks, it has overcome difficulties which proved too great for other nationalities to surmount, and there it is, as living as ever. Indeed, Magyardom has a peculiarity which is thought to be the prerogative of Anglo-Normandom. It absorbs all other national elements. The Hungarians may rest assured, says Paget (p. 68), that it will not be the fault of a newly made nobleman, — be he of what origin he may, — if he does not very soon persuade himself that his ancestors were of the purest Magyar blood, and if he himself does not become the warmest supporter of Magyarism in all its forms.

The last war affords examples in support of this remark of Paget, if support be needed. Kossuth, a Slovak, became a Magyar of the Magyars. Damianics, one of Kossuth's best generals, was a Serb. He had punished his own countrymen severely for rising against the Magyars. When he left them he said: "If you rise again, I shall return, and burn down your houses, and put to death yourselves and your parents and children; and on the grave of my nation I shall shoot myself, that not one of the cursed race shall survive that breaks its allegiance!"

Yet there is not the remotest probability that this singularly free nation will soon be an independent kingdom. We have assigned reasons in a previous paper, and we will not dwell upon them now. They may be summed up in one, — a deplorable want of unity. Hungary, in this respect, is wonderfully like two of the finest nations of Europe, Ireland and Italy. This notable disunion arises partly from the fact, that the local freedom enjoyed by the counties is so great, that no central power which is Magyar can be established. It would be the mockery of a power, — more so than that of the last Polish kings. The counties are independent, one of the other, and almost independent of the king, while the diet of counties only presents a concentrated image of the discordant interests of the kingdom. Moreover, the power of the king, while it was weak in the counties taken separately, was generally direct and efficient

in the diet of the nation. He governed the whole, but only as a whole, not, as in his hereditary dominions, in each constituent part of the whole. The power of a county to reject, *cum honore seponere*, a royal decree, is a whimsical illustration of this strange state of things.

In fact, only a woman, or a very good soldier, could keep the nation quiet. Nearly all the kings of the house of Arpad wore a crown of thorns. Men like Louis I., Matthias Corvin, and Leopold I. were equal to the task of governing Hungary, because the Magyars were afraid of them. Whenever the government was not remarkably strong, anarchy ensued in the land. The peculiar structure of Hungarian society, involving, as it does, the political equality and the civil and social inequality of the magnates and the untitled nobility, always rendered it impossible for Hungary to enjoy quiet, unless there were a strong central power to preserve peace, a power for which Magyar institutions do not provide. Their constitution secures the freedom of the subject, and the insignificance of the king. Their quarrels with Austria hence receive an explanation. Austria could not exercise the most common prerogatives of royalty without finding that, with every intention to do good, she had trampled upon some historical right or other.

Hungary, as we have seen in a preceding article, is a country won from the Turks by Austrian arms. While her counties govern themselves almost as independent establishments, she cannot govern herself as an independent kingdom, for the want of provision in her constitution for a sufficiently strong central power. Moreover, her geographical position, in the midst of so many Slave nations, would put the valor of her children to continual proof, in the struggle for national existence. Hungary belongs to Austria, to Europe. Her nationality will be preserved by the court of Vienna, for, considering the conservatism of the Magyars, their bravery, and their many noble qualities, that nationality will be a powerful barrier to Russian pretensions. Hungary, left to herself, would spill, in the contest with domestic and foreign enemies, blood which might be poured out to better purpose in the defence of Western Europe. Already the Slaves in Hungary and its dependencies, who are of the Greek schism, offer daily prayers for their Emperor Nicholas. The Magyar nation is one great security to Europe. that such prayers will not be heard.

ART. IV. — *The Edinburgh Review*, No. CXC. Art. IX.
Ultramontane Doubts. New York : Scott & Co. April,
 1851.

THE reputation of *The Edinburgh Review* for ability, learning, and criticism was established before we had learned our letters, and has been respectably sustained in spite of its formidable rival, *The London Quarterly*. It has suffered in late years, but it is still the especial favorite with our countrymen, and it probably is more influential on this side the Atlantic than on the other. It is in accordance with the prevailing tone of the great body of educated Americans, nominally Christian, moderately liberal, and really deistical. It places the state before the Church, and loyalty above religion, but disowns the name of unbeliever, and condescends to patronize Christianity so long as it is content to serve in a subordinate sphere, and exhibits no symptoms of aspiring to independence. It respects the clergy as useful parish constables, and offers no opposition to them so long as they keep entirely aloof from all secular affairs, and interpose no obstacle to the intrigues or ambition of Whig politicians. It is wise, but its wisdom is not that which is from above, and therefore may be regarded as an admirable representative of English Whiggism, personified in Mr. Augustus Tomlinson, who with great prudence and success devotes himself to robbery and housebreaking, and to lectures on ethics and metaphysics.

The article in the number before us entitled *Ultramontane Doubts* is written with cleverness and tact, and with more intellectual power than we are accustomed to look for among Protestants. Protestantism is essentially an unintellectual religion, and in their best days Protestants made but a sorry figure at reasoning ; but latterly they appear to have lost the little share of intelligence they originally carried with them from the Church, and to have become utterly unable to do any thing in the way of argument, except to vituperate, and invent, and circulate foolish and absurd stories about priests and religious. Anti-Popery lecturers and editors, in our times, and especially in our country, seldom seem able to rise above the poor old fishwoman falling into her dotage, and the fact that they

are popular, and can attract crowds and rapturous applause, is a sad commentary on the moral and intellectual culture of the Protestant community. It is, therefore, refreshing to meet even one Protestant who shows some signs of intellectual life, who has the courage to make some show of argument, and who, perhaps, has understanding enough of the matters on which he writes to be capable of being refuted. We had wellnigh despaired of ever meeting such a one, and now that he presents himself, we greet him cordially, and cherish him as a friend. We hope his courage will not fail him at his first onset, and that he will not, as soon as he receives the first blow, like our ordinary adversaries, disappear, to be seen or heard of no more for ever. Seriously, it gives us pleasure to meet a Protestant who has a beard on his face, and who has the strength to give and to take sturdy blows. We are tired of combating mere boys, or mere *simulacra*, or shadows as unsubstantial as the ghosts of superstition.

Let it not, however, be imagined that we have really encountered one of the giants. The Reviewer is no giant, that is certain; he is not above the medium size of the species, and is Titanic only in his disposition. He is great only in comparison with the ordinary herd of Protestant controversialists, as was Gulliver among the Lilliputians. He brings forward no new argument, suggests no difficulty that has not been met and answered at least a thousand times; but he has contrived with much art to obscure certain matters very plain in themselves, and to confuse certain questions so successfully, as to embarrass the uninformed Protestant mind, and to satisfy those already satisfied, that we Catholics are sad reasoners, and in the last analysis no better than Protestants themselves.

The purpose of the Reviewer is to check the speed of Catholicity in Great Britain, by a skilful appeal to the national and political prejudices of Englishmen. He begins by referring to the hope expressed by many Catholics, that England is on the eve of her return to the Church. He does not believe this hope has any solid foundation; but conceding it for the sake of the argument, he wishes Roman Catholics charitably to assist him "to ascertain fairly and logically what will be our duty in reference to this realm and constitution of England, when that inevitable hour arrives in which our consciences shall compel us to

return to their communion ; and to what extent our state and laws must be reformed and remodelled in the event of our national conversion." This he contends is very important, for "not a few of his countrymen feel it impossible to conjecture how to comport themselves, on the adoption of any *known* theory of the infallibility and supremacy of the Roman Church, towards the institutions and laws of their own country, and in relation to those doctrines of intellectual and religious freedom which at present are most 'surely believed amongst us.'" He concedes that the Catholic subjects of the queen, as a body, are truly loyal, but he thinks their loyalty is an inconsequence, not authorized by their religion, but preserved and manifested in spite of it. The theory of Catholicity adopted by such Catholics as the Duke of Norfolk, Lord Camoys, Lord Beaumont, Mr. Anstey, and, perhaps we should add, the Earl of Shrewsbury, men whose loyalty to their queen is not to be questioned, is, he thinks, only a modified Protestantism, and not the genuine Catholic article at all. Englishmen, if converted, "would conscientiously feel compelled to adopt a much more Ultramontane position." But here comes up the difficulty. If we adopt the Ultramontane doctrine, then we must accept "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." But if we do not adopt the Ultramontane doctrine, we render the seat of infallibility doubtful, which renders the infallibility itself, if not doubtful, at least of no value as a rule ; or if we remove the doubt as to the seat of infallibility, and agree as to its organ, we must say the organ, whether Pope or Council, is sometimes infallible and sometimes not, for it is certain the organ, take which you will, has uttered "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." But if the organ is sometimes infallible and sometimes fallible in its utterances, it is necessary to have some rule by which to determine when its utterances are infallible and when not, and no rule but that of private judgment is possible. That is, the Reviewer attempts to show that the Catholic cannot be consistently a Gallican, because Gallicanism pushed to its last consequences is simply Protestantism ; that to be a consistent Catholic he must be an Ultramontane ; but, if an Ultramontane, must hold "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." This is the argument of the article.

The Reviewer's inquiry is, as it strikes us, quite superfluous; for it relates solely to what may or may not be the duty of Englishmen towards civil government when they are compelled by their consciences to return to the Catholic communion, that is, after they have ceased to be Protestants and become Catholics. Whatever may be their duty, it is and can be of no interest to a Protestant, because, by the very terms of the supposition, there are to be no Protestants to be affected by it. Moreover, it does not indicate a very high religious or even moral sense, after one has become conscientiously convinced that he ought to return to the Catholic Church, to stop and inquire how obedience to his conscience will affect his political or civil relations. If a man is convinced that he ought to become a Catholic, he is convinced that the Catholic Church is God's Church, and therefore infallible, and consequently that whatever she teaches him to believe must be true, and whatever she commands him to do must be just.

We must tell the Reviewer, in the very outset, that we deny the jurisdiction of the court in which he proposes to try us. He makes politics the standard of religion, and summons the Church to plead at the bar of the state. But he forgets that religion, if any thing, is the *lex suprema*, and that politics, loyalty, and patriotism are to be judged by her, not she by them. Loyalty is a virtue commanded, and therefore defined, by religion. Whatever does not come within her definition, or whatever would conflict with her commands, is by that fact alone proved to be not the virtue of loyalty, not a virtue at all, but a crime against society, and a sin against God. So also of patriotism. It is a virtue as prescribed, and within the limits prescribed, by religion; outside of these limits, and not subject to religion, it is a vice, a crime, or a sin. Politics are simply a branch of ethics, and ethics are nothing but moral theology, the application of religious principles and dogmas to practical life. Politics are, therefore, by their own nature, below religion, and subject to her authority. To attempt to judge her by them is worse than simply ridiculous. She herself is the standard, and if you mean to be religious at all, you must conform your politics to your religion, not your religion to your politics. This is simply a dictate of common sense.

In whatever light we consider the Reviewer's inquiry, it

is simply absurd. He must either deny religion, or accept religion. He cannot do both at once. There is no possible way of reconciling two contradictories. Do our best, and we cannot reconcile religion with the feelings, wishes, and notions of those who hold all religion to be false and mischievous; for every religion, in that it claims to be religion, claims to be the supreme law, and to possess the right to demand unqualified obedience. Religion is infallible truth and justice, or what God, who is truth itself, teaches men to believe, and what God, who is justice itself, commands them to do. There can be no compromise between truth and falsehood, or between justice and injustice, any more than between Christ and Belial, God and the Devil. The Free Kirk of Scotland, in asserting its independence of the civil authority, should have taught the Reviewer that religion is above the state, and he can hardly be unaware that a Parliamentary church, like the Anglican, is no religion at all, but a part of the general police establishment of the kingdom. If he accepts religion he must accept it as religion, not as politics. He can deny all religion if he chooses, and is willing to take the responsibility of doing so, but he cannot accept it, and then object to it that it is religion. He can allege that Catholicity is false, and, if he proves his allegation, reject her on that ground, which is of itself a sufficient ground for rejecting her; but he cannot allege that she is false, because, if accepted, she would modify his politics, disturb his political convictions, or restrict his loyalty or his patriotism; for, if true religion, she has the Divine right to determine his politics, and to define his patriotism and his loyalty or his duty to the state. Religion, therefore the Church, if true religion, has by its own essence authority over kings, emperors, princes, and states, and they are as much bound to obey her as are the meanest of their subjects. The man who denies this has not as yet the most elementary religious conception.

The Reviewer thinks that Englishmen, were they to become Catholics, would feel bound in conscience to be Ultramontanes, for he thinks the Ultramontane doctrine that which is the most consistent with the general theory of the Church. On this point we have no dispute with him. We are ourselves ultra-Ultramontane, and have not the least sympathy in the world with what is called Gallicanism, though we have deep love and veneration for *Catholic*

France. But if you adopt the Ultramontane doctrine, contends the Reviewer, you must concede that your Church has erred. Why so? Because "English Protestants are apt to feel suspicious that" she has asserted "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." This is a serious difficulty indeed, and one which proves that it is a mistake to suppose that the Protestant has nothing to say for himself. We cannot deny that English Protestants are apt to feel such suspicions, but, happily, in the present discussion, we have nothing to do with the suspicion of English *Protestants*, for the inquiry the Reviewer sets out with he himself restricts to Englishmen after their consciences compel them to return to the Catholic communion. We cannot deny, again, that the Church has asserted principles to which "loyal and patriotic Englishmen," even though professing to be Catholics, refuse or will refuse to subscribe, but this, perhaps, is not a conclusive argument against her infallibility. Englishmen are, no doubt, very respectable, at least as their own little insular world goes, but we do not recollect that they in their capacity of Englishmen, whether nominally Catholics or not, ever received a Divine commission to teach, or a promise of immunity from error. As we have read history, the Church of God existed some centuries before there were any Englishmen in existence, and we are pretty sure that not to them, as Englishmen, was it said, "Going, teach all nations to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, for behold I am with you all days unto the consummation of the world." With all deference to our cousins across the water, we must tell them frankly that we do not recognize them, however "loyal and patriotic," as the infallible Church of God, from whose decision there lies no appeal. The Church of God, whatever else she is, is Catholic, not national, and her prerogatives are those of no particular nation as such, not even of the Italians, as Gioberti, in his false and exaggerated patriotism, would persuade us. Here, again, we must deny the jurisdiction of the court, and cannot consent to plead at its bar. Who says "the Church of God" pronounces a higher word than he who says "patriotic and loyal Englishmen." That patriotic and loyal Englishmen cannot subscribe to the decisions of the Church may be a grievous misfortune for them, or an excellent reason for condemning

them as heretics; but it is just no reason at all for saying the Church has erred. The Reviewer forgets that the Catholic Church is neither the Kirk of Scotland, nor the Anglican Establishment. It is only a church created by Englishmen, deriving its institution and its mission from their Queen and Parliament, and which they have made and can unmake, that can be tried by the national feelings, convictions, or prejudices of Englishmen. Englishmen, when compelled by their consciences to return to our communion, will most likely cease to be Anglicans.

But what are these principles, said to have been asserted by the Church, to which English Protestants are apt to feel suspicious that loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe. According to the Reviewer, they are the claim by the Church of the power by Divine right to depose temporal sovereigns, to absolve their subjects from their allegiance, and to persecute heretics. Here our readers will perceive that the Reviewer holds that loyal and patriotic Englishmen must place loyalty before religion, the state before the Church, and heresy before orthodoxy. If they can only provide for the state, for the temporal order, and secure immunity for heretics, they must be prepared to let the Church or orthodoxy shift for itself. A true Christian would reverse this, and contend that in securing the Church he had secured the state, and that, if he secured orthodoxy, he need not be solicitous to secure to heretics the freedom to deny it, and thus destroy themselves. But let this pass, as it is a consideration not likely to weigh with the Reviewer.

Suppose the Church has claimed the power alleged, what then? If she is what she professes to be, she is infallible, and then, if she has claimed it, she infallibly has it, and you in objecting only condemn yourself. You must be able to prove infallibly that she does not possess it, before, from her having claimed it, you can conclude that she has erred. Are you able to do this? The Church claims to be infallible, to teach and govern all nations by Divine authority, and the claim of infallible authority can never be set aside by an authority confessedly fallible. What infallible authority have you for denying that the Church possesses, by Divine right, any power she has ever claimed or claims? Do you say Englishmen cannot subscribe to it? But Englishmen are not infallible, and may themselves be the party in the wrong. Do you allege popular opinion?

Since when has popular opinion become an infallible criterion of truth and falsehood, of right and wrong? Do you say the temporal authority denies it? Is the temporal authority infallible? Do you say yes? Then you must prove it. No? Then it may be mistaken, and its assertion counts for nothing. Then, again, who made the temporal authority the judge of the spiritual? Who made its voice authoritative against the religious or spiritual authority?

Do you, finally, say the power is intrinsically evil, and such as can never, by any one, be lawfully claimed and exercised? It is, then, *malum in se*, always and everywhere wrong to depose temporal sovereigns, to absolve their subjects from their allegiance, and to punish heretics, by whomsoever it may be done. Are you prepared to take this ground? Then sing your palinode without delay. Call up your Scotch ancestors and sentence them for having made war on their king and having sold him to the English Parliament; let your righteous indignation break forth against the Long Parliament and Cromwell, for having not only deposed, but tried, condemned, and actually beheaded, Charles the First; draw up an indictment against your Whig progenitors for having called in Dutch William to expel James the Second, disown your "Glorious Revolution" of 1688, and declare Victoria the First an usurper. Why, the very essence of English and Scotch Whiggism is that kings may be deposed, and their subjects absolved from their allegiance, and the massacre of Glencoe, the penal laws of England and Ireland, and the recent Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which has received the royal assent almost at the moment we are writing, prove that "loyal and patriotic Englishmen," especially if Whigs, hold it lawful to persecute, if not heretics, at least true believers. Universal European Liberalism, the able organ of which the Edinburgh Review has been for nearly half a century, holds nothing to be more certain than that it is right to depose temporal sovereigns, and that subjects may not only be absolved from their allegiance, but rise up in arms and depose them whenever they take it into their heads to do so. Ask Lord Palmerston, ask Lord Minto, ask the present Sir Robert Peel, ask Lord John Russell, the first minister of the crown, ask your friends, Mazzini, Canino, Ledru-Rollin, Herr Hecker, Herr Struvé, and the whole band of Red Republicans, who, in 1848, overturned or shook every throne

in Europe, if it be not so. If you happen to be an admirer of Washington, and the republic of the United States, read in the Declaration of Independence by the American Congress of 1776, "that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are *absolved from all allegiance* to the British crown; and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved." You cannot as Liberals, as Whigs, as Englishmen, nor even as Americans, living under governments founded either on the right of revolution, as is that of Great Britain, or on the principle that the tyranny of the prince forfeits his rights and absolves his subjects, as is ours, maintain that in no case and under no circumstances can temporal sovereigns be deposed and subjects absolved from their allegiance. Nay, no one can do it without asserting, with the Anglican ministers under the Stuarts, the Divine right of kings, the inamissibility of power, and passive obedience, a doctrine ably combated at the time by Cardinals Bellarmine and Du Perron, and the Spanish Jesuit Suarez, and which would deprive the people of all hope of freedom, and make God himself the accomplice of the civil tyrant. You cannot deny that civil power is amissible, that it may be forfeited, and then that temporal sovereigns may, under some circumstances, be justly deposed, and their subjects absolved from their allegiance. Then you cannot conclude that the Church is fallible from the simple fact that she has claimed and exercised the power over temporal sovereigns and their subjects to which you object.

The difference, on the supposition that the Church has claimed and exercised the power in question, between the Reviewer and us is, that, while we claim it for the Church as commissioned by God to teach and govern all nations, he claims it for demagogues, conspirators, rebels, revolutionists, and the vague something called the people; that is, the mob, for the people acting without government and against government are a mob, and nothing else, whether in larger or smaller numbers. And what does he gain for loyalty and patriotism by denying the power to the Church, and claiming it for the mob? If you deny it to the Church, you must claim it for the mob, since there is nothing else for which you can claim it; for being a right against the temporal sovereign, it of course cannot be claimed for him.

You must, then, either deny all right to resist the tyrant, and assert absolute civil despotism, or else concede the deposing and absolving power either to the mob or to the Church, that is, the spiritual authority; and can you ask us to spend time in proving, that, even on the score of human prudence, the Church is altogether the safer depositary of the power? The English rebellion under the first Charles, the French revolutions of 1789, 1793, 1830, and 1848, and the Red Republican insurrections in Switzerland, in the Italian states, in the smaller German principalities, in Berlin, and in Vienna in the last-mentioned year, as well as the revolutions now fomented throughout Europe by the secret societies, and which are kept down only by immense standing armies and the most stringent police regulations, are a proof, that to concede this power to the mob is only to render freedom impracticable, and undermine all authority, and subvert all society. Great Britain herself, who opens her arms so lovingly to the political refugees from all the Continental states, and permits them to organize on her own territory a conspiracy against all legal order and all social existence, has in her bosom a large and increasing body of Chartist, Socialist, and malecontents, who will at no distant day bring home even to her obtuse understanding the danger of asserting the sovereignty of the mob. If we wish to maintain legal order, or even society at all, we must assert authority, and maintain that, in face of the subject, it is always and everywhere sacred and inviolable. In face of the mob, authority must be presumed to be always right. Then, since constitutional monarchies, republics, and democracies, as we know from experience, can tyrannize as well as the most absolute monarchies, — since it is impossible so to organize power that it may not be abused, and most grievously abused, — nothing remains but hopeless tyranny and oppression, or the recognition in the religious or spiritual authority of an umpirage between sovereigns, and especially between sovereigns and their subjects. For this umpirage the Catholic Church is peculiarly fitted. She is in all nations, and therefore has an interest in and tenderness for each; she is confined to no one, and is above all, with an equal regard for all, and for both sovereign and subject, and therefore is independent of the peculiar prejudices or policy of either, and prepared to be impartial and just in her decisions. Some such

umpirage is felt even by our age to be necessary, as proved by your congresses of sovereigns, and by the congress of nations contended for by your peace fanatics, Cobden and Elihu Burritt, and human wisdom can devise none to be compared with that which Providence has provided in the Catholic Church. The history of the modern world since her umpirage, formerly recognized, has been generally rejected by European nations, the long and bloody wars that have since raged, the large standing armies that are kept up, the immense national debts that have been contracted, the tremendous influence on politics and national movements exercised by Jewish bankers, the present unsettled state of society, the high-handed measures of government, and the general poverty and suffering of the agricultural laboring class throughout Europe, prove the absolute madness of these nations in attempting to proceed without the umpirage of the Church, and the absolute necessity of its restoration. Nations without that umpirage are in the condition of a population without government. They are as nations in a state of anarchy, and an anarchy as to their external relations necessarily superinduces anarchy or despotism as to their internal relations. Right yields to might, and justice deserts the habitations of men. Even humanly speaking, then, since the power must exist somewhere, and its exercise is necessary, the Church is its proper depository.

The Reviewer cannot conclude against the Church from the supposed intrinsic wrong of the power in question. He can conclude against her only on the ground that, though the power is good and just enough in itself considered, she has it not by divine right, but has usurped it. But in order to take this ground he must unchurch her; for if she be the Church of God, the true spiritual authority, she must necessarily have this power by divine right, since it is inherent in the spiritual authority as such. The Reviewer forgets this. He quietly takes it for granted that the temporal authority, if not absolutely supreme, is at least absolutely independent, and in no respect whatever subject to the control or supervision of the spiritual authority. He proceeds as a politician, looks solely to the state, and is indifferent to religion so long as it touches no matters of interest to the secular power, but holds that the secular power has the right to repel it, if it does any thing of the sort. He understands by religious liberty freedom from religious

obligation, the right of the state to have no religion, and to brush religion out of its way if it presumes to interfere between it and the realization of its plans, or the execution of its purposes. He in reality makes the state his religion, his church, and claims for it the rights and prerogatives which the Christian claims for the spiritual authority. This is the tendency of politicians in all ages, and in no age more than in our own. It is at bottom only the same general tendency of the flesh to rule the spirit which every Christian has to struggle against, and which causes all the confusion experienced in the bosom of the individual and of society. But religion is the *lex suprema*, and its perfect freedom, independence, is necessarily its supremacy. It is the supreme law or it is nothing; and if the supreme law, it is for states no less than for subjects, for princes are as much bound to obey the law of God as their subjects, and in their public as in their private relations. Religion is supreme over all men, of whatever rank or dignity, and in every department of life, individual or social, private or public, for no one in any rank or relation has any right to be irreligious; and to deny this is simply to deny religion itself. If then we suppose a church at all, that is, a divinely instituted authority, commissioned to teach, to interpret, and declare the law of God, we must suppose it supreme, and in all cases paramount to the temporal power; that it is the church that prescribes the sphere of the temporal, within which it is free, and not the state that prescribes the sphere of the church. The spiritual by its own essential nature defines the temporal, and therefore the powers of the state, and at the same time its own powers. Consequently, in every case of a collision of the two authorities, the temporal, not the spiritual, must yield. We must obey God rather than men, and therefore in every case the spiritual authority rather than the temporal, for the temporal loses its divine right to command, and becomes a purely human authority, which is no authority at all, the moment it commands any thing contrary to the spiritual authority, commissioned to interpret and declare the law of God.

That this conclusion will not be subscribed to by "loyal and patriotic Englishmen" is very possible, but we cannot stultify ourselves in order to gain even their subscription. The fact is as we state it, in the very nature of things; and do not let us so besot ourselves as to suppose that we can hold

religion as religion, and yet subject it to the state, or withdraw the state from its control. Do let us be one thing or another. Either pronounce all religion a cheat, an imposition, mere priestcraft, or else accept it as divine, and authorized by God himself to speak in his name, and therefore with the majesty of supreme authority. It is either one or the other, and there is no medium. Read M. Proudhon. He will tell you, and prove to you too, with an invincible logic, with a terrible consistency, that we only betray our folly and cowardice when we seek to find some middle ground, a *via media*, and that you must deny all religion, the very sovereignty of God, or else concede the supremacy of religion, and recognize in the chair of St. Peter the plenitude of power asserted by St. Gregory the Seventh, Innocent the Third, and Boniface the Eighth. How the iron logic of this bold blasphemer puts to shame the timid and hesitating dialectics of the bravest Protestant!

The Reviewer, doubtless, is far better qualified to speak for loyal and patriotic Englishmen than we are; but, if he does not misrepresent them, they are extremely deficient in religious knowledge, and have not yet learned the first question and answer of the Catechism. The spiritual is not for the temporal; the temporal is for the spiritual, as the body is for the soul, not the soul for the body. What absurdity to contend that the body should govern the soul, or to allege that the soul transcends its sphere whenever it prescribes the law to the body and attempts to restrain its appetites and propensities! Man's only destiny is eternal life, to see and enjoy God in the beatific vision. For this and this alone the law of God commands him to live, and the temporal can be legitimate only as rendered subordinate and subservient to this end. Man has no temporal destiny, properly speaking, and his only destiny is spiritual, eternal. The temporal order, therefore, has and can have no temporal destiny, no destiny in the temporal, and consequently has its destiny or its end only in the spiritual order. Society, the whole secular order itself, has no secular end, and exists only in reference to the spiritual destiny of man, and is to be regarded only in so far as made subservient to the salvation of the soul. The state is instituted for the management of secular affairs, it is true, and it has no right to meddle with any others; but it is bound to manage these affairs under the spiritual law for the spiritual end, and

therefore under the law of which the spiritual authority is the interpreter, and for an end which God through that authority prescribes. Evidently, then, the spiritual authority, however constituted, to whose handssoever committed by Almighty God, is by its own nature supreme in regard to the whole secular order, because confessedly supreme in all that regards man's spiritual destiny, and therefore under God the sovereign of all temporal sovereigns, of all emperors, kings, princes, states, no less than of individuals employed in the immediate service of the sanctuary. The Church, then, if the true Church, if the divinely instituted spiritual authority, has, we do not say temporal authority, for that we do not claim for her, but plenary spiritual power over the whole temporal order, and necessarily possesses by divine right all the power over princes and their subjects she is alleged to have claimed and exercised. These powers are hers, not merely by an express grant of temporal authority, but because they are inherent in her as the spiritual authority. It is then supremely ridiculous to attempt to unchurch her by proving that she has claimed and exercised them. If what she claims to be, she cannot but possess them, and cannot but have the divine right to exercise them. You must, then, prove that she is not the Church of God, that she is not the divinely instituted spiritual authority, before you can object either to her having exercised or to her having claimed them.

We claim power of any sort for the Church only on the ground that she is what she professes to be, the true Church of God, representing the authority of God in his plenitude on earth. We hold her divinely commissioned to teach, interpret, and apply the law of God to all cases that can arise in any department of human life. If she is not thus commissioned, she is a false church, an impostor, and we recognize in her no authority at all. You need not, then, be frightened at our Ultramontaniam. If she is what she claims to be, she is infallible, and then all her decisions must be infallibly just and true. Are you among those who fear justice and hate the truth? Yes? Then you condemn yourself. No? Then what more do you want? You have yourself begun by saying, that "none can be more convinced than ourselves of the truth of the declaration which we often find in the Acts of Roman Synods, that 'there is no better rule than that of an infallible church.' This

we think persons." Do understand, then, that infallibility means infallibility and that the decisions of an infallible church are infallible. An infallible church can act in appointing and commanding the faithful either to believe or to do. What, then, do your loyal and patriotic Englishmen fear? What can they fear when they are conscientiously convinced that she is God's Church? If she has deposed temporal sovereigns, can you not see that it is impossible for her to be deposed, and that she was right in deposing them? If she releases subjects from their allegiance, that they are released by the will of God, and she has the power to release them? and if she punishes heretics, that heretics deserve to be punished, and she has the right to punish them? Do understand that the infallibility of the actor necessarily comes along with the infallibility of the act. If the Church is infallible, what more do you want? Do you want an independent guaranty that she will not abuse her infallibility? Is not the infallibility itself the best guaranty that you can have or desire? Do you deny her infallibility? Then you are not concerned in the matter, for you are not going any farther the duty of those whose consciences compel them to refuse to her communion, and so their consciences are wounded but not so much as if a sovereign that she is what she professes to be, therefore infallible. But deny her infallibility. If you do so, and admit that she is not what she professes to be, we will then consider just as you did, and conclude that to have under her authority to be changed by you that any one of your own kind. But we deny that from the simple fact of her being created and sustained by powers not subject to you and conclude that she has acted, for I conclude, as a naturally certain and she says she then and has the right to claim and exercise them, and you in denying it are only blaspheming the *Infallible Church* of God. Suppose, then, as you do, that the Church has exercised the prerogative to which you are "bound and possess the *Thronian* signed with the," you will conclude for as much for such an infallible Church, but can be persuaded to deny that the Church is. The Governor will therefore perceive that we are not so far from the Church when we say we are a fact and a reality is constant, and in what we express is his conclusion is.

Nevertheless the Governor does not withhold the fact

that the Church has asserted the principles to which he contends Englishmen cannot subscribe. We are well aware of the passages he cites from St. Gregory the Seventh, Innocent the Third, and Boniface the Eighth; but we must tell him that these passages do not sustain his allegation,—not, as he supposes, because we hold the utterances of the organ of infallibility are sometimes fallible, and sometimes not, for we hold no such thing; but because it does not appear that they are utterances of that organ at all. We do not, in saying this, abandon the Ultramontane ground. We accept the Papal infallibility; but that infallibility is not, even on Ultramontane principles, a personal prerogative of the Pope. It attaches to his office, not to himself personally, and therefore he is the organ of infallibility only when speaking in his official character, and officially deciding a point of faith or morals for the Church. We say *faith or morals*, because it is only in questions of faith or morals that any Catholic asserts the infallibility of the Church, whether speaking through the Sovereign Pontiff or a general council, or, in fine, through the body of her bishops teaching in communion with their chief, the successor of St. Peter, each in his own diocese. We concede to the Reviewer that the Pope is infallible in interpreting the Scriptures, and that the great Popes cited do support their claim of the deposing and absolving power by the sacred text; but as we assert the infallibility of the Pope only when deciding officially, *ex cathedra*, a question of faith or morals, we are obliged to hold the Pope infallible only in reference to the precise point before him to be decided. When the question before him is the interpretation of the sacred text, we concede his infallibility; but nothing obliges us to hold him infallible in interpreting it, when its interpretation is not, so to speak, the question before the court. The interpretation is then an *obiter dictum*, and, though deserving of great respect, is not a declaration of the law. The rule that obtains in the civil courts, and with which every lawyer is presumed to be familiar, is the rule that obtains here. Now, in the instances the Reviewer cites, the Popes were not defining the faith, nor judicially interpreting the sacred text, but simply arguing from it and theological reason in justification of their acts; that is, they were reasoning, and not defining, and therefore their utterances cited were not the utterances of the organ

of infallibility. This is evident from the fact that these utterances are not articles of faith, and are not insisted on as such by Ultramontanes, since, if they were, the Gallicans, who do not accept them, would in the view of Ultramontanes be held to be heretics, which is not the fact; for the Gallican is admitted to be a Catholic, and the dispute with him turns on a question confessedly not of faith. Whatever principles the Church has asserted or asserts are confessedly, in the view of all Catholics, of faith; but as these principles are conceded even by those who hold them not to be of faith, it follows that the Church has never asserted them.

We in this are far from saying that the principles set forth by the Popes referred to are not true, very far from admitting that these great Popes erred in what they said. All we say is, that they did not define the matters involved, and therefore that what they said is not formally of faith, and if not formally of faith no Catholic can be held under pain of heresy to accept it, or obliged by his faith to assert the principles involved. All that the Catholic is obliged on Ultramontane principles to maintain is the divine right of the Popes to do what in the cases alleged they did do, and to exercise the same power in all analogous cases. This much of course he must maintain. But in taking the ground that the views presented by the Popes of their own powers are not to be regarded as definitions of faith, we do not by any means, as the Reviewer imagines, render it doubtful to whose hands the infallible authority is confided, within what limits the utterances of the organ of infallibility are infallible, and what are the utterances themselves. He says we render these three things doubtful, and thus destroy the infallible church as a rule, because we must settle them before we can use it, and we have and can have only private judgment with which to settle them. We dispute hopelessly, he says, as to the seat of infallibility. We are obliged, in order not to accuse infallibility of erring, to contend that the utterances of the organ of infallibility are sometimes infallible and sometimes not, and can never decide which of its utterances are to be received as infallible, and which are to be counted fallible. These preliminary difficulties are conclusive against the Church as an available rule, and render it more perplexing for a Catholic with his infallible Church to know what he

ought to believe and do, than it is for a Protestant who makes no pretensions to an infallible church. The Reviewer is a man of a fertile fancy. Yet Protestants insist so often and so strenuously on this objection, here put in its strongest form, that we are sometimes inclined to believe that they do really persuade themselves that there is some force in it.

The Reviewer says we dispute hopelessly among ourselves as to the seat or organ of infallibility. We have, he alleges, four theories amongst us on this point, one that the Pope alone, a second that the council alone, a third that the Pope and council conjointly, and a fourth that the Universal Church diffusely, is the organ of infallibility. He evidently supposes, or wishes to insinuate, that these are four exclusive and mutually hostile theories, and that he who accepts any one of them must necessarily deny the others. He perhaps is not so well informed as he thinks. From these four theories we must strike the second, for nobody contends that the council alone is infallible, and for the excellent reason that there is no such thing as an œcumenical council without the Pope, and only œcumenical councils are ever held to be infallible. Then, of the remaining three, we must remind the Reviewer that they are not three *theories* as to the seat of infallibility, but three modes or respects in which the Church is held to be infallible, and the assertion of one involves no denial of the other two. The Pope and council conjointly is simply the council, neither more nor less, and all Catholics without a single exception hold the council infallible in all matters of faith and morals. "The Universal Church diffusely" means, we suppose, what our theologians term the *Ecclesia dispersa*, or Church dispersed, in distinction from the *Ecclesia congregata*, or Church assembled in general council. The Church in this sense, again, is held by all Catholics to be infallible, and what in this sense she teaches, to be of faith. The infallibility of the Church in these two respects, assembled and dispersed, is of faith, and no man can deny it and be a Catholic. In addition, all, except a few individuals, — now chiefly laymen, devoted to politics, ambitious of state or court favor, or desirous of introducing political changes which are repugnant either in themselves or in the manner of introducing them to Christian morals, and who are called Gallicans, although the Gallican

hierarchy disowns them,—hold that the Sovereign Pontiff alone, when defining officially, *ex cathedra*, a question of faith or morals, is also infallible. Those who hold and those who deny the Pope's infallibility hold, be it remembered, the Church to be infallible in the other two respects mentioned. All the dispute there is amongst us is then confined to the first-named mode, that is, whether the Pope, *loquens ex cathedra*, be or be not infallible. But even here the dispute has little practical importance, for the Gallican holds that he is bound to receive the Papal definitions and constitutions as infallible, unless there is a reclamation against them, and a reclamation cannot be made, for the first bishop who should reclaim would be *ipso facto* excommunicated. The Gallican is not permitted to dispute any definition of the Pope when it is actually made, and he never does it. Bossuet, we believe, concedes that there is no instance of an erroneous Papal definition recorded, and there is never a question whether the Papal definitions actually made are or are not of faith. The Gallican bishops accepted at once, as the infallible voice of the Church, the Papal condemnation of the five propositions extracted from the book of Jansenius, and the Jansenists themselves acknowledged the authority of the Pope and the infallibility of his definition of the doctrine, and only objected that the Pope is not infallible in deciding a question of fact, such as whether the five propositions were contained or not in the book of Jansenius. The propositions they agreed were to be condemned as heretical, but as to the fact whether they were contained in Jansenius or not, they wished to maintain a respectful silence. But the Gallican bishops rejected this distinction as a vain subterfuge, insisted that the Papal constitution was infallible, and as to the question of fact no less than as to the question of doctrine.

The Reviewer says that the theory which ascribes infallibility to "the Universal Church diffusely" is unintelligible. "The Universal Church resembles some gas, enormously voluminous and elastic; it has no visible dimensions, no tangible solidity. It is a nebulous matter, of which the orb of truth may be a *making*, for aught we know, but of which it has never yet been made." No man appears to advantage who writes on what he does not un-

derstand. The Universal Church, as the Reviewer understands it, may, if he will pardon the bull, be unintelligible; but as a Catholic understands it, it is very intelligible. It consists of the whole body of pastors or bishops in communion with the Pope, their visible head and visible centre of unity. A body with a visible centre and a visible head cannot, except in Scotch metaphysics, be destitute of visible dimensions or tangible solidity. The Church dispersed, of which we predicate infallibility, is composed of these bishops or pastors teaching in communion with the successor of St. Peter, each in his own diocese. This is the ordinary way in which the Church teaches, and it is only when errors arise, and there are heresies to be anathematized, that she ever teaches in any other way. To know what she teaches in this way is always an easy matter. By virtue of the Papacy, the episcopacy is held by the bishops *in solido*, each standing for all and all for each. All must respectively agree with the Pope, and if all respectively agree with him, all, by a well-known mathematical axiom, must respectively agree with one another. To know, then, what the Universal Church teaches, you have only to consult the first bishop you meet, we care not if a Gallican bishop, in communion with the Pope, or your parish priest approved by his bishop. All the talk, then, about the doubtfulness of the seat of infallibility amounts to nothing. The Gallican is, no doubt, more or less inconsequent, that is, not a good reasoner, but he can always learn without difficulty what the Church commands him either to believe or to do; and the Ultramontane, though asserting the Papal infallibility, asserts nothing to be of faith which the Gallican does not also assert; for he does not assert the Papal infallibility as an article of faith, or hold it to be of faith in such a sense that speculative denial of it must subject one to canonical censure for heresy.

The second difficulty we have already resolved. The utterances of the organ of infallibility, whether the Pope, the Council, or the Church dispersed, are infallible without any limitation; but the Pope, although infallible when that organ, is not always it, or does not always speak as it, and what he says in any other character is not necessarily the voice of the Church. Doubtless, we must use reason to determine when he is defining a question of faith or morals, or is only arguing or acting in regard to matters on which no

Catholic claims infallibility for the Church ; but this does not concede that we are forced to rely on private judgment to say when the utterances of the organ are infallible and when not. Not every exercise of reason is a private judgment. The proper exercise of reason on those matters to which reason is competent is in no respect a private judgment, because it is not a judgment of reason as peculiar to this or that individual, but as common to all men. Private judgment is only when the matters judged lie out of the range of reason, and its principle is not the common reason of mankind, nor a catholic or public authority, but the fancy, the caprice, the prejudice, or the idiosyncrasy of the individual forming it. Catholicity does not supersede, it presupposes, reason ; and no Catholic so understands the rule of an infallible church as to suppose it can be adopted and made available, or applied, without any use of reason. The Church addresses herself to men as creatures endowed with reason, and as using their reason and using it reasonably. The point in the case before us for reason to decide is, not whether this or that utterance of the organ of infallibility is infallible, but is this or that an utterance of the recognized organ of infallibility. The former is out of the province of reason, and, if we were obliged to decide it by natural reason alone, we should be obliged to rely on private judgment ; but the latter is within the competency of reason, and its decision by reason is not an act of private judgment. The case, moreover, presents no difficulty, for the definitions of the Church or of the Pope are always rendered in clear and precise language, and bear on their very face the unmistakable marks of their real character. The documents which we must consult are official documents, which speak for themselves, and are as easily distinguished as the enactments of a legislature, the edicts of a king, or the judicial decisions of civil courts. It is only those that come in an official form that we are obliged to receive as authoritative, and therefore as infallible. Consequently, there is no inquiry as to within what limits the utterances are infallible, and no difficulty in determining what are the utterances of the infallible organ.

It follows from what we have said, that we can take either horn of the Reviewer's dilemma without any grave inconvenience. If we say the Church has asserted "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot

subscribe," nothing obliges us to concede that she has erred, because the inability of Englishmen to subscribe may be their own fault, and can weigh nothing against the Church, and because the principles in question are evidently inherent in the spiritual power. If we choose to deny that those principles are of faith, we can do so without denying the Papal infallibility, because the Pope has never defined them to be of faith. If, again, we choose to go farther, and deny, with the Gallican, that the Pope possesses by divine right the deposing and absolving power, we can do so without being forced to rely on private judgment, with the Protestant, or losing the infallible Church as the rule of faith.

We have said we are bound to hold that the Pope had the right to depose temporal sovereigns, and to absolve their subjects from their allegiance. Thus far all Catholics are agreed. We hold with Ultramontanes that he possessed the power he claimed and exercised by divine right; Gallicans, as well as we, hold that he had the power, but contend that he held it, *jure humano*, by the will of the people, or the concession of Catholic sovereigns. The Catholic people and sovereigns, of course, consented to the exercise of the power, or else the Pope could not have exercised it, at least with any effect; but we do not believe that the right to exercise it was conferred by them, for it appears to us plainly inherent in the spiritual authority as such, and Saint Gregory the Seventh, Innocent the Third, and Boniface the Eighth manifestly claim it, not as a temporal, but as a spiritual power. The Gallican view, though not contrary to the faith, seems to us to be a questionable expedient for relieving the apprehensions of the temporal authority, conciliating civil tyrants, and retaining court favor, and fitted to pave the way for withdrawing the state from its subjection to the law of God, or, what is the same thing, permitting it to interpret and declare that law for itself. But it may be well to examine the cases in which the deposing and absolving power has been exercised.

That the Popes have, in certain cases, deposed temporal sovereigns, and absolved their subjects from their allegiance, is undoubtedly true; and that they have a right to do so, in all analogous cases, we suppose must be conceded, whether we adopt Ultramontane or Gallican doctrines. But they have done so in no case that need alarm the

delicate loyalty and patriotism of either a Catholic or a Protestant Englishman. The power has never been exercised over an infidel prince, or one who was not a spiritual subject of the Pope, and bound by his profession, the tenure of his crown, and the constitution and laws of his realm, to protect and defend the Catholic religion. Such was the case with Henry the Fourth of Germany, and such was the case with the Albigensian Counts of Thoulouse. Such, too, was the case with Elizabeth of England, a case, perhaps, as favorable to the Reviewer as can be selected. She was excommunicated by Saint Pius the Fifth, deposed, and her subjects absolved from their allegiance. But she had personally professed the Catholic religion, had succeeded to the crown as a Catholic, when the Catholic constitution of England was still in force, and the Catholic religion was part and parcel of the law of the land. She was bound by her profession, her coronation oath, the tenure of her crown, and the laws of her realm, to be a Catholic, and to protect and defend the Catholic religion. When she turned heretic, violated the constitution of her kingdom, oppressed her subjects, abolished Catholicity, expelled the Catholic bishops from their sees, set up a new hierarchy of her own creation, and persecuted, exiled, imprisoned, hung, and beheaded Catholics for adhering to their religion, she deserved excommunication for her heresy and wickedness, and deposition for her intolerable tyranny. The Protestants of England themselves would instantly depose their present amiable and popular queen were she to become a Catholic, and they would contend that they have the right to do so, because she holds her crown only inasmuch as she is a Protestant, and is bound by her coronation oath to protect and defend the Protestant religion as by law established. What they hold it compatible with their loyalty and patriotism to do to their queen for embracing the true faith and seeking a heavenly crown, the Pope could well do to Elizabeth for abolishing the true faith, establishing heresy, and persecuting true believers; and if the Pope permitted the king of Spain to attempt to drive her from her throne, they have nothing to say, for they count it gloriously loyal and patriotic to have called in Dutch William to expel his father-in-law, the Catholic James the Second. Loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot complain of the Church for having done, in favor of the constitution,

the laws, and the religion of England, what Protestants glory in having done against them.

It is evident from an analysis of all the cases of deposition that can be cited, that the Popes have always respect to the constitution of the civil power, and that, when they interpose against the sovereign, it is always to vindicate the rights of the nation invaded by the prince. Where a sovereign has made no war on the constitution and laws of his realm, where he has been faithful to his obligations, and has preserved the tenure of his crown, and ruled justly, according to the constitution and laws, the Pope has never claimed the power to depose him, or to absolve his subjects. It is clear, then, that the present queen of Great Britain, in case she does not persecute Catholics, and deny them the freedom of their religion, does not come within the category of any of those cases in which the Popes have asserted the deposing and absolving power. She is a Protestant, it is true; but she has violated no law of her kingdom in being one, and breaks no obligation which as queen she has taken by remaining one. There is no principle ever asserted by the Church on which, were her subjects to become Catholics, she could be deposed. Her Catholic subjects now owe her allegiance, and are bound by the Church to obey her in all things not repugnant to the law of God, and the fact of the rest of her subjects becoming Catholics could work no change in her rights, or in their obligations to her as temporal sovereign. To say that Catholics cannot be bound to obey an heretical prince is not true. Belgium is a Catholic nation, and yet the prince is Protestant. The Pope has not absolved them from their allegiance. The Catholic subjects of Prussia are held to owe allegiance to their sovereign, as much as are the subjects of Austria to their pious young emperor. The Apostle, speaking by the Holy Ghost, commands believers to obey even the heathen emperors of Rome, and heresy, when there is nothing in the constitution of the state against it, obviously can no more work a forfeiture of the rights of sovereigns than paganism or infidelity. Doubtless, the Church would claim to decide for Catholics what things are contrary to the law of God, and what are not; but this she does now for those subjects of Queen Victoria who have the happiness to be Catholics. Obviously, the rights of the queen to her throne, and the duties of her subjects, in case they should become Catholics, would remain unaffected.

There is nothing in the Catholic religion at war with loyalty and patriotism, so long as loyalty and patriotism are confined within the bounds of virtue, and are not made pretexts for encroaching on the freedom of the spiritual authority in all things spiritual. Doubtless, such loyalty and patriotism as that of the Duke of Norfolk and Lord Beaumont are not compatible with our duty as Catholics, nor even as enlightened and upright statesmen. Every good Catholic must, of course, place God before the king, the Church before the state; but this only makes him the more loyal as a subject, and the more worthy as a citizen. Loyal and patriotic Englishmen may object to this, and insist that the state shall be independent of the law of God; but we cannot assert religion at all without asserting it, and not to assert it would be only to leave open the door to absolute civil despotism. We know no way of reconciling Catholicity with atheistical politics, no way of rendering religion acceptable to infidel politicians, and we shall not attempt to do it.

In direct reply, then, to the Reviewer's question, as to what will be the duty of Englishmen to the constitution and realm of England when their consciences compel them to return to our communion, we answer that it will be,—1. To expunge from the constitution and laws all those provisions which are directed against the Catholic religion, to free the queen from the obligation imposed by Parliament to remain a Protestant, and to give her liberty, if she chooses, to become a Catholic and aspire to a heavenly crown, without forfeiting her earthly crown; and 2. To preserve inviolate, in all other respects, the constitution and laws of the realm, and loyally to obey the sovereign in all things not repugnant to the law of God, as interpreted, declared, and administered by the Church through her proper organs. This reply is clear and distinct, and in strict logical and historical harmony with the principles which the Church has asserted and acted on for eighteen hundred years, and is repugnant by no principle the Church or the Popes have ever asserted. Nothing is more certain, than that the Church recognizes the civil power as distinct from herself, and autonomous in its own sphere. The supremacy she claims is not a temporal, but a spiritual supremacy; and consists not in the claim to exercise civil power, but in the right to prescribe under God the morality of the state, to

prescribe the end for which civil society exists, and as to their morality the means by which that end is to be gained. She denies to the state all competency in spirituals, and asserts that it is bound to observe in all its acts the law of God, of which she is the divinely commissioned guardian and judge. So long as the state respects her authority as this guardian and judge, and faithfully seeks by lawful means the true end of civil government, she leaves it free to pursue its own course, and commands her children to be loyal and obedient to it.

The Church, in fact, treats the civil government, as far as the nature of the case admits, precisely as she does the individual. If the individual is simply a Catholic layman, with no other obligations to her than those contracted in his baptismal vows, she demands of him only the fulfilment of those vows; but if he has contracted special obligations towards her, or has received from her special trusts, she demands the fulfilment of them; and if he refuses, she revokes the trusts, and punishes him for his breach of faith. So, if a sovereign contracts special obligations to her, and holds his authority on condition of fulfilling them, she demands their fulfilment; and, if she judges it meet, she deposes him, if he obstinately persists in violating them. This is all just and reasonable, if we admit any church or spiritual authority at all. Queen Victoria has contracted no special obligations to the Church, and is not bound to perform any special duties towards her. The England of former times was Catholic, had a Catholic constitution, and its special duties to the Catholic religion; but the England of our times is Protestant, and its conversion to the Catholic religion will not revive the England that was, and the old relations between its government and the Holy See. It will be the conversion to the faith of a new kingdom, and the special relations between it and the Holy See will depend on the arrangements that may be mutually determined upon. In the mean time, the relations of Catholic Englishmen to the civil power come under the general rule, and in that there is nothing to absolve them from their allegiance to their queen, so long as she does not persecute the Catholic religion, and so long as she rules justly, according to the constitution and laws of her realm.

As to the question of persecution raised by the Review, and the alleged duty of temporal princes to extirpate heresy

from their dominions, we have only a word to say; for it will be time enough to discuss it at length when Protestants cease to persecute the Church. It is not in reply to an English or Scotch Reviewer in 1850 or 1851, that we shall attempt to prove that ours is not a persecuting Church. The old penal laws against Catholics are not yet all wiped out from the English statute-books, and the recent Ecclesiastical Titles Act, which renders the exercise of the Catholic religion in Great Britain contrary to the civil law, shows what sort of friends of religious freedom English Protestants are. No matter what the pretences are, the recent law is an act of pure persecution, and as such it would make even Protestants ashamed, if shame they had, of calling themselves the friends of religious liberty. The Reviewer's impudence in pretending to be the advocate of religious liberty while approving that law, is a little too great to permit us to treat him with that courtesy which we always wish to observe towards an opponent. As for the Church, she asserts the freedom of religion, but she does not, that we are aware, assert the freedom either of heresy or of infidelity. She does not profess liberality, nor boast toleration as one of her glories; but she has never authorized the punishment of heretics with other than ecclesiastical censures, save when and where they have attacked the legally established order of things. The Church is a kingdom, a spiritual society, and it is ridiculous to say that she has not as much right to defend and protect herself as any civil society has to protect itself. When a class of heretics, like the Albigenses, arise and attack both her and civil society, not with spiritual weapons alone, but with fire and sword, burning her churches and convents, violating her religious, massacring her priests, and assassinating her cardinals and legates, she has the right, if she has the right to be at all, to call in the civil arm to protect her; nay, to call upon the princes whose subjects these enemies of religion and pests of society are, and who are bound by their oaths and the constitutions of their states to defend her, to extirpate them from their dominions; and to depose them, if, instead of doing it, they favor them. This is the only sort of persecution the Church has authorized, and we shall not so insult good sense or outrage common justice as to apologize for it. We should as soon think of apologizing for shutting up a thief in prison, or hanging a cold-blooded murderer.

This is not persecution, it is only just punishment; nay, only necessary self-defence. But where heretics demean themselves as good citizens, where they respect the peace of society and the freedom of religion, the Church never calls in the secular arm against them, or makes it the duty of sovereigns to extirpate them. She uses only spiritual arms against them. The charge of persecution, so confidently urged against her, is the thief crying out "Stop thief!" in order to divert the pursuit from himself.

We have now replied to all in the article that has struck us as in any sense deserving of notice. We have spoken freely, frankly, plainly; more so than we should have done, if we were not at times disgusted with the timidity and trimming of some English, as well as American Catholics. We may talk as we will, and trim as we please, but so long as we retain any thing really Catholic we shall not satisfy infidel, or even Protestant statesmen, who place politics above religion. The fact is, Catholicity cannot be made to please those who hate all religion, and whose affections are placed on this world alone. The carnal Jews crucified our Blessed Lord between two thieves; and their spiritual descendants cannot be expected to do less to his Spouse. The world hated our Lord, for he was not of it, and it hates and will hate his Church, for she is not of the world. Her aims are not its aims, and her maxims are not its maxims. It was so in the beginning, is so now, and will be so to the end. "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon," and it is in vain that ye try. There is no use in apologizing for serving God, or for remaining in all things faithful to his Church. In trying to prove that your Church favors the liberalism of the day, and offers no opposition to atheistical politics, seldom out of fashion, you do her and yourselves foul wrong, and conciliate no favor for either. You grieve your Church, you impede her free and energetic action, and render Catholicity, as far as depends on you, weak and languishing. We have a great respect for Lord Arundel and Surry, and we admit that he deserves great credit, considering who he is and what are his environments, but we should respect him more, and regard him as more likely to be a successful Catholic leader, if he assumed a higher tone, and asserted with more boldness the absolute supremacy of the spiritual order over the secular. The Church can be injured only by Catholics, and Catholics can receive harm

only from themselves. If English Catholics had had a more filial affection for Rome, more of the spirit of St. Anselm and of St. Thomas of Canterbury, and less of that which dictated the Constitutions of Clarendon, if they had been as prompt to obey the Church as they have always been to sustain their princes in their encroachments upon her prerogatives, they would never have had the affliction of seeing their religion proscribed by law in their own country, and a false religion established in its place. Nationalism has from the first been the curse of England, and till English Catholics learn that the Lord loves an Italian, a Frenchman, a Spaniard, as well as an Englishman, they need not hope for the return of their country to the Church. They have always been too ready to side with the secular order against the spiritual, and till they correct this fault, they may be sure the state will despise and trample on them.

We trust that we appreciate the delicate position of English Catholics, and we are far from disregarding the admonitions of prudence; but in our times, and indeed in all times, the truest prudence is fidelity to God, and full confidence in his truth. We are too apt to forget that the Church does not stand in human policy or human wisdom, that she is under the special protection of Almighty God, and that he will bless no efforts to serve her, the glory of which will not redound to him. We rely too much on ourselves, and not enough on him, and take counsel of our own short-sighted wisdom rather than of the Holy Ghost. We must not be afraid to trust all to God. The truth will sustain itself, and is needed to sustain us, instead of our being needed to sustain it. We regard the free, frank, and energetic assertion of those great principles, which so many Catholics are afraid to avow, and are always seeking to explain away, as the most prudent course now to be adopted. The Church was founded by our Lord on Peter, and every attempt to lessen the power of the Holy See, to diminish respect for the Supreme Pontiff, is only an attempt to undermine the foundation of the Church. The Greek empire could not bear to acknowledge the supremacy of Peter; it withheld from Rome her due, and she fell into schism, and became the prey or the slave of the proud infidel barbarian. Northern Germany would separate between the Church and the Pope, and she has fallen

into schism, heresy, infidelity, and wellnigh lapsed into her old heathenism; England would distinguish between the Pope and the court of Rome, and has become a jest and a byword among the nations. Every nation that has refused filial love and reverence to the chair of Peter has been hurled from the seat of its greatness, as France, Spain, and Portugal can bear witness. The only true policy, the only true wisdom in our times, is in exalting the chair of Peter, and energetically asserting the pontifical authority, and the universal supremacy of the spiritual order. The salvation of the world in more senses than one depends on the Holy See, and on a loyal submission and filial obedience in all things to the successor of St. Peter. We confess, then, that we are grieved to see distinguished Catholic statesmen searching history to find examples of resistance to the Papal authority by the temporal power, and concluding from them that a man may be a Catholic and also loyal to his temporal sovereign. Let us, in God's name, have no more of this. Let us dare assert the truth in the face of the lying world, and, instead of pleading for our Church at the bar of the state, summon the state itself to plead at the bar of the Church, its divinely constituted judge. The state may become enraged, may confiscate our goods, prohibit our worship, shut up our churches and religious houses, imprison, exile, or massacre us; but what then? Such things have been, but they have never been able, so long as Catholics retained their fervor, to injure the Church or retard her progress. These things are powerful against us only when our faith is weak, and our love waxes cold. Who has God on his side has no occasion to fear men or devils.